Traffic slowed down along the Kurunegala - Anuradhapura highway last Thursday as rows of long wheel based Army tow trucks sped towards the Wanni.
Coupled behind them were 130 mm artillery guns clothed in canvas and mounted on trailers. The protruding olive green barrels were naked and caught the attention of passers-by, both motorists and pedestrians alike.
They had arrived at the Colombo Port days earlier from a foreign manufacturer and were being rushed to the battle areas in the Wanni where troops last Friday resumed “Operation Jaya Sikurui” (Victory Assured). That afternoon they were spewing out fire on LTTE positions.
The nine days preceding the resumption of this major military offensive last Friday, its reverberations were reflected not only on the highways but also in many other sectors in far corners of the country.
In most Police stations, strength was withdrawn to be re-assigned to the Wanni. As a result, Male cops were becoming scarce in their regular beats in the streets and at check points. Newly passed out females have taken their place.
In some of the bigger military installations, both in the operational areas and outside, additional strength was hurriedly raised and inducted into the Wanni. Senior officers responsible for logistics rushed fresh requirements demanded by field commanders.
Before crack of dawn on Friday, troops began their advance - the 55 Division along the A9, Vavuniya - Jaffna highway and the 53 division from Nedunkerny towards Nayinamadu in the direction of Puliyankulam. The two columns were poised to link up at Puliyankulam - a move that would effectively separate the LTTE dominated Mullaitivu jungles from the security forces controlled Weli Oya sector.
“Operation Jaya Sikurui” resumed last Friday after a break of nine days for consolidation. The military offensive itself began on May 13 and went on till just before Vesak. Thereafter it resumed on Saturday, May 24 and went on for four days until May 27. Since then, until last Friday (June 6), troops consolidated whilst military planners examined how the operation has gone on so far and what its future course should be.
Although Overall Operations Commander, Major General Asoka Jayawardena, who is directing the operation and his senior military planners thought of a much longer phase of consolidation at the positions held by them (the 55 division at Vilakku Vaitha Kulam, north of Rampaikulam and 53 Division at Nedunkerny), they made a quick decision to resume on Friday.
This was after they were satisfied that the required Police strength to meet immediate requirements were on hand.
The main reason prompting this move, senior military officials said, was to deny the LTTE time to re-group or consolidate its own positions.
The 55 Division is being led by Brigadier Shantha Kottegoda (GOC) together with his deputy, Brigadier Nihal Marambe. The 53 Division is headed by Brigadier Vasantha Perera (GOC) assisted by his deputy, Brigadier Nanda Mallawaratchchi.
In order to ensure Police deployment went ahead as planned, Inspector General of Police, W.B. Rajaguru (just back in Colombo after a foreign tour) detailed Lionel Karunasena, DIG (Operations) to oversee the Wanni Sector.
Mr. Karunasena who was Commandant of the elite Police Special Task Force (STF) which spearheaded counter terrorist operations in the east for several years, is based in Anuradhapura. In addition to his own duties, he will oversee Wanni in place of Jayantha Wickremaratne, DIG, who is on sick leave.
Deputy Minister of Defence, General Anuruddha Ratwatte, declared in Parliament during the debate on the extension of the State of Emergency on Thursday, that the aim of “Operation Jaya Sikurui” was to re-open the highway to Jaffna.
Senior military officials said yesterday they expected strong resistance from the LTTE but were confident that the link-up of 55 and 53 divisions at Puliyankulam could be achieved in the coming week. They said that a fuller re-appraisal of the remaining phases of the operation would be made only after the link-up at Puliyankulam.
By Friday evening, troops of the 55 Division were five kilometres away from Puliyankulam whilst those of the 53 Division were eight kilometres away.
One high ranking official re-iterated that it would be many months before the main Jaffna-Colombo highway is fully re-captured and the road re-opened for traffic. This is in view of the enormous logistic and other related requirements. He emphasised “we are not in a hurry. Every area we re-capture is not only a gain but brings us a step closer to the LTTE’s so called heartland.” Similar sentiments were also expressed by this official last week too.
As the operation resumed, there were increasing signs that the LTTE was making preparations to trigger off incidents particularly in the Jaffna peninsula and in the Trincomalee district. Intelligence sources said levels of infiltration in the Jaffna peninsula has increased whilst in areas south of the Trincomalee coast, large groups of Sea Tigers had been arriving.
These sources believe that in the case of the latter, LTTE moves are intended not only to distract the security forces attention from “Operation Jaya Sikurui” but is also linked to the incident in the high seas on May 28 where a flotilla of Navy boats engaged the Sea Tigers. Naval craft attacked LTTE boats but more details of the incident has come through intelligence channels.
One of the boats which was evading fire from a Naval craft is said to have rushed towards the main body of the LTTE flotilla. A huge explosion, the cause of which is yet unknown, had hit a fleet of LTTE boats. Intelligence sources claim 181 Tigers, among the re-inforcements that were rushing from the east to the Wanni, were killed in the explosion. They said at least 50 Tiger cadres among the number killed were drowned. Intelligence sources suspect that some faulty mechanism in an explosive laden suicide boat may have triggered off the massive explosion.
Independent verification of these details are not possible since the media is banned from the battle areas and communications remain cut off.
Intelligence sources have learnt of another factor which has sparked off an extensive probe. They have received reports that in view of the serious difficulties the LTTE was facing in looking after its wounded cadres, groups of casualties are being evacuated to South India. According to these reports, the evacuation is being carried out with the collusion of Tamil Nadu fishermen. It is alleged that they are being paid large sums of money for ferrying the injured across the Palk Straits. In addition, it is claimed that the fishermen are also being given handsome cash rewards to be paid to corrupt officials in the Coast Guard to avoid detection.
Intelligence officials believe the ruse is being carried out without the official knowledge of the Tamil Nadu authorities or the Indian Central Government. They point out that it is financially lucrative for Tamil Nadu fishermen to do errands for the LTTE since the revenue they earn is much more than what their catches yielded.
As reported in these columns, casualties to troops in the ongoing operation has been unusually high. The Operational Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence is yet to reveal statistics of the total number killed and injured since the operation commenced. By Friday evening, 22 security forces personnel including two officers were killed. So far the security forces have lost two main battle tanks. Both were destroyed by Tiger guerrilla Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs). At least three other tanks that were damaged have been repaired and have become operational again.
In spite of casualties to both men and material during “Operation Jaya Sikurui”, the LTTE has been unable to force the Army to delay its advance. Any restrictions on the speed of the security forces advance has been self imposed due to the need to restrict casualties as well as to solidly consolidate in the re-captured areas so as to deny the LTTE penetration to interfere with the rearward lines of communication.
The vulnerability of the security forces, if at all, is in maintaining the security of the rear areas of the advancing columns.
To up strength the 55 and 53 Divisions effectively for the “Operation Jaya Sikurui”, much of the trained cadres from other sensitive operational areas necessarily had to be thinned out. Thus the operational troops on “Jaya Sikurui” have to necessarily focus on their operational mission to go forward leaving the consolidation of the defences to their rear to the Navy, Air Force, Police and some volunteer battalions. This not a satisfactory solution but nevertheless a no option situation.
Hence, the further the security forces advance, the longer its tail which has to be protected by lesser trained militia. This is perhaps LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran’s hope to isolate the advancing column from its rear support.
This is a well established guerrilla doctrine but the question is whether the LTTE has got the cadres to do so and maintain a breach in the line for a sufficient length of time to inflict any worthwhile damage or delay to the advance.
All in all, any restrictions on the military, as noted earlier, is more a result of cautious self imposition rather than as a reaction to any LTTE strategy.
Prabhakaran has not divulged his hand as yet. Undoubtedly the LTTE rank and file must be in disarray, both as a result of the security forces’ success as much as the attrition on LTTE strategies, tactics and logistic options.
Not only is Prabhakaran, now faced with shrinking military options, he also has to contend with receding political options. His empire is threatened as is his military position. In the long run he is therefore faced with the choice of either being a soldier or a politician.
To soldier on, he must have adequate resources and space. To be a politician, for which he has hitherto shown no talent, he should be prepared for other options, for which he is not. This is the LTTE dilemma at the moment.
The security forces cannot afford to loosen the grip they have gained. To permit the LTTE breathing space would be disadvantageous to the political strategy of the Government to successfully complete the war to reap its benefits within its mandated tenure.
This calls for achieving the full aim of “Operation Jaya Sikurui” to establish the Vavuniya-Jaffna link. Anything short of it, whilst it may not be disadvantageous to the security forces, may not confer any political advantage to the People’s Alliance.
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