Rejecting
the UN protocol; its consequences and effect
By Kishali Pinto Jayawardena
It may be recalled that the invocation
of the individual communication remedy by Sri Lankans
had been only evident in recent years. The Committee
which constitutes eighteen jurists, had delivered six
Views against the Sri Lankan State. And there is no
doubt that these views were in respect of issues that
many consider to be fundamental to the good and proper
working of Sri Lanka's legal system.
In an article first published in the
Sri Lanka Journal of International Law, Volume 16, 2004,
Faculty of Law, University of Colombo, former Justice
of Sri Lanka's Supreme Court, Mark Fernando explained
succinctly as to why decisions of the United Nations
Human Rights Committee are binding on Sri Lanka.
Examining the Committee's views in
Victor Ivan v Sri Lanka (Communication No 909/2000,
Decision dated 27th July 2004), he observed that these
Views "give new life and vigour to human rights
in Sri Lanka and indeed, opens up a new dimension to
human rights with many implications for future development."
The Committee had ruled that a number
of defamation indictments kept pending against the applicant
had 'chilled' his freedom of expression, and violated
his Covenant right to be tried without undue delay.
The recognition of a right not expressly stated in the
Sri Lankan Constitution was looked upon at that time,
as a positive step, indicating the better safeguarding
of basic rights of citizens.
But we are concerned with the wider
view as to whether international covenants, such as
the ICCPR, impose legal obligations on Sri Lanka. Justice
Fernando responded in the positive, reflecting earlier
judicial reasoning.
For example, in Weeranansa v AG (2000
1 SriLR 387,409), the question was posed thus by him;
"Should this Court have regard to the provisions
of the Covenant [i.e. the ICCPR]? I think it must. Article
27(15) [of the Sri Lankan Constitution] requires the
State to "endeavour to foster respect for international
law and treaty obligations in dealings among nations".
That implies that the State must likewise respect international
law and treaty obligations in its dealings with its
own citizens, particularly when their liberty is involved.
The State must afford to them the benefit of the safeguards
which international law recognizes."
In other words, such covenants must
be regarded as "law", binding on Sri Lanka
and any violation will amount to a denial of the protection
of the law - "if it is by executive action, the
fundamental rights jurisdiction of the SC can be invoked,
and if it is by judicial action, the ordinary jurisdiction
of any relevant court may be invoked."
These are, of course, views that are
diametrically opposite to the reasoning of a Divisional
Bench of the Supreme Court expressed this Friday. The
Court took the view that the Committee rulings are contrary
to Sri Lanka's Constitution. It further opined that
Sri Lanka's accession to the Optional Protocol to the
ICCPR in fact, amounted to a purported conferment of
'judicial power' on the Committee and violated Articles
3 and 4 of Sri Lanka's Constitution which "reposed
sovereignty in the people."
The question centres, around international
obligations and domestic implementation of such obligations.
Any person with ordinary commonsense would query as
to why a State would agree to bind itself in international
law to particular commitments while airily disregarding
those same commitments within that country itself. But
this is exactly what Sri Lanka had been doing in the
past under the convenient logic of the dualist theory
of international law which is to the effect that municipal
treaties entered into by the executive have to be implemented
by domestic legislation.
However, Friday's judgement goes even
further than the reminder that we are a dualist system,
which in any event, any student of basic international
law is well aware of. Thus, the decision is to the effect
that the very accession to the Protocol is invalid,
has no basis in law and is unconstitutional. In the
process, it raises a number of questions that need to
be dealt with exhaustively in a different forum rather
than a newspaper column.
Briefly however, these questions may
be framed as follows. In what manner is the accession
contrary to the Constitution in a context where the
Constitution itself gives the right to the executive
to enter into treaties binding in international law?
Again, where the Constitution has mandated respect for
"international law and treaty obligations in dealings
among nations", in what manner are we to respect
such laws and norms? Citation of international human
rights standards by Sri Lankan courts, (in regard to
which only some have been mentioned here), have been
evident in the area of economic social and cultural
rights as well as in civil and political rights. Are
we then embarking on a contrary course to these norms,
often referred to as the sum total of the law binding
the community of nations? Are we now called upon to
withdraw from the Protocol? This would be a drastic
step that would lead to dire consequences particularly
in view of Sri Lanka's present renewal of the conflict
in the North and East.
It may be recalled that the invocation
of the individual communication remedy by Sri Lankans
had been only evident in recent years. The Committee
which constitutes eighteen jurists, had delivered six
Views against the Sri Lankan State. And there is no
doubt that these views were in respect of issues that
many consider to be fundamental to the good and proper
working of Sri Lanka's legal system.
For example, in both the Victor Ivan
case and in its most recent decision delivered in July
2006, (Lalith Rajapakse v Sri Lanka Communication No
1250/2004; 14/07/2006)), undue delay in the hearing
and concluding of legal proceedings was said to be in
violation of Covenant rights. In a context where laws
delays are of tremendous importance in the domestic
context and moreover where the domestic jurisprudence
has not addressed that question sufficiently critically
enough, these views were of extreme importance.
Similarly, the other Communications
also address crucial issues. In Fernando v Sri Lanka
(Communication No 1189/2003: 31/032005), the Committee
called upon Sri Lanka to enact a Contempt of Court Act
similar to laws in many other countries. In other cases,
issues in regard to the arbitrary working of the terrorism
laws and the phenomenon of disappearances have been
put in issue.
The Sri Lankan State is required to
justify itself before the UN Committee not only in respect
of individual communications but also when the Committee
sits when examining the country's periodic reports.
On these occasions, as I have personally observed, many
questions are directed by Committee members to the high
level Government delegations in respect of the manner
in which its Views in respect of individual communications
have been adhered to. Future satisfaction in that regard
will pose a daunting task.
In addition, Sri Lanka's recent membership
to the UN Human Rights Council also imposes on the State,
great obligations in respect of its conformity to international
norms. Non-conformity may well result in the membership
being forfeit and again, the consequences of withdrawal
from the Protocol will be undoubtedly catastrophic.
These are the horns of the unenviable dilemma that the
State is now placed in.
|