Making
inroads: LTTE's Pongu Thamil celebrations
Beware of the
Tiger trap
Is the Govt. ready for a lightning LTTE
attack, asks S.L. Gunasekara in his new book
The
Wages of Sin by S. L. Gunasekara Review by Neville Ladduwahetty
In his new book,
aptly titled 'The Wages of Sin", S.L. Gunasekara has brought
to the attention
of the public how the LTTE through acts of terror has intimidated
and exploited the weaknesses of successive governments to gain concessions.
The latest concessions the LTTE demands are the twin goals of de-proscription
and an interim administration.
The cumulative
effect of it all is that if these two concessions are granted, the
LTTE would be in a position to establish a de facto state in the
Northern and Eastern Provinces.
The book begins
with a commentary on the prevailing attitude in the country towards
dissent. This attitude regards dissent as being anti-government.
Based on a
premise that the UNF Government received a mandate for peace, the
attitude is that the Government must be given a free hand to work
out a durable peace. In this backdrop, any criticism regarding the
far-reaching concessions being made to the LTTE under the ceasefire
agreement is portrayed as being anti-government and anti-peace.
Undaunted by
the prevailing attitudes and motivated by his sincere concern for
the country, the author lays out boldly and with characteristic
forthrightness his views regarding the weaknesses in the current
attempts to negotiate a settlement with the LTTE.
Drawing on
a history of past failures in peace talks with the LTTE, the author
challenges the Prime Minister's claim that "previous rounds
of negotiations with the LTTE broke down on the humanitarian issue".
Starting with
the Thimpu talks in 1985, and the subsequent talks that were associated
with the Indo-Lanka Accord in 1987, as well as later attempts by
the Premadasa and Kumaratunga regimes in 1990 and 1994-1995, evidence
is presented to show that negotiations broke down not because of
the failure of successive governments to address humanitarian issues,
but clearly because continued negotiations were not in the interests
of the LTTE and its agenda.
In Chapter
1 Section (vi) the author lists some of the "achievements of
the LTTE". This information is a collated record of the gruesome
atrocities committed by the LTTE in every district and every province
in Sri Lanka as well as acts of horrific violence committed in India,
including the assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi. The sheer inhumanity of these acts is beyond comprehension,
but is a revelation about the kind of mindset needed for the planning
and execution of such acts. This section also includes a list of
'prominent Tamils murdered by the LTTE'.
One particular
incident stands out for the scale of its inhumanity and brutality.
While peace talks were in progress during the Premadasa regime,
several police stations in the east were attacked by the LTTE. The
police officers at Kalmunai led by Ivan Boteju refused to surrender
and kept on fighting until he was ordered to surrender.
"No less
than 677 police officers of four police stations laid down arms
and surrendered to the LTTE after having been promised safe conduct
to and release at Ampara by the LTTE... 324 of these police officers
who happened to be Sinhalese and Muslim were taken to the jungles
of Thirukkovil, blindfolded with their hands tied behind their backs,
made to lie down on the ground and murdered with sprays of bullets
by the LTTE. The total number of Sinhalese and Muslim police officers
from the Batticaloa and Ampara Districts abducted and murdered in
captivity by the LTTE was about 600. A further 78 were abducted
from Trincomalee and murdered."
The single-minded
agenda of the LTTE is to establish a separate state within Sri Lanka.
To achieve this goal, it has used every ceasefire to extract concessions
from successive governments and these governments in their anxiety
to negotiate a favourable political solution have overextended themselves
to accommodate the demands of the LTTE. This has resulted in successive
governments being duped by the LTTE and the rebels gaining decisive
advantages at every break down of the ceasefire.
Despite the
mounting evidence of the LTTE's previous duplicity, the author asserts
that the UNF Government, too, is treading the same course as previous
governments. The author warns that this ceasefire, as happened with
previous ceasefires, is bound to break down; the only difference
being that the gains secured by the LTTE this time would be far
greater than on any previous occasion.
Attention is
drawn to the altered world-view towards terrorism following the
terrorist attack in America on September 11, 2001. The UNF Government
has failed to make maximum use of this opportunity.
The ceasefire
agreement itself is considered to be a "total illegality"
on the grounds that it is a pact with a proscribed party.
Significant
clauses in the ceasefire agreement are evaluated and analysed, and
clauses that have a bearing on security are highlighted. This analysis
exposes the one-sided nature of the agreement, with all advantages
going to the LTTE.
Special attention
is drawn to the "unqualified undertaking to recruit into the
armed forces all such members of the paramilitary groups as are
prepared to join....". The other being the undertaking given
for the armed forces to move out of strategic locations in the North
and the East regardless of the implications on national security
in the event of a resumption of hostilities.
The LTTE leader's
news conference in Kilinochchi on April 10, 2002 confirmed that
there was no change or mellowing in regard to basic issues as far
as the LTTE was concerned. The assertion by Anton Balasingham that
the President and Prime Minister of Tamil Eelam was Prabhakaran
affirmed the LTTE's commitment to Tamil Eelam in the event that
autonomy or self-government was not to their liking. The assassination
of Rajiv Gandhi was dismissed as a "tragic incident".
The fact that the Government heard only "internal self-determination"
speaks of their wishful thinking, or in the author's opinion they
were "clutching at straws".
The two issues
that are of interest to the LTTE at this juncture are de-proscription
and an interim administration which would give the LTTE official
control over the Northern and Eastern Provinces. This control will
give them the opportunity to set up a parallel administration thus
dividing the country and creating a de facto separate state. An
interim administration would give the LTTE the opportunity to muster
the civilian population to do its bidding, as for instance, demand
the withdrawal of the security forces.
The author's
view is that having created the right conditions, the LTTE, would
resort to a "lightning strike" to take control of the
two provinces because it is only total and absolute control that
would satisfy Prabhakaran's nature. The sudden strike will take
everyone by surprise and it would not be possible to roll back the
gains that would have been secured by the LTTE, even with assistance
from external sources such as India and/or the United States.
Although the
popular belief is that the LTTE is interested only in the Northern
and Eastern Provinces, the author is of the opinion that Prabhakaran
is likely to "cast his greedy eyes on the hill country where
the bulk of our water resources and hydro power reservoirs are located".
While offering
several options to meet these challenges, the author has offered
no explanation as to the current weak attitude of the Government.
For instance, what possible reason could there be for the Government
to overlook the several violations committed by the LTTE while it
rushes to satisfy any shortfalls on its part? Has the Government
fallen prey to the propaganda about the lack of funds to prosecute
a war at this particular moment? Does it mean that if the LTTE engages
in a lightning strike, the Government would not retaliate? Since
the certainty that the LTTE would restart a war is the thinking
of many analysts, the Government has to be prepared. The question
is whether the Government would be prepared to the degree proposed
by the author.
Through this
timely publication, the author has demonstrated that good men will
not remain silent. By sharing his concerns he has made the public
aware of the seriousness of the current situation. If the Government
yields to the pressures of the LTTE to set up an interim administration,
the formation of a de facto state would be inevitable. Sri Lanka
would then end up divided for the first time in its long and distinguished
history, not by armed conquest, but by default.
The book is
a "must read" for all concerned citizens.
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