The LTTE leader, V Prabhakaran, and his aide, Anton Balasingham, told a press conference last week that their talks with the government in Thailand would focus on the details of an interim administration for the north-east. Outlining a solution embodying the right to self-determination, homeland and a recognition of its distinct nationality as the LTTE alternative to Eelam, Mr. Balasingham said the government was not "politically stable or powerful enough" to offer this at the moment. Instead, the LTTE had suggested an interim administration, he said.

Mr. Balasingham reasoned that the tense co-habitation of the government of the Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe, with the presidency of his political opponent, Chandrika Kumaratunga, made a permanent solution that was acceptable to the LTTE impossible for now. Once an interim administration was set up, the LTTE would be ready to go for negotiations on a permanent settlement to the conflict, he added.
But the same demands were rejected at the 1985 Thimpu talks as a virtual recipe for secession, and it is doubtful if even the most stable Sri Lankan government can offer a solution that incorporates these principles.

Mr. Wickremesinghe has chosen to see hope for a settlement within a united Sri Lanka in the phrase "internal self-determination" used by Mr. Balasingham.
"If autonomy and self-government is given to our people, then we can say that internal self-determination is to some extent met," the 62-year-old political advisor to Mr. Prabhakaran said.

Responding to this, Mr. Wickremesinghe indicated he was willing to consider this demand, pointing out governing systems with "internal self-determination" were in operation in many parts of the world and had even existed in medieval Sri Lanka.
Though this is a political Pandora's Box, Mr. Wickremesinghe's generosity might have been part based on the knowledge that the stage for substantive political discussions is far away. For now, both sides are focused only on an interim administration.
The proposed interim administration is expected to give the LTTE political control of the north-east, with the government legitimising its present de facto control over many parts of it. The result would be a de facto Eelam, a throwback to the period between 1990 and 1995 when the LTTE ran Jaffna, but this time with the east thrown in as well, and the implicit consent of the Sri Lankan state.

The fact that it will be described as an "interim" solution might help the LTTE project the impression to its supporters in Sri Lanka and abroad that there has been no compromise on its final goal. What is in this for the government? As Mr. Balasingham rightly said at the press conference, space and time to rebuild southern Sri Lanka's economy by giving the LTTE what it wants: control of the north-east, which in any case, does not figure in the economic calculations of the south. It is now being argued that the government might as well withdraw troops stationed in the north-east, as their presence there would be superfluous, an unnecessary point of tension with the LTTE and that they would be sitting ducks in case the process breaks down.

The political calculation is that if all this happens quickly during Mr. Wickremesinghe's honeymoon period in power, the opposition will be minimal to handing over the north-east to the LTTE. To the war-fatigued people, it can be projected as an "interim" arrangement pending a final settlement. In any case, the government is not planning any constitutional changes in order to implement this set-up, which means it does not have to be taken before parliament for approval. The government believes it can also handle opposition from the President, Mrs. Kumaratunga.

How long can such an interim arrangement continue? Forever, perhaps, because of its political advantages to both sides. Unless the LTTE has more territorial ambitions, which could lead to a Cyprus-like situation, optimists argue that with time, the set-up would by itself evolve into a Serbia-Montenegro style solution. For the protagonists, India is the only problem in the unfolding scenario. So far, New Delhi has gone along with Sri Lanka's Norwegian-facilitated peace process in a distantly interested way. But the country-wide outcry and the reaction of Tamil Nadu chief minister, J Jayalalitha, at the appearance of Mr. Prabhakaran on television screens dodging questions on the Rajiv Gandhi assassination, has underlined the crucial role of India in the unfolding scenario.

But New Delhi's intentions are far from clear. It was significant that while asserting the ban on the LTTE would stay, the Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, said the only request from the Tigers pending before the government was for assisting in the medical treatment of Mr. Balasingham, and that this would be considered "sympathetically". This was at variance with an official denial some time ago of such a request from the LTTE.

At the press conference, Mr. Balasingham said despite the unfavourable public reaction to the proposal that he be allowed to live in Chennai for medical treatment and because of its proximity to the northern Sri Lanka headquarters of the LTTE, the issue was not closed yet. He expected a positive response from New Delhi within the next few weeks, he added.

Whether or not Mr. Balasingham gets the response he awaits, the larger question to which Sri Lanka now seeks an answer is how comfortable would India be with an LTTE-controlled north-east Sri Lanka, especially if Mr. Prabhakaran were to assume a public role in it. The writer is the Colombo correspondent for the Chennai-based Hindu newspaper

Goodbye to all that?
The hunt is on, officially. but the peace may show how badly New Delhi is out of touch with reality
By V. Sudarshan
When Union home minister L.K. Advani told the Rajya Sabha, on November 30, 2000, that New Delhi had requested the Sri Lankan government to extradite LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran for facing trial in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case, a few powerful men in Colombo had gone into a complete tizzy. The then Sri Lanka prime minister, Ratnasiri Wickremanayake, reportedly exploded: "We will do no such dirty thing."

Three days later, the then Sri Lankan foreign minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar, summoned the Indian high commissioner to Sri Lanka, Gopal Gandhi. Kadirgamar had just returned from London where he had read the 55 pages of the Rajya Sabha debate that his country's high commission in Delhi had faxed to him. The same evening Gandhi sent a cable to the foreign secretary saying: "I summarise his (Kadirgamar's) observation in more or less his words."

The cable quoted Kadirgamar at length: "Has a new proposal (for Prabhakaran's extradition) been made? I know of the original request and of the ritual reminders.
When I was told of this development, I wondered if there was something fresh given by your team. I checked with our legal advisor in the Sri Lankan foreign office who said nothing was given to him.... P's (Prabhakaran's) extradition in the present circumstances is not practically realisable."

What Advani had referred to in the Rajya Sabha was the visit of the Multi-Disciplinary Monitoring Agency (MDMA)-which was established in December 1998 to track down those involved in the Rajiv assassination case and were absconding-to Sri Lanka in November 2000. The three-member team had called upon Sri Lankan attorney general K.C. Kamalasabayson to discuss, as Advani had told the Rajya Sabha, different aspects of the extradition.

But even Kamalasabayson went on record claiming that the Indian team hadn't made any formal or informal request for Prabhakaran's extradition. All this shows just how complex the Prabhakaran issue is for the Indian government, now compounded by the LTTE leader's first public appearance in 12 years at Kilinochchi last week.
No longer is available to the Indian government-and its Sri Lankan counterpart-the fig leaf that concealed inaction: since Prabhakaran's whereabouts were not known, he couldn't obviously be caught and extradited.

Not willing to make the government's task any easier, the Congress has now publicly asked it to get Prabhakaran extradited. The party, obviously, feels stung by the LTTE supremo's audacity to describe the assassination as "tragic", showing no contrition for the killing he ordered. Just how politically divisive the issue is can be discerned in MDMK leader Vaiko's pleas to New Delhi to allow LTTE spokesman Anton Balasingham to seek medical treatment on "humanitarian grounds". Vaiko cited the "umbilical relationship" between the "Tamils of Eelam" and the Tamils of India to back his request.

Considering that the LTTE has been a proscribed outfit since May 1992 under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (1967), it would be unrealistic to expect New Delhi to concede to Vaiko's request. Prabhakaran also continues to be a proclaimed offender in the Rajiv assassination case, with a warrant for his arrest under TADA on January 31, 1992. India's situation is delicate, more so because Colombo is on the verge of initiating a dialogue with the LTTE.

There are also expectations that Colombo would soon lift its ban on the Tigers, a precondition Prabhakaran set in his last week's press conference for initiating talks on establishing an interim administration in north-east Sri Lanka.
(The island-nation banned the LTTE only in 1998, after it bombed the Temple of the Sacred Tooth Relic in Kandy, one of the holiest Buddhist shrines, a few days before the Sri Lanka's 50th independence anniversary.)
- Outlook, India

T'Nadu assembly adopts resolution demanding Prabha's extradition
Chennai: Amidst stiff protest from the PMK and the neutral stand taken by the main Opposition DMK, the Tamil Nadu assembly on Tuesday adopted a government resolution demanding the Centre to take steps to extradite LTTE supremo V. Prabhakaran from Sri Lanka to India to face trial in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case, in which he was the prime accused.

The resolution also demanded the Centre to send the Indian army to Sri Lanka with the consent of the government there to nab Prabhakaran if the Sri Lankan government was unable to capture him and opposed permission to LTTE men to enter India.
Leaders, cutting across their party lines, admitted that Prabhakaran should face trial, but some of them said the resolution adopted by the House should not hinder the Oslo brokered peace talks between the LTTE and Sri Lankan government to end the ethnic strife in the island republic.

Moving the resolution, Chief Minister Jayalalitha welcomed the inclusion of the LTTE in the list of terrorists organisation and be banned under the POTA, and said the Centre's 'continued silence' on some issues linked to the LTTE of late caused concern to her.
Jayalalitha said, "India cannot keep its eyes closed and be a mute spectator when the leader of a most dreaded terrorist organisation V. Prabhakaran, appearing before an international press, said that his organisation would continue its fight for a separate Tamil nation. Time has come for the Centre to take action to capture Prabhakaran".
She demanded that the Centre ban Tamil Nadu Liberation Army and Tamil National Retrieval Troops, which propagated the separate Tamil country and had "links" with the LTTE.

Prabhakaran's media conference at Kilinochchi had a direct bearing on India's security, integrity and sovereignty, she said adding that the people of Tamil Nadu had expressed lot of concern over the developments in Sri Lanka. Banning of the LTTE under POTA was an ample evidence that the organisation posed threat to Indian security. Opposing any move to allow LTTE ideologue Anton Balasingham to enter on "humanitarian considerations" for medical treatment, she said the LTTE should not be allowed to gain a foothold in Tamil Nadu.

For the sake of maintaining good relationship with the neighbouring countries, the Centre should not adopt any "casual attitude". In its efforts to get Prabhakaran extradited to face the trial in Rajiv Gandhi assassination case, she said adding there could be no two opinions on the protection of rights of Sri Lankan Tamils and peace should prevail in Sri Lanka.

PMK legislators, wearing black shirts to protest against adoption of the resolution, shouted slogans in the house, while CPI-M and CPI legislators staged a walk out opposing the plea to sending the Indian army to Sri Lanka. The Leader of the Opposition K. Anbazhagan said peace talks at Sri Lanka was like a light at the end of tunnel and at this present juncture, the resolution should not be a hindrance to the talks.

The DMK would adopt strict neutrality on the resolution, he said, adding when the Centre had clearly stated that it would not directly be involved in the talks. The demand for Prabhakaran's extradition made in 1995 was still valid and there was no need for the resolution. He said when DMK Chief Karunanidhi was the Chief Minister, the state had prevailed upon the Centre to extend the ban on the LTTE, Jayalalitha intervened to say that Karunanidhi had not written even a single letter to the Centre on this. Anbazhagan retorted the Chief Secretary to the state government had written three letters. "Do you think the Chief Secretary could have written these letters without the consent of the Chief Minister", he asked. -PTI

Sonia Gandhi insists on Prabhakaran's extradition
Congress president Sonia Gandhi said last week that the LTTE chief V. Prabhakaran was the main accused in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case. "According to the law of the land Prabhakaran stands accused in the plot to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi for which his extradition was sought by the government", a visibly emotional Gandhi told a press conference in Guwahati.

To the LTTE request to lift the ban on the outfit, the Congress president said her party was for Prabhakaran to face trial in the country as he stood accused in the assassination case." "As far as I know the Indian government's stand is also the same, Gandhi added.-PTI

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