Situation Report

This week, both Government troops and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) saw the dawn of Eelam War IV. However, despite its advent, there is still a bizarre paradox. They both continue to re-iterate their commitment to the Norwegian-brokered Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) of February 2002.

The strategic north-eastern port city of Trincomalee was the launching pad for the second time. The outbreak of Eelam War III on April 29, 1995 came after the guerrilla attack on the Trincomalee Port. The new phase began in the same area. As a diversionary tactic, guerrillas directed fire at security forces positions in the North. Concerns heightened that violence would spread to the South too. This is after the discovery by Karandeniya Police, following a tip off, of lethal military items concealed in the false bottom of a lorry, at a checkpoint in Bentota. There were fears more would have gone undetected.

These developments have confined the ceasefire to a set of words on paper. The same with the Scandinavian monitors tasked to supervise it. They complain there are no security guarantees and they are unable to do their job. Even in the unlikely event of Norway's Special Envoy to the peace process, Jon Hanssen-Bauer, who arrived in Colombo on Friday, securing such guarantees, there are other critical issues.

Three out of five truce monitoring countries - Finland (11), Denmark (11) and Sweden (15) - are pulling out. Thus SLMM members would dwindle down from 58 to 21 representing only Norway (16) and Iceland (5). Replacing them from other countries would require the concurrence of both sides. That now becomes a secondary issue. The first would be a means to ensure a halt to war and a return to ceasefire. Only then could there be any monitoring.

The turning point appears to be Wednesday (July 26) when President Mahinda Rajapaksa chaired a meeting of the National Security Council. Matters of serious concern to national security interests came up for discussion. Among them: reports that the LTTE was constructing a second airstrip northeast of Puthukudiyrippu in the LTTE-dominated Wanni. Another was the LTTE blockade of water from Mavil Aru irrigation reservoir (located within the Trincomalee district) to paddy fields and other farmland in villages in Government-controlled areas north of Batticaloa.

As revealed in The Sunday Times (Situation Report) last week the Air Force began a four-day air campaign from Wednesday evening. It bombed rebel positions near the Mavil Aru anicut area and near the Verugal River - the boundary between Trincomalee and Batticaloa districts. The next day (Thursday) the Air Force continued the air raids on Sea Tiger bases further east towards the coast in the general area of Kathiraveli.

During this air campaign Israeli built Kfir jets of the Air Force also bombed the LTTE's main base at Karadiyanaru, 23 kilometres west of Batticaloa. More than 40 guerrilla cadres were reported killed in this attack on Saturday (July 28). It also left the Batticaloa military wing leader Banu injured though intercepts showed he was active on the LTTE radio network this week.

It is in this backdrop that some 2,000 troops launched a military offensive on Sunday (July 30) to gain control of the Mavil Aru anicut. Supported by the Army's elite commandos, the troops were made up of the 7th battalion of the Sri Lanka Light Infantry, 8th battalion of the Gemunu Watch, 2nd battalion of the Sri Lanka National Guard, 8th battalion of the Sri Lanka Light Infantry and 10th battalion of the Sri Lanka Light Infantry. They made a two pronged pincer move. The operation continues.

There was one distinct disadvantage to the troops. Public pronouncements by politicians and some officials that the military would seize the anicut and restore badly needed water to some 30,000 acres of paddy, ready for harvest, had denied to them the element of surprise. They said that would also obviate the need for drinking water being supplied to villagers in the area in bowsers. Tiger guerrillas seized this information to heavily mine the area, plan moves to resist troop advance and place snipers at strategic locations.

By Monday, troops moved despite the heavy resistance offered by Tiger guerrillas. Air Force Kfir jets pounded LTTE bases on the border between Trincomalee and Batticaloa districts. They included the "Lima Seven," "Four Eight" bases (located south of the Mavil Aru anicut). They also hit the "Hillman" and "Nedaal" bases located east of it. Air Force sources said they scored an accurate hit on the Sea Tiger base at Kathiraveli. Reconnaisance aircraft had reported later that a fire in a main building lasted for hours after the bombing. It also led to secondary explosions of ammunition and other ordnance.

Two Commando officers and eight soldiers were killed. Among them were seven commandos. Forty five soldiers were injured. The commandos played a daredevil role to clear the way for the advancing troops. On Monday night 16 more soldiers, part of re-inforcements proceeding to the area, were killed when the guerrillas exploded a claymore mine near Kantalai. Two soldiers were wounded.

When the military offensive was under way, the guerrillas resorted to more diversionary tactics. Hours before dawn on Monday, from Elephant Pass they fired artillery at troop positions in Nagerkovil, a part of the defended localities straddling the Army's entry-exit point at Muhamalai. This is the gateway to the LTTE-dominated Wanni from the Jaffna peninsula. It lasted for over half an hour in the morning. Later, in the evening the same routine was repeated. Two soldiers were injured.

The next day (Tuesday) the LTTE had embarked on a major diversion. Before it began, the guerrillas fired artillery and mortars at security forces detachments in Mannar. Later in the afternoon, a flotilla of Sea Tiger boats, said to be around ten, set out from Sudaikuda to attack "Jetliner," the new passenger ferry that was bringing in 854 armed forces personnel from Kankesanthurai to Trincomalee. Sudaikuda is located near Sampur, a land mass divided only by the deep seas of the harbour from the Eastern Naval Area Headquarters at the Dockyard. Tiger guerrillas have been dominating this area since the Army pulled out long before the ceasefire. The troops were going on leave. The new vessel has been chartered by the Navy from a state agency in Indonesia. This was after the charter contract for Pearl Cruise II, that escaped a Sea Tiger attack on May 11, was cancelled thereafter by the Navy.

The Navy's Small Boat and the Fast Attack Craft (FAC) Squadrons went into action. They came under 122 mm artillery and 81 mm mortar fire. They returned fire and three Sea Tiger boats were destroyed. As the gun battles went on, Navy crew who were manning "Jetliner," that was near the harbour mouth, hurriedly moved the passenger ferry into the Dockyard area. The troops disembarked safely thereafter.

Thus a second attempt by the guerrillas to drown a Navy passenger ferry with a large complement of troops failed. When the battles raged outside the harbour, a second flotilla of Sea Tiger boats were heading towards Trincomalee from a base at Mullaitivu. They were intercepted by Navy FACs. Gun battles ensued off the shores of Alampil. Helicopter gun ships of the Air Force joined in. The boats later retreated. At least two more Sea Tiger boats were destroyed. One sailor was killed and two were wounded.

Failing to hit the passenger ferry, the guerrillas directed a barrage of artillery and mortar fire to the Dockyard, home for the Eastern Naval Area Headquarters. It also came from Sudaikuda. When it ended, six sailors were killed and 18 were wounded. There were varied claims about the casualty count of guerrillas. The Navy said around 150 guerrillas were killed. However, other sources said 35 were killed and 130 wounded in the fighting in and around Mutur. Independent verification of guerrilla casualties is difficult.

Casualty figures given in pro-LTTE websites were lower (than those obtained from radio intercepts) and the details were highly exaggerated. The pro-LTTE Tamilnet website said "Jetliner" had moved to international waters and Indian assistance was being sought. Another account spoke about the bodies of 40 soldiers in their custody being handed over to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The accounts turned out to be untrue. The ICRC said no such request has been made.

With a second attempt to attack a passenger ferry coming a cropper, the LTTE shifted its battle to the adjoining area. Soon after midnight that signalled the dawn of Wednesday, they directed artillery and mortar fire at the Mutur Jetty. Two policemen and an airman were injured. Army and Navy detachments at Kaddaiparichchan, Selvanagar and Mahindapura also came under attack. At Kaddaiparichchan, two soldiers were killed and 20 wounded. This was to seal off any help being rushed to Mutur.

The guerrillas infiltrated Mutur from the western side of the town before the crack of dawn. Police and security forces personnel on guard duty at telecommunications centre and the Bus Depot were forced to back out due to intense fire. The Naval detachment too was under fire together with the Mutur Jetty. By Thursday morning Air Force Kfir jets began bombing Sampur area whilst Mi 24 helicopter gun ships attacked Sea Tiger boats in the surrounding seas. The guerrillas initially prevented re-inforcements from rushing in by blocking the Jetty and the entry points on the Kantalai side.

By late Thursday afternoon intense fighting continued in the Mutur area. Infantry companies moved in, one from the Pachchanoor side to fight their way through. The guerrillas began to dominate parts of Mutur throughout Thursday afternoon till Friday morning. Another infantry company inducted the previous night fought their way to seize control of the Mutur town. A soldier was killed in the fighting yesterday. The guerrillas backed out but continued to direct fire at troop positions hiding behind civilians who had gathered at several points. Later in the day they began to take full control. The LTTE operations in Mutur were led by Muttuselvi and Kunjan.

The LTTE attempt to gain a contiguous stretch of land from Sampur southwards, a move that would have crippled the working of the Trincomalee Port, was thus thwarted. Such a move would have had very disastrous consequences. This port is the lifeline for some 40,000 security forces personnel and policemen deployed in the Jaffna peninsula. It is from this port that they embark or disembark when they go on leave from the North. Only a few hundreds are ferried by the Air Force from Colombo to Jaffna. Military and food supplies to the north are also moved from this port.

Hence the LTTE attacks to seize control of Mutur and adjoining areas were a failure. But the guerrillas still won in one aspect. They succeeded in creating a mass exodus of Muslim civilians from Mutur. Nearly 30,000 are now in temporary shelters in Kantale and other areas. At least 16 of them were killed in artillery and mortar fire. The Government and the LTTE traded allegations against each other over these attacks. The matter came up for discussion at a special meeting of the National Security Council on Friday.

Without doubt, many a major attempt by the LTTE in the recent months has come a cropper. The latest was the attempt on the Navy's passenger ferry and the attack to take control of Mutur and surrounding areas.

With the exit of renegade eastern leader Karuna (Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan), it is clear the LTTE has not been able to effectively strengthen its military strike capabilities in the East. This is a contributory cause for its failure although the LTTE in an unusual move, declared its action in Mutur was a defensive one to "protect civilians". Yesterday, the LTTE announced it had withdrawn from the area. Indeed, it has, but against all its wishes to remain on the ground. Their grand design failed.

However, this does not mean the LTTE would give up. Yesterday, Army personnel at Muhamalai were tipped off about a group of guerrillas who had asked for water from a household. A search of the area led to a confrontation in which five guerrillas were killed. They had in their possession a Global Positioning System (GPS), guns, maps, mini Uzi sub machine guns among other items. Army officials believe their incursion into the area was a prelude to a major attack.

The pre-dawn discovery on Thursday by the Karandeniya Police of lethal military items concealed in the false bottom of a flat bed lorry is also causing concern for the security authorities. The Police had been tipped off that such a lorry was heading from Vavuniya to an estate in Elpitiya. The items were to be hidden there until the guerrillas planned a major attack. They rushed to a check point at Bentota. When the lorry was checked, they found concealed inside three T-56 assault rifles, 18 grenades, a box containing 38 packages of explosives each weighing five kilogrammes, a micro pistol, 38 claymore mines, T-56 magazines and a large quantity of ammunition. Two persons were arrested in this regard from Vavuniya.

Police believe the discovery is linked to confessions made by an LTTE female cadre, 27-year-old Mariyadas Anthony Suja, who was arrested in Tissamaharama. She confessed upon her arrest that she and a group of 12 other suicide cadres were planning an attack on a VVIP as revealed in The Sunday Times (Situation Report - July 23). Concerns in the security establishment have been raised after fears that similar military items would have been smuggled into other areas in the south by Tiger guerrillas who were planning to unleash violence there.

It seems an irony that successive Governments have continued to ignore warnings of the threats to the strategic Trincomalee harbour. It was The Sunday Times (Situation Report - August, 3 2003) that revealed the LTTE build-up surrounding the Trincomalee Port in a report titled "TIGER TRAP FOR TRINCO SIEGE." This and other exclusive disclosures then led to late Lakshman Kadirgamar, former Foreign Minister, raising issue over security concerns, both with the then United National Front (UNF) Government and the Indian authorities in New Delhi.

This was one of the main reasons why then President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga took over the Defence portfolio (together with Internal Security and Mass Communication) from Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe's cabinet in November 2003. Having done so, she told a meeting of the National Security Council on August 17, 2004 that reports about the existence of LTTE camps in Trincomalee district were not true. She said such reports were being spread by those who wanted to see a resumption of war, as reported in The Sunday Times (Situation Report - August 22, 2004). In other words, she believed there was no such threat to the Trincomalee harbour.

In July 2004 I joined a Navy patrol in the seas off Trincomalee. Travelling past the Sampur area, we came under guerilla fire. In an account in The Sunday Times (Situation Report - July 25,2004), I said:

"………Tiger guerrilla camps deep inside, (Sampur) behind some of these bunkers (see map on this page) posed a grave threat. Artillery (130 mm and 122 mm) were positioned towards the harbour. In addition they believe there are 81 mm mortar positions near the bunkers along the coastline from Sampur towards Foul Point.

"What does all this mean for the Navy? In the event of a confrontation, the Tiger guerrillas can immobilize the Trincomalee harbour in just a matter of minutes. Firing artillery or mortars into the harbour mouth area will mean no vessel can either enter or leave the Trincomalee Port. That will mean naval vessels will be trapped in the Dockyard…."

It was not only The Sunday Times (Situation Report) that repeatedly bared warnings about threats to the Trincomalee harbour. On September 14, 2003 a front page report by me headlined "Trinco Naval base is vulnerable," US military warns Sri Lanka"gave details of a warning by the United States Pacific Command.

This warning came after a high level United States Pacific Command team examined security conditions in Sri Lanka and handed over a report on "Assessment of the armed forces of Sri Lanka" to the Government. The visit of the team was the direct result of a meeting then Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe had with US President George W. Bush in Washington D.C. in July 2002. This is what the PACOM report had to say on Trincomalee harbour:

"Discussion: The most important base for the Sri Lanka Navy is without question the Trincomalee Harbour. Currently, the LTTE control the southern portion of the Harbour. From this area, the LTTE have effectively monitored all ship movement in and out of the Harbour, launch suicide and artillery attacks against the Naval Base and could destroy any vessel coming in and out of the harbour. The SL Army is responsible for this area but they have been unable to completely secure it.

"Recommendations:
"a. The SL Defence force must secure this land area. The vulnerable position that currently exists could essentially level the majority of the Sri Lanka Navy fleet. The result would be that the only re-supply capability for the Jaffna peninsula would have to come from Colombo, more than four times the distance to Jaffna.

"b. Currently there are designated areas for the LTTE and areas for the Sri Lanka Defence Forces. If the southern tip of Trincomalee Harbour has not been designated for the LTTE, it more than likely isn't, then the Sri Lanka Government should be massing police and military personnel in this area in case the hostilities resume.

"Without control of this area the defence of Trincomalee Harbour will always be a losing battle. Without Trincomalee Harbour the ability to prosecute the war would be detrimentally affected."

Speaking on behalf of then United National Front (UNF) Government, then Minister G.L. Peiris denied there were LTTE camps around the Trincomalee harbour. (The Sunday Times - Situation Report September 14 2003). At that time, former President Kumaratunga, who firmly believed there was a threat took over the Defence portfolio. Once her own party was foisted in Government, she too denied the fact. She is now in the UK whilst an entire nation is paying heavily for the omissions and commissions of her and the successive governments. All sides then succeeded in blaming the media and sought to intimidate them. For many connected with the defence establishment, that is a delightful pastime be it in the past or now. Now the truth is staring in the face.

For President Mahinda Rajapaksa, just eight months in office, has inherited all these problems. They were not his creations. That no doubt stands in the way of his development plans. It is no easy task for him. Whilst facing a fierce enemy, he has to put right the colossal damage caused to national interest and national security. That is an enormous task whilst coping with Eelam War IV.