Should
the constitutional council be made "Rights Free"?
The enshrining of basic, natural or moral rights in a Constitution
of a country has a singular purpose. It is this recourse to these
rights, which enable an individual to successfully resist political
power, necessarily defining in this process the limits of state authority
and the obligations of government.
The shadow
of fundamental rights has been likened to a "brooding omnipresence"
underlying every single state action by the Indian Supreme Court
and by necessary adaptation, executive and administrative action
or private action instigating the former in this country. Rights,
reasonably restricted, therefore provide the touchstone of the often
unequal relationship between state and citizen.
And it is this
touchstone that is violated when individuals or bodies wielding
authority prefer to put themselves completely outside the reach
of these rights for whatever reason.
Current thinking
of the United Front Government that the 17th Amendment ought to
be further amended in order to make decisions of the Constitutional
Council "rights free", therefore sits somewhat uneasily
with cardinal principles underlying the rule of law articulated
above.
Central to
this debate is Article 41H of the 17th Amendment which state that
no court shall have the power or jurisdiction to entertain, hear
or decide or call in question on any ground whatsoever, any decision
of the Council or any approval or recommendation made by the Council,
which shall be final and conclusive for all purposes.
However, this
Article explicitly makes provision for challenge on grounds of violation
of fundamental rights.
It is this
latter provision which is sought to be deleted, bringing into question
once again, the morality of constitutional ouster clauses with regard
to the object and purposes of the 17th Amendment.
It is interesting
in this sense that this limited ouster clause was present even in
the earlier drafts of the 17th Amendment.
One recalls
at this point that when the 17th Amendment was enacted by Parliament
late last year, it was expected predictably (and perhaps), unreasonably
to transform Sri Lanka's highly degenerate political and public
culture.
Its initial
performance during the December parliamentary elections was not
very promising as the country witnessed an Elections Commissioner
conferred with enhanced theoretical powers with regard to misuse
of state resources for example but lacking sufficient authority
to enforce these powers.
Consequent
to a new regime in December, the progress of the 17th Amendment
was unbearably slow. As six months passed, we saw the Constitutional
Council being appointed through painful consensus and listened to
reassurances by the Wickremesinghe administration on the expected
transformative changes.
One waited
therefore and watched. The possible rider that the decisions of
the Council would be made free from rights challenge is therefore
an unexpectedly negative development.
The Government
has advanced a primary justification that otherwise, the Council
would be unduly hindered in its work. This justification is however
extremely problematic for several reasons.
Under the 17th
Amendment, the Constitutional Council is a body that is semi political
in its composition, though balanced as it is sought to be, by the
inclusion of persons of eminence and integrity.
The Council
comprises the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Leader of the Opposition,
one Presidential appointee, five appointees nominated jointly by
the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition and one appointee
nominated upon agreement by the remaining political parties and
independent groups in Parliament.
Its functions
are primarily two fold. On the one hand, no person shall be appointed
by the President to specified key public bodies except on the recommendation
of the Council.
These bodies
comprise the Elections Commission, the Public Service Commission,
the National Police Commission, the National Human Rights Commission,
the Bribery and Corruption Commission, the Finance Commission and
the Delimitation Commission.
On the other
hand, no person shall be appointed by the President to particular
public offices unless such appointment has been approved by the
Council, upon a recommendation made to the Council by the President.
These offices
comprise the Chief Justice and judges of the Supreme Court, the
President and judges of the Court of Appeal, members of the Judicial
Service Commission other than the Chairman, the Attorney General,
the Auditor General, the Inspector General of Police, the Ombudsman
and the Secretary General of Parliament.
The Council
shall endeavour to reach a unanimous decision on these recommendations,
failing which such decision must be supported by not less than five
members of the Council present at such meeting.
The Council
was given definitive authority in the making of appointments to
crucial public offices and bodies due to particular reasons.
The prevalent
structure of appointments centering on the President alone was deemed
to be unsatisfactory, not only for reasons of political impartiality
but because the President is vested with immunity.
Replacing presidential
immunity with a near collective immunity of the Constitutional Council
can hardly be ideal. Neither is it acceptable to maintain that even
though fundamental rights jurisdiction will be removed, decisions
of the Council that are invalid in law, made without jurisdiction
and 'no orders' at all, will be implicitly subject to judicial review
despite the exclusionary clause.
Grounds of
challenge in writ jurisdiction, particularly in the present context,
are notably narrower (both in procedural and substantive terms)
as opposed to rights violation, though discussion of the exact scope
of difference appropriately belongs to a different forum than this
column.
What is clear
is that the scope of review of decisions of the Council will be
considerably restricted, despite its semi political structure and
the nature of its decision making.
One must also
not forget the fact that the composition of the present Council
(with its preponderance of legal minds) is obviously liable to change
in the times to come, while constitutional changes, once made, may
not be that easy to reverse.
These are all
questions that the present administration ought to be extremely
sensitive to, if the spirit and purpose of the 17th Amendment is
not to be irredeemably refuted.
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