The Situation Report

24th May 1998

LTTE destabilising Jaffna, gunning for SAARC

By Iqbal Athas

Hours after four bullets from a T-56 assault rifle downed 60 year old Sarojini Yogeswaran, the Mayoress of Jaffna, last Sunday, Nadesapillai Vidyatharan, Editor of Uthayan, the leading Tamil newspaper in the peninsula, had a hand- written note on his table.

Signed by K. Sureshkumar of a so-called Sangiliyan Force, the note in Tamil claimed she had been "sent to heaven" for ignoring their warnings to quit office. It warned other local councillors to pay heed and not to ignore their warnings.

The fact that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam used front organisations for non-military tasks is well known. In the recent years, a self styled Ellalan Force was known to send out warnings to target commercial interests in the City. One such act was the canard that tea meant for export from Sri Lanka was poisoned by them. Similarly, the name of the last king of Jaffna, Sangiliyan was used in the peninsula in the past years for a variety of "operations" against civilians.

But last Sunday's note from Sureshkumar saw a re-emergence of the "Sangiliyan Force" with a new face. Pointing out that Uthayan was resisting the publication of their reports, he said very soon they would be receiving their rubber stamp. In view of their inability to meet the Uthayan staffers personally, they would then place their seal on the statements sent for publication. Publishing all the news for the benefit of the public was the duty of the newspaper, he told the Editor in that note.

Even if that note to Mr. Vidyatharan did not bear a seal, the rubber stamp of the LTTE was very manifest in the gory killing of Mrs Yogeswaran. It was nine years after her husband, a firebrand politician, was killed by LTTE gunmen (on July 13, 1989) together with Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) leader, Appapillai Amirthalingam, in Colombo. The incident came when late President Ranasinghe Premadasa invited an LTTE delegation and lodged them at the Colombo Hilton for peace talks. The incident embarrassed his Government. His own Deputy Minister of Defence, late Ranjan Wijeratne, was to deny the involvement of the LTTE. But it did not take long for the truth to dawn.

Mrs Sarojini Yogeswaran, had rejected military offers of bodyguards. She feared that would attract attention. The same fear prompted her to ask the military not to set up a checkpoint anywhere near her residence - 292 Navalar Road, Jaffna, right opposite the Kailasa Pillayar Kovil.

Last Sunday her household staff and aides were busy helping her to shift residence. She was moving to a house at Stanely Road that adjoined the TULF office. Part of the furniture was outside awaiting transport to arrive. She was inside chatting with a TULF colleague when two young men walked into the house and asked to see the Mayoress.

As she emerged, one of them pulled out a T-56 assault rifle from a bag he carried and fired four shots - two towards the chest, one on the thigh and another below. She dropped to the ground. Her colleague was wounded in the leg. The two assailants walked out as the crowd that gathered whisked her away to the hospital.

When the news reached the Security Forces Headquarters in Jaffna, its Commander, Major General Lionel Balagalle, called the local Air Force base for a helicopter. She was to be rushed out of the peninsula for urgent medical attention. But reports soon came that she was pronounced dead upon admission to hospital.

Truck loads of troops descended on Navalar Road for a cordon and search operation. They combed the area for the assailants and their weapon. From the description of an eye witness, Army officials wondered whether the T-56 rifle in question had a sawn off barrel. But others believed the weapon may have had a folding butt.

If the security forces re-captured Jaffna in a historic military achievement three years ago, it was Mayor Sarojini Yogeswaran and a group of local councillors who had given real meaning to that effort. She emerged as the first citizen of Jaffna in local polls conducted after a lapse of 14 years.

There was spontaneous public revulsion to her killing. White flags adorned Government buildings and houses alike. There were also black flags hoisted as a sign of mourning. The fact that the residents expressed their grief and sympathy publicly over the incident was evident throughout the peninsula. The Colombo based diplomatic community responded with shock and horror. As news of the incident reached world capitals, there was condemnation.

The London-based Amnesty International which deplored the attack and declared it as a "breach of international humanitarian standards", called on the LTTE to "make a clear statement condemning the killing." A statement issued by AI said Mrs. Yogeswaran "although as a Mayoress of Jaffna, had important political responsibilities, cannot be considered in any capacity to have taken a direct part in the conduct of hostilities."

Amnesty International appealed to the LTTE to "ensure that such attacks by the LTTE, or by forces under LTTE control, on civilians taking no direct part in hostilities will not be tolerated."

The AI statement also had a note of caution to the Government. It appealed to "authorities engaged in the investigation of her death to follow procedures which conform to international standards relating to arrest and detention."

The US Government also came out strongly. The State Department said "we strongly condemn this senseless act of violence."

Even before these responses became public, there appeared to be a surprisingly sudden change of mind by Sangiliyan Force.

Mr. Vidyatharan received another hand written note from the Sangiliyan Force on Monday. Signed by K. Maniappan who called himself the Chief Spokesman, the note in Tamil said

"We very much regret that our colleagues who are in charge of Jaffna district have given a wrong news to Uthayan news organisation that our cadres shot dead Mrs. Sarojini Yogeswaran as they believed in unconfirmed information."

The note said "it is true" the Sangiliayan Force gave warnings to "all members of local bodies." It added that Mrs Sarojini Yogeswaran was also included in their hit list.

Contradicting its previous position, the second note claimed "at a time when we were about to implement our action, we are very much thankful to those who have killed Mrs. Yogeswaran and made our work easy. One of the Tamil parties who have an eye on the chair has done this killing. Whatever it may be, we say our thanks once again to those who have made our task easy."

Why did the so called Sangiliyan Force first admit to the killing and later retract from the position that it carried out the attack. That is,whilst admitting that Mrs. Yogeswaran was very much on their hit list and faced "action."

Military Intelligence believes the shift in stance was to ward off increased local and international criticism over the action. "They did not expect such a heavy backlash of public opinion," declared one senior intelligence source. But the second note which denied that the Sangiliyan Force executed the attack nevertheless held out fresh warnings. If the first note spoke of only local councillors, the second covered State officials in the peninsula. For obvious reasons, I refrain from identifying the various categories. It would be suffice to say the move is part of an organised plan to intimidate state sector officials and thus disrupt the process of civil administration being fully restored.

That seemed a significant development and appeared to be the immediate phase after the increase in levels of LTTE infiltration into the peninsula. Coupled together with moves to introduce a television broadcast in the area, they were all clear signs that Jaffna has become a focal point for LTTE actions. This is whilst the security forces were focused on "Operation Jaya Sikurui" (Victory Assured) to link the peninsula to the rest of the country. Therefore, if and when that objective is achieved, the LTTE expects to bring about a destabilised Jaffna. Of course the security forces are alive to that possibility.

This move came in the backdrop of other measures by the Joint Operations Headquarters (JOH) to keep on rails its major pre-occupation in the past one year - the conduct of "Operation Jaya Sikurui" (or Victory Assured) now running on its second year.

Navy Commander, Vice Admiral Cecil Tissera, had early this week ordered his men to take charge of inshore security tasks in Kayts, Velanai and Karainagar, areas which were under the 514 Brigade. The troops there were re-inducted to the Wanni where a major thrust to re-capture the strategic Mankulam junction.is due to begin any time now. As a prelude to the move, defences in areas already re-captured were last week strengthened with the induction of more personnel.

The man who is running the military machine against the LTTE, Deputy Defence Minister, General Anuruddha Ratwatte, was in the Wanni yesterday with the service commanders to check on preparations for a renewed offensive. Needless to say the new move will receive greater media attention once it gets underway.

On Thursday night, Gen. Ratwatte hosted a dinner for media personnel at the Senior Officer's Mess at Army Headquarters. Senior military officials were on hand but the Deputy Minister, unlike on previous occasions, did not use the opportunity to declare another deadline. He mingled freely with the 70 invitees which included security forces top brass and the Director of Information, Ariya Rubasinghe.

The fresh offensive to re-capture Mankulam will undoubtedly be a crucial one. Military Intelligence has already reported that LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran has briefed his key leaders on the need to defend Mankulam "at any cost." In fact there was hectic activity in the LTTE side of Wanni early this week.

NGO vehicles that went into the area on official business were not allowed to return since last Tuesday. So were lorries that carried food supplies. In a preventive move, security forces installations in the Wanni were put on a high level of alert from last Tuesday.

Pointing out that the re-capture of Mankulam is vital to the Government's image and that it planned to use it for a major propaganda offensive for the forthcoming Provincial Council elections, Prabhakaran had told his leaders that they should use minimum cadres with maximum fire power. He has recommended the use of heavy machine guns on the forward-most defences of Mankulam and more at vital locations to "cause maximum destruction."

Military Intelligence has also reported that Prbhakaran has discussed a major plan to attack key complexes in Kanakarayankulam and to follow that up with missions to cut off supplies to this area from the sourthern and northern directions. As a part of this mission, LTTE cadres who are operating inside the cleared areas are carrying out reconnaissance missions on helipads so they can take on helicopters which bring in supplies or evacuate casualties, MI has warned.

Senior officials in the security establishment believe that a re-capture of Mankulam, just ahead of the forthcoming SAARC summit in Colombo in July, will augur well for the Government. They are also mindful of efforts the LTTE may make to trigger off incidents to deny the advantages the summit will accrue.

Military Intelligence has noted that during his meeting with key leaders, Prabhakaran had spoken of the need to deny to the Government the advantages internationally and locally. According to an MI warning, some of their actions are aimed at preventing one leading SAARC country from taking part and the other is to trigger off incidents in City suburbs before the summit begins. A high ranking security source said measures to counter both threats were in place.

The developing posture between the Government and the LTTE increasingly indicates different and opposite strategies. The Government relying on "Operation Jaya Sikurui" as its central offensive, almost to the exclusion of other operations of any significance elsewhere, as against an LTTE strategy based on widespread and dispersed small-scale operations whilst retaining the ability to concentrate against "Operation Jaya Sikurui."

It is obvious that the LTTE strategy is designed to deny the military the ability to concentrate by compelling it to widespread deployment to counter their "flea bite" tactics thus thwarting government focus on "Operation Jaya Sikurui".

To overcome that problem the government will require massive inputs of both men and material. A build-up which will be so time consuming that it will make it most unlikely that the aim of "Operation Jaya Sikurui" could be achieved this year, or even perhaps challenge its completion in the next, which is the pre-election year of this government. The resulting military, political and economic pressure on the government of such a strategy compounded with a gamut of other political compulsions could give the LTTE, it hopes, a bargaining advantage over the government and enhance its image both internationally and amongst its diaspora.

Or else, at worst the war will drag on and put under pressure a newly elected government, whoever, with whom the LTTE hopes they could gain a political upper hand under duress for an advantageous solution from a war weary and economically drained nation.

Time is on their side, an accepted tenet in guerrilla doctrinaire. The much publicised declarations that given l5,000 additional men one could achieve the aim of Operation Jaya Sikurui, seems in the context of a realistic assessment somewhat optimistic, to say the least.

A logical question would be, if that is the required shortfall to consolidate and recommence the offensive after being stalled a bit over half way of the operation, will that strength suffice to go through with the balance. Especially with the LTTE resistance to "Operation Jaya Sikurui" getting stiffer, as should be expected, as the operation gains ground.

In raising the question, it is not to under estimate the capability of the security forces but rather to impress the need for a realistic assessment of the ground situation in the context of LTTE aims and strategies, without regard to illogical hollow and self seeking political demands.

The obvious miscalculations made in the first year of "Operation Jaya Sikurui" dictates that the second stage of the operation is carried out with military professionalism.

As much as the military is obliged to conduct itself professionally, the government should leave the military free to execute military plans once the politico-military strategy has been decided. Not to have done so, some high ranking military officials have told me, was one reason for the tardiness of the first year of "Operation Jaya Sikurui".

The execution of the Mayoress of Jaffna, Mrs Sarojini Yogeswaran, leaves no doubt that the LTTE will by insidious tactics attempt to deny the government any political control of the north and east, and that they will neither contend with any competition to them as the self-acclaimed representatives of the Tamils.

In the manner of true terrorists, they employ harsher punishment on their own following. Not only has this been manifest in international terrorist movements but also the LTTE murder of hundreds of Tamil politicians, state officers and civilians, men and women, amply proves the fact.

After l6 years of militancy, the LTTE have come back to square one, emulating the murders of Alfred Durraiappa and other Tamils who represented both Tamils as well as the larger polity of this country. To regard this as a sign of frustration, as a result of being cornered in the Wanni, as camouflaged political egotists will want to do, is to under estimate the will and cruelty of the LTTE. There are many, many other brave Tamils who will run the gauntlet of the LTTE to represent their people within a democratic framework.

To do so, a realistic government umbrella of security is essential. To bring about confidence in democracy is essential for the people of Jaffna, or any other area claimed by the LTTE, to resist coercion through murder, violence and resist the forces of terrorism. Only by doing so can terrorism be defeated.

Military strategies should be tailored to that end. Stop-start operations for political one-upmanship (party or individual) is short sighted and unproductive. A realistic politico-military strategy should be evaluated at a national level so that there will be continuity of policy in tackling this burning issue irrespective of vagaries of politics. To this end, the political establishment is answerable.

This unfortunately for Sri Lanka is where there is no light at the end of the barrel.

The Fifth Column

Editorial/Opinion Contents