Are Tigers preparing for offensive before polls?

Four different Sea Tiger units were engaged on the same net. One unit responding to the call sign Eight Two was directing Eight Three to move towards a secret location off the north eastern Mullaitivu coast code named D 1. Waiting there for the arrival of the Sea Tiger boats was Suman, the Sea Tiger leader responsible for transporting and unloading cargo. 

That intercept was to come as confirmation that Tiger guerrillas have succeeded in smuggling in another consignment of military hardware, though what it contained still remains a mystery. What is significant about the latest discovery is that the latest quantity was brought in hours after Sea Tiger guerrillas and Naval craft fought bitter gun battles in the seas off Point Pedro only last Sunday morning. 

A Navy FAC in action

Were these part of the consignment the Navy intercepted on the run up to the gun battles? Did some of the Sea Tiger logistics boats veer deeper into international waters after fighting broke out at mid sea to return under cover on Monday night? 

Or was it a shipment transferred in the international waters from ships into Sea Tiger logistics boats? The answers to these questions are still not known. 

As revealed in these columns last week (Situation Report – October 21), what is known quite clearly is that the Tiger guerrillas are continuing with their arms build up. Repeated deep sea confrontations with the Navy have not deterred them. And last Sunday's encounter is no exception. Here is what happened. 

The Commander of the Navy, Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri, alerted the Eastern and Northern Naval Area Headquarters in Trincomalee and Jaffna respectively, shortly after 9.30 a.m. last Sunday. He had learnt that a flotilla of Sea Tiger vessels, made up of patrol craft and logistics boats specially constructed to carry military cargo, was some 60 nautical miles off Point Pedro. They were heading towards the shores in Chalai where the Sea Tigers operate a main base. 

Naval craft deployed in "Operation Varuna Kirana," the Naval blockade in the north eastern seas off the coast from Chalai to Alampil, were asked to engage the incoming Sea Tiger fleet. As they moved out, Vice Admiral Sandagiri, tried to reach out to the Commander of the Air Force, Air Marshal Jayalath Weerakkody. He learnt that the latter was on his way to the SLAF base at Katunayake, now a routine exercise to ensure security measures in place after the Black Tiger attacks on July 24 on the airbase and the adjoining Bandaranaike International Airport remained on high gear. 

As an aide to the Air Force Commander explained, Air Marshal Weerakkody had learnt of the attack even before he could reach Katunayake or received a call from Vice Admiral Sandagiri. His radio in the car was tuned to a Sinhala news channel. 

There, the Navy's Media Spokesman, Commander Jagath Ranasinghe, tasked with an onerous public relations and damage control assignment, had already announced to the radio that heavy fighting had broken out between the Navy and the Sea Tigers. His forecast was to come right barely an hour later. 

Fighting broke out shortly after 10.10 a.m. some 55 miles east of Point Pedro between five Sea Tiger boats and Fast Attack Craft assigned to "Operation Varuna Kirana." One Sea Tiger logistic boat was destroyed. Re-inforcements for the Navy came from Trincomalee and Kankesanturai. For the guerrillas, more boats arrived from their base in Chalai. In the subsequent fighting, the Navy destroyed two more Sea Tiger patrol boats. Other guerrilla boats withdrew. 

The Operational Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence said in a news release last Sunday that "it is believed at least 20 LTTE cadres were either seriously injured or killed in the confrontation." However, the clandestine Voice of Tigers radio, heard in the Wanni, claimed five Sea Tiger cadres were killed. They were "senior" personnel according to the names given – "Black Sea Tiger Major" Rosha (Ganeshan Katpukkarasi of Jaffna, a female cadre), "Captain" Senthalir (Isithor Maryluths, Jaffna), "Lt." Vinothan (Yokeswaran Thilipkumar, Kilinochchi), "Captain" Sellappan (Ramayah Makenthiran, Vavuniya) and "Major" Siva (Velayuthan Thayaparan, Jaffna). 

The VoT broadcast accused Sri Lanka Air Force jets, that were called in to support the Navy, of bombing the coastal villages of Puthumaathalan and Ampalavanapokkanai. However, an Air Force spokesman denied the charge. Senior Navy officials say the Sea Tiger logistics boat was carrying a load of ammunition although the exact variety is not known. This is after eye witness reports from Navy personnel that they saw a series of secondary explosions which continued for a long time after the logistics boat was hit. 

A series of interception of Sea Tiger logistics runs by the Navy has undoubtedly posed problems to the Tiger guerrillas. Navy officials believe that the guerrillas are hit by fuel supplies – the result of supplies being intercepted. They say intercepts of rebel radio communications have confirmed this. 

Among the major interceptions of guerrilla logistics runs in the recent past were: October 5 – Seven Sea Tiger boats on a logistics run were confronted by the Navy. One boat was destroyed and another was damaged. A Navy Dvora Fast Attack Craft was also damaged. October 14 – Sri Lanka Air Force bombers destroyed a guerrilla logistics boat and damaged another. It transpired that six boats, which set out to sea from Mullaitivu, were a deception to enable a military consignment to be smuggled in from an unknown location in the north east coast. This has been confirmed through intelligence channels. A similar operation had also been carried out in September. 

"I am sure they (the Tiger guerrillas) are badly short of fuel and ammunition," says Navy Commander, Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri in an interview with The Sunday Times.

With the onset of the North East monsoon, the coming weeks are referred to by security officials as the "honeymoon period" for the LTTE. The reference is to the heavy rains and choppy seas which make Naval and ground operations for the military difficult thus allowing the guerrillas a distinct advantage. 

The fact that it comes in the backdrop of the upcoming Tiger guerrilla "heroes" week culminating in the annual "policy" statement by leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, makes the setting a worrisome one for the security establishment. 

As Foreign Minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar, declared in an interview with The Sunday Times last week, there would be no offensive military operations in the coming weeks. He said that would remain unless something happens on the part of the LTTE to disturb the situation. 

There are clear indications that the Tiger guerrillas are stepping up their attacks on military targets, both in the north and east. The likelihood of stepped up attacks in the east in particular has now been confirmed by state intelligence agencies. Such action, as Mr. Kadirgamar warns, would draw security forces retaliation. 

With nominations over yesterday for the December 5 Parliamentary general election, it is not only a polls war that will begin tomorrow. The question is whether Tiger guerrillas will also provoke another war with the security forces as a prelude to enhancing their own bargaining position with a newly elected Government. 
 

We have dealt a severe blow: Navy Chief

"Recent deep sea encounters by the Navy with Sea Tiger boats bringing in fuel and ammunition are very clear evidence of this," he told The Sunday Times. Here are excerpts from an interview: 

ON THE LATEST INTERCEPTION OF GUERRILLA LOGISTICS 

MOVEMENTS: Last Sunday morning, Naval craft in the second barrier line located the movement of the LTTE ships. They spotted Sea Tiger boats with supplies loaded from mother ships heading towards the shore. Four FACs (Fast Attack Craft) moved close. They were followed by gunboats deployed in the first barrier. They spotted a logistics vessel. It was having a speed problem. It was destroyed. Re-inforcements had to be rushed from Trincomalee and Kankesanthurai. 

For the LTTE, it was a case of seeking re-inforcements from Chalai, the Sea Tiger base north of Mullaitivu. The time taken by them to arrive at the scene is shorter since they are always closer to the scene of the incident. On the other hand, it takes a while for our re-inforcements to arrive in view of the long distance they have to travel. 

THE IMPACT OF THE RECENT NAVY INTERCEPTIONS: 

It has dealt a hard blow to the LTTE. We have prevented them from smuggling in large quantities of fuel. We know it has hurt them. 

THE WORKING OF 'OPERATION VARUNA KIRANA": 

Despite constraints on our resources, we have been able to obtain substantial results. The fact that we have placed a blockade between the seas off Chalai and Alampil has helped us to make several interdictions of logistics movements. Of course, we will continue to strengthen "Varuna Kirana" when more and more resources become available. 

Even before "Operation Varuna Kirana" was in place, when there were threats to our craft, I have taken measures to deploy them suitably. 

Last April 18, on the eve of the anniversary of the so called Eelam War III, I ordered that all vessels move out of the Trincomalee harbour. If there were attacks on the port, no vessel would have been there. On the other hand, if they had planned any attacks on vessels, we were ready in full strength to take them on. 

INCREASE IN SMUGGLING OF MILITARY HARDWARE: 

We have not been able to identify all items they (the LTTE) are known to have smuggled in. But I am sure they are badly short of fuel and ammunition. They need the fuel to run their vehicles. There are also signs they are getting ready for another confrontation. 

With the available resources, we have been able to prevent them from having a free run. We will soon track down their mother ships from which the cargo is loaded into smaller vessels in international waters to be smuggled into the country. 

My officers and men are doing a very difficult job very well with the resources available to them. When we do receive more resources, I am confident we can cut off their supplies. Ninety per cent of the battle can then be won for the LTTE depends on supplies from outside to sustain this high intensity war. I have identified all the means and what we should do. But we don't have all the wherewithal. But soon things can change.