Countdown to near disaster

Outpourings from the local public to the unprecedented human tragedy, and colossal destruction, prompted the United States Embassy in Colombo this week to thank them. US media, particularly the electronic networks providing live coverage for days, used many a message of condolence and sympathy from concerned Sri Lankans. 

If that was the mood among Sri Lankans this week, most of them are unaware that a human tragedy of the proportions of the September 11 incidents in the United States, almost unfurled in their own country on Sunday, September 16, 2001. 

That was when over 200 Sea Tiger guerrillas, including suicide cadres, launched a major attack on the cargo vessel "MV PRIDE OF SOUTH," carrying 1325 policemen, troops and crew on board. A successful attack would have led to the entire lot being wiped out. That would easily have become the worst national tragedy for the nation. 

Fortunately, it was not to be for two important reasons: First, a great deal of providence came in the way. Second: The grit and courage of a few Navy personnel helped. 

The near national tragedy came just seven weeks after Black Tiger guerrilla attacks on the Sri Lanka Air Force Base and the adjoining Bandaranaike International Airport at Katunayake – till now the worst incident in the 19 year long separatist war. Some lamented advance intelligence warnings of such an attack could have helped prevent the incident. Perhaps true. Like the incidents in the US showed, it is not easy to come by such intelligence. 

Click image for a larger view

Here was a case where there were specific intelligence warnings. It came not only from the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) but also from Sri Lanka Navy's own intelligence and threat assessment reports. They warned of guerrilla attacks in the seas off Point Pedro. These reports also spoke of vessels leaving Trincomalee Port with military cargo or troops being targets. 

If that was not serious enough, there was more. The Directorate of Foreign Intelligence (DFI) warned Tiger guerrillas were to smuggle in a shipment of weapons from Kampuchea. Details of how this was procured were given. The ship was to arrive in international waters off the north eastern Mullaitivu coast from where the weapons were to be transferred into smaller boats and smuggled inland. This was despite attack craft remaining deployed in "Operation Waruna Kirana," a blockade off the seas between Chalai (north of Mullaitivu) and Alampil, since May, this year. It is at Chalai that the main Sea Tiger bases are located. 

In the wake of these warnings, Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri, flew to Trincomalee on September 7 accompanied by Director General of Naval Operations, Rear Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda, to personally oversee security measures. (Situation Report – September 9, 2001) 

These important developments apart, there was something more shocking if not appalling. The headquarters of the Eastern Naval Area in Trincomalee (area of COMEAST or Commander, Eastern Naval Area, Rear Admiral Dayananda Dharmapriya) warned Navy Headquarters in Colombo repeatedly it would be hazardous to send troops by the vessel "MV PRIDE OF SOUTH." They wanted it stopped at any cost. Apparently no one bothered. 

First to what happened. It was evening on Fri day, September 14, when workers completed loading 2,500 tons of rice on board "MV PRIDE OF SOUTH" at the Trincomalee port. The 150 metre long cargo vessel with a capacity of 8500 tons deadweight had arrived there from Colombo only that morning, after a three day voyage. 

Later, 12 Navy personnel, 89 policemen and 1209 soldiers boarded the upper deck. Together with a 14 member crew, those on board totalled 1324. Just before nightfall, the vessel moved 100 nautical miles eastwards into deep seas off Trincomalee – a standard operational procedure before veering north towards the Jaffna peninsula. 

COMEAST or Commander, Western Naval Area, Rear Admiral Dayananda Dharmapriya, had assigned two Navy gunboats – "SLNS Udara" commanded by Commander A.A.P. Liyanage and "SLNS Edithara," commanded by Lieutenant Commander A.S. Ediriweera to escort the cargo vessel. Each carried a complement of 40 Navy personnel. One night and a day later, before crack of dawn on Sunday, September 16, the vessel had reached the area of COMNORTH or Commander, Northern Naval Area, Commodore Upali Ranaweera, precisely 26 nautical miles north east of Point Pedro. It would have to travel only a further six nautical miles to rendezvous with vessels from COMNORTH awaiting to escort it to Kankesanturai port. 

In fact, "SLNS JAGATHA," and two Coastal Patrol Craft (CPC), had left the Navy base SLNS Uttara in Kankesanthurai before dawn to escort "MV PRIDE OF SOUTH" into port. The CPCs, purchased from France, were originally classed as Fast Attack Craft (FAC) but were later down graded since they were small in size and slow in performance compared to the newly acquired Fast Attack Craft. 

With barely an hour before dawn, the three escort vessels had hardly made contact with "MV PRIDE OF SOUTH" and the two accompanying gunboats, when their radios crackled. "SLNS UDARA" and "SLNS EDITHARA TWO" had observed on their radar a cluster of boats ten nautical miles ahead of them. The cluster lay between the main body, the cargo vessel and the three escort vessels heading to meet up. 

The escort vessels were some six to eight miles from the main body. Their engines went into full thrust. Those at the headquarters of COMNORTH, who heard the radio calls for help, also went into action. 

When the news reached Navy Headquarters in Colombo, Commander Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri, was away in Anuradhapura. So was the Director General of Naval Operations, Rear Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda. They were to drive later that Sunday morning to Poonewa, (South of Vavuniya) headquarters of COMNORCEN (area of Commander, North Central Area, Commodore M.R.U. Siriwardena). Vice Admiral Sandagiri was to ceremonially declare open an Officers' Mess that day by unveiling a plaque that bore his name. 

In Colombo, Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Mohan Wijewickrema, rushed to the Operations Room at Navy Headquarters to co-ordinate operations to counter the attacks in the sea off Point Pedro. 

By then, a serious situation had developed at a location some 26 nautical miles north east of Point Pedro, six nautical miles beyond the point of rendezvous. More than 20 Sea Tiger boats, resembling Inshore Patrol Craft (IPC) and fitted with 23 mm guns, had surrounded "MV PRIDE OF SOUTH." There were at least ten guerrillas in each boat. Aboard three to four of these boats were suicide cadres though the number in each of them is not known. 

Fire from the Sea Tiger boats began to rain on "MV PRIDE OF SOUTH" and the two accompanying gunboats. Deafening explosions lit up the pre-dawn sky. As one soldier on board the cargo vessel described to a relative, it was louder than the sound of fireworks during a New Year's eve. 

Panic stricken police and troops on the upper deck hurriedly scattered to take up secure positions. Soon, hundreds were firing their own weapons at the boats. Some even pulled out General Purpose Machine Guns (GPMGs) and Minimi Machine Guns (MMGs) they were carrying to their camps in Jaffna and were directing volleys of fire at the Sea Tiger flotilla. 

The gunboats engaging the Sea Tigers fired repeatedly from their 30 mm Giat guns. Navy personnel on board saw two guerrilla craft explode into fireballs. They also saw some other boats being hit. Just then, one of the Coastal Patrol Craft (P 251) tasked to rendezvous and escort the cargo vessels to port moved ahead to engage a Sea Tiger boat. In no time it lost radio contact with other Navy vessels and COMNORTH. There was no word from Chief Petty Officer Dissanayake, who was commanding the CPC and the nine men on board. 

Senior Navy officials have pieced together, from sketchy accounts of those who took part in the battles, a story on what could have happened to CPC P 251. It appeared that the CPC, also known as Baby Dvora, had been rammed by a guerrilla "suicide boat." Many had heard a loud explosion just when radio contact with P 251 was lost. 

When dawn broke the crescendo of the fire fight increased. Two Mi-24 Hind helicopter gunships from the Sri Lanka Air Force rushed to the deep sea battle area. When they began strafing guerrilla boats, a pilot in one of the helicopter gunships observed a smoke trail. A Surface to Air missile fired from a Sea Tiger boat was speeding towards his helicopter. He did a few manoeuvres and avoided the missile. The two Mi-24s later withdrew from the area. 

As fears grew that "MV PRIDE OF SOUTH" may sink if it was badly hit, thus placing the lives of 1325 persons in jeopardy, authorities in Jaffna ordered it to alter course. The vessel began moving away. 

Those at COMEAST headquarters rushed more vessels to join the fray as "MV PRIDE OF SOUTH" moved slowly towards deep waters. Four Dvora patrol craft operating near Chalai and Mullaitivu, as part of "Operation Waruna Kirana" naval blockade, were diverted to join the sea battles. Later, five more Dvora Fast Attack Craft from COMNORTH and four from COMEAST were rushed. 

The fact that the Sea Tiger boats emerged from their base at Chalai to carry out last Sunday's attacks raised questions on the efficacy of "Operation Waruna Kirana," which is known to be sapping a substantial volume of the Navy's resources. The area covered by this blockade extended from Chalai to Alampil. 

As the cargo ship was moving away, fighting escalated between Sea Tiger boats and Naval craft. In a sudden development, a Dvora Fast Attack Craft (P 465) was surrounded by enemy boats. Heavy guerrilla fire crippled the Dvora skippered by Sub Lieutenant Vithana. Six of the 17 Navy personnel on board were killed. All others, except one sailor, sustained injuries. The Dvora 465 was now drifting and fears for the lives of those on board grew. Naval craft attempting to move towards the crippled Dvora came under fire from Sea Tigers. 

It is during moments like this that one is reminded of the dictum, when the going gets tough, the tough get going – the motto of Sri Lanka Army's elite commandos. A Navy officer was inspired by the message. After nearly two hours of high sea gun battles, Lieutenant Commander Halaldeen, Commander of the Dvora Fast Attack Craft P 472 fought his way through the ring of Sea Tiger boats. He brought P 472 alongside the crippled Dvora (P 465). Though other Navy vessels fired at Sea Tiger Boats, P 472 also was forced to dodge fire while carrying out this delicate rescue operation. Lt. Cmdr. Halaldeen thus succeeded in towing the crippled Dvora to Kankesanthurai port. His brave deed and that of his men are to be rewarded. 

More Naval craft that rushed to the scene were engaging Sea Tiger vessels. Some took time off to return to port to re-fuel and went back to allow others to follow suit. Towards evening, when the fighting receded, Naval vessels and Sea Tiger boats were positioned at a distance, one facing the other. They were within visible distance of one another but were only engaging sporadic gun fire. 

"MV PRIDE OF SOUTH" had by then travelled almost a 100 nautical miles away from the scene of the battles. Instructions went out from headquarters of COMNORTH to return to port along with the two accompanying gunboats. Two Mi-24 helicopter gunships flew out to provide air cover to the cargo vessel. Dusk had fallen when it reached the outer harbour area at Kankesanthurai. It could not be berthed alongside. Hence, the policemen and troops had to be transferred to smaller vessels and brought ashore. Those injured were immediately rushed to Palaly hospital or airlifted to Colombo. 

When the 13 hour long deep sea battles, described by senior Navy officials as the worst in their 19 year long war with Tiger guerrillas ended, 11 Navy personnel were dead and 24 more were wounded. A further ten on board the CPC P251 have been declared missing in action but are feared dead. Thirty eight Army personnel on board "MV PRIDE OF SOUTH" were injured, eight of them critically. 

The Sea Tiger operations were led by its leader, Soosai. One of his confidantes, Perambalam, who led the Sea Tiger attack on Trincomalee port on October 23, last year, (Situation Report – December 31) and ten others were killed. Intercepts of guerrilla radio transmissions spoke of three "Lieutenant Colonels" and three "Majors" among them. 

Last Sunday's incident involving a near national tragedy laid bare some shocking revelations. It appears that President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, commander-in-chief or the Ministry of Defence, were not made aware of the fuller magnitude and implications of this major incident. Not even the National Security Council which discussed the incident last Monday. 

Otherwise, it is inconceivable why a full and impartial inquiry was not ordered over a matter which is of utmost concern to national security interests and well being of the security establishment itself. 

The most important is the repeated warnings sent by headquarters of COMEAST to Navy Headquarters in Colombo about "MV PRIDE OF SOUTH." The dangers posed would have been clear even to the most dim witted. The message sent by headquarters COMEAST to NHQ on September 14, the day the cargo vessel arrived in Trincomalee to pick up the cargo of rice, the policemen and troops is revealing. This is what it said: 

"From COMEAST TO NHQ: 

"Observed following wrt (with regard to) MV Pride of South A. Immense difficulties when manoeuvring / berthing / off due less power. B. Deteriorating hull condition. C. Unnecessary deployment of limited escort units due slow speed. Para: 2. Hence strongly recommend utilization of vessel for troop transfer to be ceased considering the securing/onboard hazardous conditions involving lives." Para 3. My 092140/07 also relevant." 

Even as early as June 9, this year, headquarters of COMEAST had sent a strongly worded message (referred in last line above). This is what it said: 

"From COMEAST to NHQ "MV Pride of South left CBO (Colombo) and expected to reach KKS (Kankesanthurai) 2200/05. Observed vessel at an average speed of 04 knots throughout passage. 

"04 FGBs (fast gun boats) deployed to provide close quarter escort within eastern area under adverse sea condition and 03 developed machinery/hull defects whilst on task. Due chartering of ships which are not conformity to standards laid down the SLN will lead to unnecessary deployment of limited resources available causing following: (a) excessive running hours leading to unexpected maintenance/material fatigue (b) human fatigue leading to reduction of fighting efficiency of crew ( c ) security threat due slow speed as maintaining in critical area for prolonged period. Hence strongly recommend due consideration be given when chartering vessel for missions / off chartering of above vessel with immediate effect." 

Evidently, senior officials at Navy Headquar ters did not pursue any action. No one appears to have bothered to raise issue with relevant authorities, either in the Navy or any institution outside. If they did, whoever responsible had not chosen it fit to take appropriate action. Was it pressure from powerful interests or due to other sinister reasons ? Only an impartial investigation will reveal answers. This is why "MV PRIDE OF SOUTH" ended up in Trincomalee on September 14 and figured in the Navy's worst sea battle two days later. 

With a divine intervention, and the courage of a group of Navy personnel, "MV PRIDE OF SOUTH" and the men on board were saved. On September 18, the cargo vessel returned to Trincomalee. That very day headquarters of COMEAST sent Navy Headquarters another message. It said: 

"From COMEAST to NHQ Observed damages / casualties on board main body/escort units during initial confrontation maximized as MV Pride of South unable to clear enemy cluster / confronting area due lack of speed / poor manoeuvrability. (2) Strongly recommend when chartering vessels for troops/defence cargo transfers SLN team to inspect and ascertain suitability of such vessels for the task." 

The next day, Navy Headquarters hit back at COMEAST with a terse four liner. It said: 

"Your 182034. Incongruous. Note that SLN has no involvement in chartering ships for military commitments. What is provided by CGES (Commissioner General of Essential Services) been utilized." 

The Sunday Times learnt COMEAST was admonished for the messages sent to Navy headquarters and warned not to repeat such messages. 

It is true that the Sri Lanka Navy was divested of responsibility of chartering ships by President Kumaratunga following a spate of complaints of alleged irregularities. This came when Admiral Cecil Tissera, now retired, was the Commander. 

No one in their right senses would say the lives of 1324 persons is incongruous. How Navy Headquarters, or more particularly the official or officials responsible, came to this frivolous conclusion is not clear. Was it not their moral, if not official responsibility, to have pursued warnings sent out by headquarters of COMEAST. 

If "MV PRIDE OF SOUTH" was chartered by the Commissioner General of Essential Services (CGES), why was no effort made to pursue action with his officials ? The Sunday Times learnt some Navy officials now claim the message from headquarters of COMEAST was faxed to the office of the CGES. They argue it was left to CGES officials to pursue action. 

Very often, troops are transported by the Ceylon Shipping Corporation vessel "Lanka Muditha." However, it had called at Trincomalee on the evening of September 15 with a group of internally displaced persons to Jaffna. It had been arranged by the Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP). This vessel with a speed of over 10 knots per hour was due in Kankesanthurai on September 16 but had heard on its radio about the confrontation in the high seas. It had ventured into deep waters and did not arrive at KKS till September 17. 

The fact that 1325 lives on board "MV PRIDE OF SOUTH" was saved, quite clearly, does not absolve officials at Navy Headquarters complacently dismissing warnings on the grounds that the cargo vessel was not chartered by them. What would have been the position if the vessel was attacked and a large number of lives lost in what might have been a national tragedy ? 

The fact that it did not happen does not mean all has ended well. Imagine the feelings of the police and the troops on board "MV PRIDE OF SOUTH", moving at three to four knots per hour not sure of their lives for almost 13 hours. The equivalent land speed would have been approximately three to four miles per hour – a little faster than a bullock cart but much slower than even a three wheeler auto rickshaw. Would not such a situation lead to desertions, particularly at a time when the Army is about to embark on a fresh recruitment drive. 

Another is the painful personal sacrifice police and troops deployed in the north make. Unlike politicians, they do not have the comfort of awaiting the arrival of new Pajeros, Prados, BMWs and double cabs to replace what many already possessed. 

To the 12 Navy personnel, 89 policemen and 1209 soldiers – who, like their colleagues, are the real heroes of this 19 year long separatist war – the 60 hour ordeal on board the cargo vessel, to say the least, was humiliating. With only six toilets on board the cargo vessel, they endured hardships. They ate from their ration packs (pre-cooked meals) usually consumed in the battlefield where the luxury of a hot meal is denied. 

The attack and the departure of "MV PRIDE OF SOUTH into the deep seas after the attack forced most to starve. Hearing of this, COMNORTH dispatched 400 packets of rice and curry by small boats to the cargo vessel which was then heading for Kankesanthurai. The lucky ones ate but the majority starved until they came ashore. 

This is why President Kumaratunga should order a full investigation and punish those responsible. That will show that the sacrifice those men in uniform make serving in the peninsula is not in vain. It will also assure their next of kin that the government cares for their dear, loved ones. 

In the wake of military reversals in the Wanni in 1999, she ordered a tri-service Court of Inquiry. Seven Army officers including two Majors General were sent on compulsory leave on the findings of this Court. Disciplinary action was also taken against two Navy officers who were found guilty of lapses. They were deprived of courses abroad among other matters. 

But in a surprise development, one senior Navy official has been named to review all the punishment meted out. This was whilst they were allowed to undertake official trips abroad. 

This is not only in marked contrast to the se vere punishment meted out to seven Army officers, but also to the punishment that is due to be meted out to those found negligent during the July 24 attacks on the Sri Lanka Air Force base and the adjoining Bandaranaike international airport at Katunayake. Already SLAF Base Commander at Katunayake, Air Commodore R.A. Ananda, now under interdiction, has been indicted in the Magistrate's Court for criminal negligence. Needless to say the move smacks of double standards. 

Commander Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri told senior defence officials this week he had asked a senior official not to assign "MV PRIDE OF SOUTH" to carry troops but he had not heeded his advice. The Navy Chief has also said he wondered whether last Sunday's deep sea battles were used by the Tiger guerrillas to smuggle in military hardware from somewhere in the north east coast. 

Reports in the Sinhala media in the recent weeks have spoken of growing infighting and factionalism in the Navy – a disturbing development which does not augur well for morale and a factor which the Ministry of Defence cannot continue to ignore. 

In their long thrust to regain control of the Jaffna town, Tiger guerrillas have embarked on a campaign to destabilise the east and attack Naval targets. Hence, the role of the Sri Lanka Navy is most important to the Government's military efforts, both offensive and defensive than anytime before.

The Fifth Column

Editorial/ Opinion Contents