Telescope

In his article last Sunday this writer said, "While President Mahinda Rajapaksa unleashed a war that has killed over 5000 persons in the past two years and displaced many hundreds of thousands, the newly-formed National Congress too is, understandably, working within the constraints of extreme Sinhala nationalism brewed by the SLFP-JVP-JHU combine."

This week, UNP Parliamentarian Ravi Karunanayake announced the UNP "was seriously considering the idea of repositioning itself" on federalism. Karunanayake, however, went on to say that the UNP's stance from 1988 of a political solution through a maximum devolution of power remained unchanged.

Though it remains not quite explicit, it appears that the UNP's present stance is to implement to the maximum extent, devolution of power as envisaged under the 13th Amendment to the Constitution. In other words, it is maximum devolution within a unitary setup.
To the Tamils, well seasoned in the opportunism of southern politicians, this does not come as a particular surprise. What is of importance, however, is to understand whether this is an election gimmick or a well-reasoned shift in policy that the UNP [as a coalition partner with the SLFP (M) in the National Congress] intends to implement.

If it is indeed a tactical manoeuvre, its intention, in all probability, is to bring down the government at the forthcoming budget debate. The National Congress has been working assiduously towards this objective and its target has been to enlist the support of the JVP's 38 MPs. The snag is the JVP's reluctance to be seen by its supporters as conniving with the detested UNP to overthrow the government party (PA).

One of the sticking points in uniting in a common endeavour had been the UNP's position on the devolution of power — the UNP favoured federalism, while the JVP is unitarist. The UNP's shift, however, would provide sufficient grounds for the JVP to convince its supporters that both parties could work on the limited programme of toppling the incumbent regime at the budget.

This is supported by JVP Leader Somawansa Amarasinghe's statement of a possibility of both parties uniting to bring down a government that is against the people. UNP Parliamentarian Lakshman Kiriella was also quoted as stating that the UNP and the JVP could work towards a common goal while maintaining individual policies.

If, however, the UNP's is a well-reasoned policy shift on the devolution of power, the implications are much graver. It means abandoning the Oslo accords that were endorsed by the international community. It also means leaving in the lurch parties like the CWC and the SLMC (and the communities they represent) because despite being in government, they were strong advocates of a federal solution. The UNP's anti-minority stance is also evident because surveys carried out by organisations such as the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) showed a clear bias against federalism among the Sinhalese.

That the UNP's politics were taking a pro-Sinhala direction could be seen when UNP Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe announced publicly sometime ago that his party was contemplating amending the CFA due to contemporary realities. The transformation is due, as mentioned above, to the extremist politics spawned by Sinhala nationalism, which the UNP finds hard to resist. And what cannot be denied in giving credence to that extreme point of view is the illusion created by the military's capture of the East.

There is ample opportunity for the UNP's burgeoning hard line stance to surface if the consequence of toppling the government at the budget is a general election, a subject on which the National Congress is waxing eloquent. This likelihood is due to the following reasons: If the JVP is prepared to topple the incumbent regime it means the party (JVP) has come of age and is willing to sacrifice its 39 seats in parliament to contest an election with the hope of eventually capturing for itself the coveted position as one of the two leading parties in Sri Lanka's parliament by outflanking the SLFP. This might not happen in the near future, but that is the JVP's ambition. To achieve this it will go on a Sinhala nationalist path, at least initially. In such an environment the UNP cannot be seen as pro-federal, which is interpreted today as pro-minority.

Second, the politics of the UNP's coalition partner in the National Congress forbids any softening on the federal issue. Both Mangala Samaraweera and Sripathi Sooriyarachchi have been critical of the LTTE and demanded the war be conducted professionally, implying thereby war is justified, but the Rajapaksa regime is corrupt and inept to fight the Tigers.

In addition, if the National Congress is to win at a general election, Samaraweera and former president Chandrika Kumaratunga (who has given her blessings to the coalition) would have to steal 'Bandaranaike loyalists' and so-called moderates from the SLFP and persuade them to support the Congress. It is very unlikely that either of these elements in the SLFP have strong sympathies for the federal form of government.

This would leave the Tamils with two options: to fall at the feet of the international community for deliverance, or encourage the LTTE and the TNA to pursue their politico-military moves to neutralise the dark forces opposed to political change in the Sinhala polity.

Can the Tamils trust the international community? Though the US Ambassador in Colombo said recently his government was willing to support peace moves regardless of labels 'unitary' or 'federal,' it stands to reason the international community would use its power to influence a solution which it is most comfortable with, not what the Tamils demand. And to expect the international community to be fair by the Tamils in a situation where the LTTE does not hold military parity with the government would be a delusion.

Further, both Wickremesinghe's and Samaraweera's connections to the international community remain very solid and it is very likely that if the National Congress were to form a government the Tamil voice will get suppressed as it was during the 2002 to 2003 period.

The UNP's move only strengthens the LTTE's position that the Sinhala polity cannot be trusted to deliver a meaningful power-sharing for the Muslims, Sri Lankan Tamils and Upcountry Tamils. It also shows the time has come to politically unite the Tamils (Upcountry and Sri Lankan), the Muslims and all who believe there has to be a radical alteration in the way power is distributed among the different stakeholders in Sri Lanka.

While the UNP's stance on federalism is of little consequence to the Tigers, the question as to whether it would wish to deal with the present government or the National Congress if it comes to power remains important. And that question can only be answered by playing the political game.

No shock as UNP shifts gear