The Situation Report

10th May 1998

Operation Jaya Sikurui one year: how justifiable?

By Iqbal Athas

It was just past noon at the Joint Operations Headquarters (JOH) Complex in Vavuniya last Monday when the sirens began to wail.

As one explosion after another rocked the area, followed by what appeared to be gunfire, there was a heightened level of alert. The take post order went into effect and every soldier took up a pre determined positions. Military Police sealed off the Complex and shut down the telephone exchange to prevent any news leaking to the media - all part of operational procedures in a contingency.

The JOH Complex, the nerve centre for counter terrorist operations was under attack or so it seemed.

Overall Operations Commander, Major General Srilal

Weerasuriya, had just finished a conference with his GOCs and senior officials. All had adjourned to the Officer's Mess for lunch. Some rushed for cover to the nearest bunker.

It took a while for them to realise that the Complex was not under attack after all. An underground ammunition dump belonging to the Special Forces had exploded. It had contained explosives and small arms ammunition worth over a million rupees. One soldier was killed and another was seriously wounded.

Radios at the JOH crackled and military installations countrywide heard the news. Orders went out that every establishment should immediately check their ammunition dumps and armouries.

Fears of an attack on the JOH Complex exacerbated in view of Military Intelligence warnings that the LTTE planned to trigger off incidents to mark the first anniversary of Operation Jaya Sikurui (or Victory Assured). So much so all military installations in the Wanni have come under a high level of alert from last week. The JOH has also planned a number of counter measures.

On May 13 or in the next three days, it will be one year since 'Operation Jaya Sikurui' (or Victory Assured) commenced with much political fanfare. It promised to be the crowning victory, which by overcoming the LTTE, was to link the Jaffna peninsula to the rest of the country and pave the way for peace.

The political hype of an assured victory matched only by grandiloquent statements of 'V' day deadlines by politicians claiming arcane privilege to security plans. Each such deadline unfulfilled came to be unashamedly superseded by another. The much publicised boast by the man who is running the military machine, General Anuruddha Ratwatte, of a handshake with LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, after linking north with the south last February 4, is best forgotten, at least for now.

Judging from the progress of 'Operation Jaya Sikurui' as it is today, in the hindsight of a full year's operations, the inescapable impression is that the thirst for political kudos out of a military success has over ridden military realities and operational pragmatism. Consequently it has brought about many of the problems that today beset the execution of this operation.

Following on the success of operations Riviresa and Edibala, that 'Operation Jaya Sikurui' would fulfill its promise was the euphoric mood in May, 1997. The LTTE, forced out of Jaffna and from control of major population centres in the north, was made out to be a force against the wall confined to the east Wanni. The comparatively non resisted successes of Riviresa and Edibala exhilarated opinions of a weakened LTTE, at least judging from political claims of percentage statistics said to remain before final victory.

The confidence displayed, as was to be demonstrated by the extent of the resistance in the Wanni, was to underestimate, if not ignore, a fundamental principle of guerrilla warfare expressed by all its Grand Masters. One of them, Mao Tse Tung wrote:

"Ours are guerrilla tactics. They consist mainly of the following points:

"Divide our forces to arouse the masses, concentrate our forces to deal with the enemy.

"The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; when the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue;

"To extend stable base areas, employ the policy of

avenging in waves when pursued by a powerful enemy, employ the

policy of circling around.

"Arouse the greatest number of the masses in the shortest time by the best possible methods.

"These tactics are just like casting a net; at any moment we should be able to cast it or draw it in. We cast it wide to win over the masses and draw it to deal with the enemy."

It is unimaginable that the operational commanders of the Army, all seasoned veterans of guerrilla type warfare, would treat lightly well tested fundamental principles in assessing operational designs. Or were they denied that role by those who wanted to impose their political will ? Nor could intelligence have been unaware of LTTE capabilities and strategies.

If such was the case of the operational progress "Jaya Sikurui" should not have been bogged down the way it has. It is only logical to assume that the military would have catered for contingencies arising from operational reversals. On the contrary, a couple of LTTE attacks on the rear of the 'Jaya Sikurui' have halted the operation, at least to buy time for consolidation and re-mustering of resources.

Underscoring the fact that the initial planning of 'Operation Jaya Sikurui' seems to have sacrificed military common sense is, an almost self-admittance of that surmise, illustrated by the astounding realisation now, that the Army is now short of manpower.

None other than the Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Rohan de Daluwatte, declared at a news conference on Friday that the Army's advance was being hampered by the lack of manpower.

Much publicity has been given to the fact that the present manpower shortage is the result of desertions, officially claimed to be around 15,000. Whether this is a valid claim can be disputed when it is considered that at the beginning of 'Operation Jaya Sikurui' last year, the number of deserters was much higher.

The question of deserters notwithstanding, it is a recognised fact that manpower availability is a prime consideration in operational planning. Military sources confirm this, in what they term in military jargon as "troops to task." It is said to be both an operational as well as a logistics exercise which dictates the selection of objectives and aims.

Manpower planning, military sources again confirm, takes into account not only existing force levels but also needs to take into consideration the estimate of casualties, wastage by retirements, deserters , recruiting potential. This includes training time and relief from operations by way of leave or change of units from front line duties for rest and re-training.

All intricate planning responsibilities are well know to the services whose officers have been trained in staff work and logistics of these aspects at staff, war and defence colleges. This begs the question as to why and how the progress of "Operation Jaya Sikurui" has been stultified from what appears to be, at least in part, due to shortcoming in operational and logistics planning.

If the responsibility for the question does not lie within the security forces, then the search for an answer must lie in the political agenda which determined the strategic need for this operation.

It is no secret that in the planning of 'Operation Jaya Sikurui' there were differences of opinion between the military assessment of the situation and political requirements. It is also no secret that senior and competent officers have been relieved of their operational appointments because of such issues. In these circumstances and in consideration of the fact that 'Operation Jaya Sikurui' has not been able to achieve its objective of opening a Main Supply Route (MSR) or impose anything more than a stalemated operational environment, it is time that more responsible sections of the Government take a hard look at its strategies.

This is not to say that "Operation Jaya Sikurui" has been a failure. At the same time, it is not to say it has been a success. In fact, it has been neither. That is in its theatre. But given the inputs that have gone into this operation at the expense of security in other vulnerable areas, the validity of the MSR strategy is arguable. Furthermore, the reliance on a single option strategy opens itself to debate. Not the least of which is whether by doing so, the LTTE has not been conferred with the advantage of the freedom of greater flexibility for widespread tactical options as opposed to our own forces tied down in a positional role in the conventional mode.

Given the superiority of strength, equipment, air and naval resources, it is not a creditable achievement to have advanced only some 50 kilometres in one full year. In this operation alone, nearly 1400 have been killed in action and over 5500 wounded. Military hardware worth millions have been lost or destroyed. They include artillery guns, mortars, armoured vehicles and tanks.

In terms of war expenditure, an estimated Rs 550 million or more has been spent for the conduct of 'Operation Jaya Sikurui' in the past one year. This is on a modest estimate of Rs 1.5 million a day and excludes the cost of military hardware.

The question then is whether, in real terms, has 'Operation Jaya Sikurui' justified the casualties and expenditure, both in military achievement and in its contribution to the political effort ? These are difficult aspects to quantify. Nevertheless, they need assessment in terms of what has been achieved and what more is left to be achieved.

It is at the moment inconceivable that Prabhakaran will be willing to negotiate. His declared aim has been to negotiate only when he is on equal terms. Whether that means on the achievement of military parity or whether it is on an equal state basis is a million rupee guess. However, what is relevant is that at the moment there is little other option than to marginalise the LTTE, both politically and militarily. It is in this context that 'Operation Jaya Sikurui' has to be viewed and its performance assessed.

The amnesty offered to deserters on a number of occasions and a high geared recruiting drive indicates the predicament of the Army in regard to manpower. The suggestions of resorting to conscription should manpower levels not be filled by normal recruitment underscores the problem the Government is facing.

Merits and demerits of these measures apart, the question that arises is the time period it would take for these measures to be operationally effective.

Military sources estimate it at a six month period. This would mean that effective force levels can only be operational come November or so. This of course would co-incide with the onset of north east monsoons.

This, then would mean that 'Operation Jaya Sikurui' will go on to next year unless another strategy is to be evolved.

As commander-in-chief, President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, to her credit has spared no costs once she made her decision to combat the LTTE. This was after they reneged on their undertaking during the late 1994 peace talks.

To build up the required military hardware in a hurry, procurement procedures had to be relaxed to cater for the fast track purchases. Unfortunately, this brought in its wake corruption and malpractice.

Regrettably some of those whose names have come to question are senior personnel of the security forces from whom was expected the strength of moral character. This was at least in consideration of the fact it was their obligation and duty to procure the best possible material and equipment for use by those fighting under the very leadership of these corrupt officers. Many brave may have lost life and limb because of the greed and avarice of a few, both in uniform and those in the dovecotes of political power.

Some of them are under investigation, and some awaiting inquiry by Presidential Committees. Yet, some others who freely flout ill gotten gains.

Now that President Bandaranaike Kumaratunga has initiated action to institute inquiries into matters of procurements in the Sri LankaAir Force, she should extend the process to all other services. This, the country owes to those gallant men fighting for their country, risking their lives and suffering the hardships of combat conditions for nothing more than regulation pay. One year of 'Operation Jaya Sikurui' has brought home many lessons. It is opportune that the operation be assessed in the light of its failures, successes and overall objectivity. It does appear that operational planners had either under estimated the enemy, over estimated their own capability or subordinated it to a political agenda to suit the whims and fancies of a politician totally disregarding a rational appreciation.

Whatever be the contributory factors, it is clear that there has been a mismatch between the military and political plans and the assessment of capabilities, logistics and aims.

These shortcomings have at the end of one year been able to only develop a stalemate situation. The LTTE may be weaker than what it was when the operation began, but that does not appear to have made an appreciable dent to their military ambitions.

The lessons of the last year must be critically examined and corrected. It will do good for the defence establishment to remember that those that do not learn from history are destined to live in it. The country does not want. The national interest must come before the personal glory and aggrandisement of politicians who have their own secret ambitions and agendas.

Another factor during the year long conduct of 'Operation Jaya Sikurui' is from a media perspective. The media remains barred from the battle areas. During the one long year of the operation, there has been only two conducted media tours to the Wanni. The first was a reaction to an LTTE claim that they had seized parts of Kilinochchi. The second visit, within days, came on the same day as the media were staging a demonstration at Lipton Circus.

In the backdrop came the high pitch propaganda that 94 per cent of the war was now over and only a meagre six per cent remains to be completed. There were many other boastful claims. And now, there is a fervent appeal to the public to urge their sons and daughters to join the Army. Needless to say most of them would be confused. If the truth was told to the public, they would be participants in the war effort even if they were outside the battle field. With their support, the Government's task would have been much easier. But, unfortunately that is not to be.

Whoever won or lost 'Operation Jaya Sikurui' in the past one year, there was one winner. Those who watched TV during those 12 months are familiar with that aspect of the operation.

Fifth Column

Editorial/Opinion Contents