Rajpal's Column

21st November 1999

The fight right out from the cold

By Rajpal Abeynayake

This has got to be Wickremesinghe's biggest political gamble for a score of years. By all logical reckoning, Wickremesinghe seems to have surmised that the slice of the vote of the majority for him, cannot be increased substantially by any political acrobatics. But, he seems to have decided that the Tamil votes can tilt the balance — and minorities can win elections. (He was Prime Minister in the Premadasa regime, which essentially came to power on the minority vote).

It's a monstrous risk , but perhaps, it was taken on the advice that it was the only way in which he could tilt the balance in his favour and win the polls against an incumbent candidate who comfortably appears to be leading the race.

Wickremesinghe's gamble seems to be a defining moment in the 1999 Presidential polls, irrespective of whether he comes a cropper as a result of it or turns it to his advantage.

But, from the onset of the election campaign, Wickre-mesinghe seems to have advised himself — or been advised — to hunt for votes on the fringes.

It's a somewhat daring gambit, which at least seems to say that he believes the contest is not over until its over in these complicated times. Pundits will yearn to get their hands on the advisors who seem to have pushed Wickremesinghe into the unorthodox gambit of winning the race from the fringes.

His "pact with the people'' plan of handing over the administration of the North-East to an LTTE held interim council is a calculated risk which rests on the rationale that the move will not sufficiently alienate the Sinhala vote.

Conspiracy theorists on the other hand, will also make short work of Mr Wickre-mesinghe's plans.

The way the Wickre-mesinghe campaign has played out so far is a dream scenario for conspiracy faddists.

His first strike in the campaign was to sound audaciously confident about the fact that the Army is on his side.

Now, he follows that up with the promise that he will hand over the administration of the North-East to the Tigers, which is a promise that will normally incense the Army which is basically being told to hand over all the territory it fought for in the past five years.

Either Wickremesinghe is alienating the Army, in the hope of winning the minority vote and is therefore flailing around crazily in the hope of winning some votes — and is therefore as mad as a hatter in the process.

Or, he is a delight for the conspiracy theorists because the sequence and the audacity of his moves can prove that he is having a do - or - die ( and only that cliché can describe it ) plan to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat (and only that cliche can cap the sentence.)

Unless, improbably, the mad hatter scenario is true, Wickremesinghe seems to be conducting his election campaign to a plan this time, and whether the plan works or not, the existence of a plan seems to imbue some life into the UNP's effort.

If there is a plan , it also seems to go counter to all the commonly held deductions, which is why a million dollar price should be offered by any inquisitive analyst for deducing the real think tank behind these strategies. Going against conventional wisdom and being contrarian is risky; it also seems to be an effort to bring the UNP back to power never mind what it takes, and then proceed to think of the consequences.

The North-East interim council is probably also the counterpoint to the package that is the integral factor in the Kumaratunga campaign, which is a campaign which essentially rests on the twin strengths of Kumaratunga's personality and the promise of constitutional change .

The promise of activist constitutionalism may be full of holes (for instance, why is Kumaratunga having a Presidential election first and not a parliamentary election, if she thinks a two thirds majority for the PA will solve the country's problems?) But Kumaratunga's appeal among a massive swathe of the rural voter can almost be taken for granted.

It's almost axiomatic that she is ahead in the race.

So, perhaps , Wickre-mesinghe figures that only a radically audacious effort can win him the race. Or to re - emphasize, the more hilarious prognosis would be that he is flailing like an underrated pre-match boxer determined to make some sense out of a losing fight.

What has infused some interest into the battle is that the former conjecture may be true, which means that there is some chance that Wickremesinghe's camp may have the last laugh, when the history books are written years after the '99 campaign dust has settled.

Any victory may be improbable, but Wickre-mesinghe seems to have figured out that how to govern after he wins is an entirely different matter altogether. On a very brutal perhaps Machiavellian reading of things, he is probably right. In an atmosphere in which the ethnic problem is not anywhere near a solution, no matter who is in power, Wickremesinghe probably treats it as the lesser of his problems.

His call for an interim two year council has not aroused even a faint response of antipathy from the majority elite, except of course from the PA for political reasons, and so at least up to this point then he seems to have bargained right. He calculation is that he can win, going on the surmise that as far as the North-East is concerned, the country has nothing to lose.

He might also be thinking of coming to power and prevaricating on his interim council pledge, and he may have figured that if the PA can prevaricate he can repeat the act. If Wickremesinghe is on the money, the PA, and the country will never live this down — this audacious bid for power right out from the cold.

Hulftsdorp Hill

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