24th October1999

Ghost attack mars 'Watershed' victory

Deputy Defence Minister, Anuruddha Ratwatte, was in an exceptionally buoyant mood last Wednesday.

Moments after arriving at Kanakarayankulam, he sat down to watch video footage of the latest military offensive of the security forces -"Operation Watershed." He was joined by Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Srilal Weerasooriya, Air Force Commander, Air Marshal Jayalath Weerak-kody and DIG Lionel Karunasena, who was representing the Police Chief. In a second Mi-17, which was chasing the VIP helicopter, was Navy Commander, Vice Admiral Cecil Tissera. He joined in too.

The footage showed details of Tiger guerrilla casualties, with bodies of dead strewn around, weapons, documents seized from the enemy and the newer areas brought under security forces control.

Later Minister Ratwatte chaired a conference of senior officers, Brigade Commanders and Commanding Officers at the 55 Division headquarters. He congratulated the officers and men for what he called the successful conduct of "Operation Watershed" and for the damage inflicted on the enemy during the three day long offensive.

That not only lit up the faces of those in the conference room. Some talked in whispers about the Minister Ratwatte giving them credit, rightfully theirs, whilst the Operational Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence, for strange reasons, attempted to divert attention from the operation by resorting to disinformation.

As revealed in these columns last week, the Op Hq said in a news release:

"On 14 October 1999 around 11 am in general area East of Ampakamam, terrorists launched an attack on to the forward defence line with machine guns and mortars. Troops retaliated effectively with artillery causing heavy casualties among the terrorists.."

"This Op Hq MOD claim caused serious concerns at the highest levels of the security establishment. After the revelations in the Situation Report last week, top officials were ascertaining why such a news release containing wrong and misleading information was issued as an official news release.

Concerns were heightened because of a perception at the higher echelons that the contents of the news release not only embarrassed the Government but was also not fair by the officers and men who fought boldly, some sacrificing their lives and others sustaining injuries. If the claim of attacks on the forward defence lines have been dropped from subsequent news releases, there have been no word at all on the conduct of "Operation Watershed," which Minister Ratwatte believes is a success and has congratulated the officers and men who took part. More on that later.

The two Mi-17 helicopters carrying Minister Ratwatte and his entourage first flew to Olumadu, where the Army 55 Division's Tactical Headquarters for the conduct of "Operation Watershed" was located. There, the team received a first hand briefing on how the latest offensive progressed and how the troops succeeded in extending their defence lines. Minister Ratwatte mistakenly stepped into a hollow patch and fell down. Brigadier Boharan rushed in to help him out as the service chiefs who were close by also moved in. He was, however, unhurt. It was from there that they arrived at the 55 Division headquarters in Kanakarayankulam.

More details on the three day long "Operation Watershed" have now emerged. It began amidst light showers at 11 am on November 14. The Army let off a barrage of pre-bombardment artillery fire from 130 mm, 122 mm and 152 mm guns on locations ahead of Mankulam. It was a clear ploy which made the LTTE believe that troops were to resume an advance along A-9 Kandy-Jaffna highway – a move which the LTTE resisted for 18 long months during the conduct of "Operation Jaya Sikurui" (Victory Assured). The Government on December 4, last year, announced this operation was being called off.

It was only after troops broke out from their defences and advanced did the LTTE realise their intentions. The security forces defence lines east of the A-9 highway at Mankulam juts out into a box like area northwards upto Ampakamam, tapers down southwards to Karuppad-damuripu and extends (along the Mankulam-Mullaitivu road) to Oddusuddan. From here it goes further southwards to Nedunkerni.

The movement in effect was the advance of troops occupying the box shaped stretch of territory. They were extending the box by moving in a north easterly direction. Troops on the western (or left) flank of this advance, as well as a part of eastern flank, was led by Colonel Athula Lankadeva. Columns of troops led by Col. Athula Jayawardena followed from the western flank whilst troops led by Col. Bahar Morseth followed from the eastern flank. Leading the operation was Brigadier T.M. Boharan, General Officer Commanding the 55 Division. One Brigade from the 56 Division (561) also took part in the operation.

Earlier, troops of the second battalion of Special Forces led by Major Upul Weerasinghe moved ahead to attack enemy positions and pave the way for the advance.

If the pre bombardment of locations ahead of Mankulam with artillery fire made the LTTE believe troops had begun an advance to re-capture more of the A-9 highway, military officials believe, there were other fears when the troops continued their advance. The north easterly advance of the box like territory (the northern most stretch in the Wanni under security forces control), they say, raised fears of a possible security forces advance towards Mullaitivu now the nerve centre of LTTE activity.

From late afternoon on October 14 (Thursday), LTTE fired heavy artillery and mortars on the advancing troops. They used 122 mm artillery guns, 60 mm, 80 mm and 120 mm mortars. A bitter battle since "Operation Jaya Sikurui" had begun. Most of the firing came from the direction of Muthaiyankaddu, an area which troops earlier planned to encompass. Heavy barrages of 152mm artillery by the Army forced the LTTE to fall back from their positions.

Like on the first day, light showers continued on day two of the operation. On both days, adverse weather conditions prevented the Sri Lanka Air Force from providing air cover. But conditions improved on the third day with Mi-24 helicopter gunships and Kfir jets joining in the action. Later that day (October 16, Saturday) when "Operation Watershed" ended, troops had advanced a little over two kilometres. The extension of the box like territory had led to the re-capture of some 12 square kilometres of territory.

With the conclusion of the latest operation and the consolidation process that followed, troops killed in action were one officer and 37 soldiers. A further 15 officers and 397 soldiers were wounded, almost all of them from artillery or mortar fire.

There is still confusion over the exact Tiger guerrilla casualties. Last Sunday, the LTTE accepted 32 bodies of their cadres through the ICRC at Mankulam. They have refused to accept some bodies on the grounds that they were civilians.

Military officials insist that civilians who were hit were those busy helping the LTTE to fortify their defence lines. One high ranking source said "they were helping in this work even before the operations began. We know that some 29 civilians died as a result."

These officials insist that 129 LTTE cadres, nearly 85 per cent of them women, were killed. This figure, they claim, is based on both High Frequency (HF) and Very High Frequency (VHF) radio intercepts. However, other sources placed the figure at 65 Tiger cadres, mostly women.

And now to the claim by the Operational Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence that "terrorists launched an attack to the forward defence line with machine guns and mortars. Troops retaliated effectively with artillery causing heavy casualties among the terrorists...."

The unsuspecting media, both local and foreign, believed the Op Hq account of an LTTE attack on the security forces defences at 11 am on October 14. Reports both in Sri Lanka and abroad about this account received wide play. But it is now well known that the claimed attacks did not take place. Instead, it was at 11 am on the same date that the security forces launched "Operation Watershed."

Why then this disinformation ? Why has there been no mention of the launch of this operation, when all other operations have been announced when they have been launched or have been under way? The official media silence becomes curious when Minister Ratwatte himself has found it to be a success for the security forces. Is it not proof once again that the dissemination of information over the ongoing separatist war has been badly flawed and remains in the hands of a bunch of mediocrites in uniform? Are they not causing irreparable harm both to the image of the security forces and the country?

All this is whilst the LTTE is gaining maximum propaganda mileage. Even news of the latest fighting in the Wanni came in a news release issued from its "International Secretariat" in London. It was faxed to local and foreign media offices in Colombo.

LTTE press releases have often boasted whenever its cadres launched attacks on security forces positions. That has been their main propaganda thrust. But an LTTE press release on the latest offensive, which boasted they have "inflicted heavy casualties on the Sri Lankan troops in the fierce fighting that erupted in Mankulam area," adds that "troops attempted to over-run the front defence lines of the Tamil Tiger fighters at Ampakamam and Vavunikulam in the eastern and western flanks of Mankulam."

The question that begs answer is not only the strange reason why the Op Hq resorted to disinformation. Whatever the answer may be, the attempt at disinformation has revealed one worrisome factor-that news of the war is continuing to be managed and manipulated. A more disturbing feature is the fact that it comes in the backdrop of a 16 month old censorship, introduced on June 5, last year. Compounding the situation further is the ban on media personnel visiting the operational areas. The only exception has been the conducted tours.

The management of news from the battle areas, needless to say, poses credibility problems for the Government and casts serious doubts on whatever reports that come as official accounts on the ongoing separatist war. If this has been one of the main reasons that have eroded public support, there is no doubt it has contributed to continuing desertions and a pathetic lack of response to recruitment drives. The public who are contributing to the war effort are clearly being denied the truth. This time, strange enough, a truth which the Government would like to tell and the public would be happy to know.

If the increasing monsoonal showers has severely impeded troops advance, both during "Operation Watershed" and phase two of "Operation Rela Pahara" that followed, another factor that portends to place military offensives on hold will be the upcoming Presidential elections, most certain to be held during the second week of December, this year.

A string of incidents triggered off by the LTTE, both in the operational areas as well as outside, has left the inevitable feeling in Colombo's intelligence community that they may make attempts to scuttle the elections. The subject figured at a top level conference at the Ministry of Defence, early this week, where measures to step up security for VIPs and political leaders facing threats were discussed.

By a co-incidence, representatives of Tamil political parties met the Army's Chief of Staff, Major General Lionel Balagalle, early this week for talks on enhanced personal protection.

Although the meeting had been previously scheduled, the issuing of a proclamation by President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, on the conduct of a Presidential poll 16 months ahead of schedule, has added significance to the move.

In fact one group of representatives were known to have been in conference with Maj. Gen. Balagalle when one participant's cellphone rang. He broke the news at the conference that there would be an early Presidential poll.

It is indeed strange that the Op Hq of the Ministry of Defence that has never been slow to claim credit for any successful military gains against the LTTE should not only make a modest exception in the case of "Operation Watershed," but also go to the extent of misinforming the public by suppressing that success to a non event.

Equally curious is the fact that those known to turn military successes to a personal aggrandisement should in the case of "Operation Watershed" modestly give credit to the Army sans publicity whilst maintaining deafening silence on the disinformation exercise by the Op Hq of the MOD.

The run up to the Presidential polls coincides with the monsoon period when operations in the North will be difficult, it would seem politically sensible, in the context of the polls, to go slow on the military effort. The military inactivity could always be justified due to monsoon conditions, not altogether incorrectly. In as much as it may be desirable for the Government to go slow militarily, the operational preferences of the LTTE may well be diametrically opposite. But whether the LTTE would want to accelerate operations to a point of seeming to upset the democratic process in the country is strategic gamble.

That, in all probability, will not be to the liking of Western democracies where the LTTE are already under pressure. The best option for the LTTE to go slow with the view of pressurising a new President to negotiate peace with third party mediation.

So, whereas politico-military thinking for the next few months dictates a go slow strategy to back election manifestos declaring for a settlement of the vexed question which has dogged this island nation for decades, the reality of peace will depend on the will of the people of all communities and the wisdom of their elected leaders to place the Nation above parochial politics.

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