Discussing
the problematic functioning of Sri Lanka's NHRC
There is no doubt that independence of human
rights institutions is of the essence. This principle is heavily
emphasized by The Paris Principles on National Human Rights Institutions
(1993) endorsed by the UN General Assembly. The Paris Principles
are widely considered to be the seminal body of guidelines against
which the effectiveness of national human rights institutions ought
to be measured. The Principles point to several aspects of independence
that national human rights institutions must possess.
It is good that the Minister for Human Rights Mahinda
Samarasinghe has directed that "there is nothing in law"
impeding Sri Lanka's NHRC consideration of two thousand cases of
disappearances that the previous Commissioners had decided should
be looked into by this body.
To recollect what was examined in last week's
column, the crisis of public confidence currently affecting the
independence of the NHRC after the present Commissioners were appointed
by President Mahinda Rajapaksa bypassing mandated approval of the
Constitutional Council (CC) was aggravated by the Commissioners
deciding last week, to stop inquiring into complaints of over 2000
disappearances of persons in the past. An extremely disturbing reason
had been advanced by the Commissioners for the stopping of its inquiries;
viz,"for the time being, unless special directions are received
from the government." As taken verbatim from the note of the
Secretary to the HRC dated 29.6.2006, this is due to the fact that
"the findings will result in payment of compensation, etc."
These 2000 disappearances were a small part of
an estimated 60,000 disappearances of persons owing to both the
ethnic conflict in the North and the civil conflict in the South.
The victims spanned the broad compass of all ethnicities in Sri
Lanka: viz, Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims. Many of these complainants
had not received reparation for the disappearances or had been informed
as to what had happened to their loved ones despite the decades
that had passed since the enforced disappearances.
Minister Samarasinghe's intervention should not
have been warranted in the first instance. However, the very fact
of this intervention should not detract from the fact that the status
quo needs to be set to rights where the NHRC is concerned without
delay. The present appointments need to be set aside and upon the
constitution of the needs to be appointed properly following the
mandated constitutional procedures and after its members are approved
by the Constitutional Council. Equally, basic gaps in the law under
which the NHRC is established needs to be redressed.
There is no doubt that independence of human rights
institutions is of the essence. This principle is heavily emphasized
by The Paris Principles on National Human Rights Institutions (1993)
endorsed by the UN General Assembly. The Paris Principles are widely
considered to be the seminal body of guidelines against which the
effectiveness of national human rights institutions ought to be
measured. The Principles point to several aspects of independence
that national human rights institutions must possess.
Sri Lanka's NHRC is established under an act of
parliament (Act, No 21 of 1996). It is imperative that amendments
to Act, No 21 of 1996 should be made. Currently, section 3 (1) of
the Act stipulates that the members of the NHRC may be "…chosen
from among persons having knowledge of, or practical experience
in, matters relating to human rights." These requirements are
vague and should be replaced by stricter standards. Section 3(1)
of the Act should be amended as follows, in order to require a high
level integrity and commitment to human rights from those who are
appointed as members: …chosen from among men and women who
are independent of government and are known for their integrity
and proven expertise and competence in the field of protecting and
promoting human rights. They should be drawn from a variety of disciplines
including relevant professional groups and the non-governmental
sector." (See Amnesty International Proposed Standards for
National Human Rights Commissions (1993)).
Moreover, members to the NHRC must be appointed
on a full time basis and the Act must be amended to reflect this
requirement. Currently, the membership is restricted to five. The
Act should mandate that members, if they are public servants or
are in semi-public service, be released on leave for the duration
of the membership without affecting their seniority and other benefits
of employment.
Another problematic feature of the Act are the
powers conferred on "the Minister" (unspecified portfolio)
to make regulations regarding the implementation of the Act, including
regulations regarding the conducting of investigations by the NHRA
(section 31). Section 31 of the Act should be repealed. Similarly,
the Act must be amended to ensure that the NHRC has the authority
to select and appoint its own staff.
According to the Paris Principles, an important
aspect of independence is financial autonomy of a national human
rights institution. The Principles stipulate that "…
it will generally be advisable to ensure that the budget of a national
institution is not linked to the budget of a governmental department
or ministry."
The necessity for the State to provide adequate
resources to enable the NHRC to function effectively is obvious.
The Paris Principles point out that "[f]inancial autonomy must
be accompanied by adequate, continuing funding". In the absence
of adequate government assistance, past Commissioners of the NHRC
had been successful in raising donor funds. However, given the current
constitutional crisis regarding the direct presidential appointment
of its present Commissioners much of this funding has been suspended
leading to a financial crisis of some severity.
There are other problems with its functioning
that arise from lacunae in the Act. Though past Commissioners of
the NHRC (appointed properly and constitutionally) attempted to
transform the NHRC to an effective human rights monitor, their efforts
were hampered by the fact that under the Act, the NHRC can investigate
and inquire into only violations of fundamental rights recognized
by the Constitution of Sri Lanka. This is a serious flaw as the
Constitution recognises only a limited category of rights and does
not include the right to life even though creative judicial interpretation
has sought to bring in the right to life in a very limited sense.
The mandate of the NHRC should be expanded so as to permit it to
exercise its authority not only with regard to fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Constitution, but also with regard to international
human rights standards that Sri Lanka as a State is legally bound
to respect and protect.
It may also be relevant to consider whether the
NHRC should possess the mandate to investigate abuses of human rights
by non-State actors as well. In a country which has seen decades
of conflict between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
and the Sri Lankan government where ordinary people have been subjected
to the most extreme violations of life and liberty not only by government
forces but also by the LTTE, the NHRC must have the mandate to also
investigate abuses by private actors, in appropriate circumstances.
Section 14 should be further amended to expand the scope of the
mandate of the NHRC to investigate abuses by non-State actors; "taking
into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty
imposed by the right" [see Article 8 (2) of the Constitution
of South Africa, 1996].
It is essential that a through overhauling of
the NHRC Act takes place. In the alternative, the relegation of
the NHRC to yet another pitiable example of Sri Lanka's dysfunctional
institutional process is a foregone conclusion.
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