Should
            the constitutional council be made "Rights Free"? 
             The enshrining of basic, natural or moral rights in a Constitution
            of a country has a singular purpose. It is this recourse to these
            rights, which enable an individual to successfully resist political
            power, necessarily defining in this process the limits of state authority
            and the obligations of government.  
            
 The shadow
              of fundamental rights has been likened to a "brooding omnipresence"
              underlying every single state action by the Indian Supreme Court
              and by necessary adaptation, executive and administrative action
              or private action instigating the former in this country. Rights,
              reasonably restricted, therefore provide the touchstone of the often
              unequal relationship between state and citizen.  
               
             And it is this
              touchstone that is violated when individuals or bodies wielding
              authority prefer to put themselves completely outside the reach
              of these rights for whatever reason. 
               
             Current thinking
              of the United Front Government that the 17th Amendment ought to
              be further amended in order to make decisions of the Constitutional
              Council "rights free", therefore sits somewhat uneasily
              with cardinal principles underlying the rule of law articulated
              above. 
               
             Central to
              this debate is Article 41H of the 17th Amendment which state that
              no court shall have the power or jurisdiction to entertain, hear
              or decide or call in question on any ground whatsoever, any decision
              of the Council or any approval or recommendation made by the Council,
              which shall be final and conclusive for all purposes.  
               
             However, this
              Article explicitly makes provision for challenge on grounds of violation
              of fundamental rights.  
               
             It is this
              latter provision which is sought to be deleted, bringing into question
              once again, the morality of constitutional ouster clauses with regard
              to the object and purposes of the 17th Amendment.  
               
             It is interesting
              in this sense that this limited ouster clause was present even in
              the earlier drafts of the 17th Amendment. 
               
             One recalls
              at this point that when the 17th Amendment was enacted by Parliament
              late last year, it was expected predictably (and perhaps), unreasonably
              to transform Sri Lanka's highly degenerate political and public
              culture.  
               
             Its initial
              performance during the December parliamentary elections was not
              very promising as the country witnessed an Elections Commissioner
              conferred with enhanced theoretical powers with regard to misuse
              of state resources for example but lacking sufficient authority
              to enforce these powers. 
               
             Consequent
              to a new regime in December, the progress of the 17th Amendment
              was unbearably slow. As six months passed, we saw the Constitutional
              Council being appointed through painful consensus and listened to
              reassurances by the Wickremesinghe administration on the expected
              transformative changes.  
               
             One waited
              therefore and watched. The possible rider that the decisions of
              the Council would be made free from rights challenge is therefore
              an unexpectedly negative development. 
               
             The Government
              has advanced a primary justification that otherwise, the Council
              would be unduly hindered in its work. This justification is however
              extremely problematic for several reasons. 
               
             Under the 17th
              Amendment, the Constitutional Council is a body that is semi political
              in its composition, though balanced as it is sought to be, by the
              inclusion of persons of eminence and integrity.  
               
             The Council
              comprises the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Leader of the Opposition,
              one Presidential appointee, five appointees nominated jointly by
              the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition and one appointee
              nominated upon agreement by the remaining political parties and
              independent groups in Parliament. 
               
             Its functions
              are primarily two fold. On the one hand, no person shall be appointed
              by the President to specified key public bodies except on the recommendation
              of the Council.  
               
             These bodies
              comprise the Elections Commission, the Public Service Commission,
              the National Police Commission, the National Human Rights Commission,
              the Bribery and Corruption Commission, the Finance Commission and
              the Delimitation Commission.  
               
             On the other
              hand, no person shall be appointed by the President to particular
              public offices unless such appointment has been approved by the
              Council, upon a recommendation made to the Council by the President.
               
               
             These offices
              comprise the Chief Justice and judges of the Supreme Court, the
              President and judges of the Court of Appeal, members of the Judicial
              Service Commission other than the Chairman, the Attorney General,
              the Auditor General, the Inspector General of Police, the Ombudsman
              and the Secretary General of Parliament.  
               
             The Council
              shall endeavour to reach a unanimous decision on these recommendations,
              failing which such decision must be supported by not less than five
              members of the Council present at such meeting. 
               
             The Council
              was given definitive authority in the making of appointments to
              crucial public offices and bodies due to particular reasons.  
               
             The prevalent
              structure of appointments centering on the President alone was deemed
              to be unsatisfactory, not only for reasons of political impartiality
              but because the President is vested with immunity.  
               
             Replacing presidential
              immunity with a near collective immunity of the Constitutional Council
              can hardly be ideal. Neither is it acceptable to maintain that even
              though fundamental rights jurisdiction will be removed, decisions
              of the Council that are invalid in law, made without jurisdiction
              and 'no orders' at all, will be implicitly subject to judicial review
              despite the exclusionary clause.  
               
             Grounds of
              challenge in writ jurisdiction, particularly in the present context,
              are notably narrower (both in procedural and substantive terms)
              as opposed to rights violation, though discussion of the exact scope
              of difference appropriately belongs to a different forum than this
              column. 
               
             What is clear
              is that the scope of review of decisions of the Council will be
              considerably restricted, despite its semi political structure and
              the nature of its decision making.  
               
             One must also
              not forget the fact that the composition of the present Council
              (with its preponderance of legal minds) is obviously liable to change
              in the times to come, while constitutional changes, once made, may
              not be that easy to reverse.  
               
             These are all
              questions that the present administration ought to be extremely
              sensitive to, if the spirit and purpose of the 17th Amendment is
              not to be irredeemably refuted.   
            
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