In the interests of long term stability for the country as a whole, it seems to me that strategy requires to be radically adapted in recognition of the facts of life on the ground.

My suggested new strategy is based on military/defence requirements in the context of preserving the integrity of the state so far as is possible given the present situation. I recognise that some of my suggestions would be difficult to implement politically, but they are based entirely on a pragmatic approach without reference to political agendas of any party.

As such, they may be impractical but are presented as a compromise solution to demarcate the country whilst that option is still available to the government in Colombo.

During the last 160 days it is, I think, fair to say that the government has done everything in its power to promote a lasting peace. It might very well be argued that the government has done far too much and there have, indeed, been remarkable concessions made to the LTTE.

As a result of the ceasefire agreement, the power and influence of the LTTE in the so-called 'cleared' areas of the north and east has increased enormously: those in rebellion against the legitimate state apparatus have effectively achieved more in five months or so than in the last five years.

There is an early prospect of parallel court, police and taxation systems throughout the north and the east as the LTTE effectively occupies all the social and political space. A de facto state of Tamil Eelam is now inevitable and strategy should now be adjusted to limit the borders of this nascent state whilst a military capacity, albeit demoralised and degraded, still exists.

It seems to me that in military-strategic terms there is no justification any longer for maintaining almost 40,000 members of the security forces in the Jaffna Peninsula. Their work is effectively over: the uncleared areas of the Wanni can never be retaken and a disproportionately large number of the limited security personnel available to the country are holed up in a tiny, indefensible piece of land with no apparent future military objective.

They should be withdrawn by air and by sea as quickly as possible and redeployed to the east where they will be able to assure the security of Muslims and others who dissent from the LTTE's aggressive policy of taxation and coercion. An adequate force of police might be left for the present - and there should be the option for evacuation of civilians who have cooperated with the security forces - but, in the longer term, the Jaffna Peninsula will be required to be abandoned to the LTTE, together will all other lands north of Vavuniya.

The present forward defence line (FDL) could come to represent the border of a future, independent Tamil Eelam and it will be both more defensible militarily and politically acceptable to the state of Sri Lanka than a long meandering border curling around from Chilaw to Hambantota.

Such a border will imply decades of sporadic, inconclusive Palestinian-style conflict. If the LTTE fails to make itself available for talks at an early stage then contractors should be engaged to reinforce the FDL in the north with an electronic chain-link fence, reinforced by minefields, razor wire, bastion walling, and ditch emplacements, on the Sri Lanka Army side.

Israeli contractors are well versed in construction of this type of semi-permanent defence capability. This will not only serve to create a defensible FDL, but will also separate LTTE cadres in north and east with associated military benefit to the state. There will then be sufficient security for the people of the east to vote freely and without inhibition in a referendum as to whether they wish to live under the LTTE or within the democratically organised Sri Lankan state.

If, as would seem likely, the people of the east vote for their own democratic federally-based local government, then the remaining LTTE cadres in the east can be offered voluntary repatriation over the northern FDL, or they can be surrounded and eradicated.

Failure to adapt strategy at this stage will, in the short term, see the LTTE becoming increasingly bold in its demands. Today, it is demanding that coastal waters off the east of the country be regarded as the preserve of the Sea Tigers and is seeking exclusion of the Sri Lanka Navy.

The next demand will be for the removal of land-based security forces. In the medium term, there will be severe effects on the 300,000 strong Muslim population of the east and on isolated pockets of Sinhala farmers in the north and the east. At best, they will find it disagreeable to stay on in a mono-ethnic, undemocratic state.

At worst they face ethnic cleansing. In the longer term, absence of new strategy will place much of the hill country under threat of absorption by Tamil Eelam.

There is considerable evidence mounting that the LTTE has clearly defined long term goals in this area and the threat should not be taken lightly. Its ultimate absorption within Tamil Eelam would imply economic doom for the state of Sri Lanka.

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