The UNP's jubilation over the election result of the Colombo Municipal Council is perhaps misplaced in view of the aberrant nature of that victory. The UNP's triumph in Colombo has been seen as strengthening the hand of its leader Ranil Wickremesinghe in the ongoing dogfight over the party leadership (that grows uglier by the day). Wickremesinghe has rather optimistically hailed it as the 'beginning of a victorious journey.'
No doubt it has salvaged the party from total ignominy, given the losses of its other traditional grassroots bases in Kandy, Nuwara Eliya etc. The party's mayoral candidate, A.J.M. Muzammil, was a loyalist from his camp, and Wickremesinghe himself assumed high visibility in the campaign, even taking a ride in a three wheeler to prove he was as street-wise as they come. But though the CMC victory delivered the cherry on the cake to the UNP, it would appear that the win was in fact in spite of Wickremesinghe's leadership rather than because of it. The factors that decided the result lay elsewhere.
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| A.J.M. Muzammil acknowledges the cheers of his supporters |
The UNP's comfortable lead of 24 seats in the 53 member council has been variously attributed to the 'minority vote' (on the basis that ethnic minorities form a numerical majority in Colombo city) and/or the traditional voting habits of Colombo elites, whose partiality to the UNP is seen to have delivered the CMC to that party for decades. However neither of these factors seems to fully explain the result. Both UPFA and UNP candidates took trouble to promise improvements in the lot of all citizens regardless of ethnicity or religion, and to work towards unity. The minority vote was split for a variety of reasons.
Mano Ganesan's Democratic People's Front secured no less than six seats, placing it in a deciding position if it joined forces with others on any particular issue. These aspects of the election make it implausible to attribute the UNP victory to minority votes alone. As for the elites, it looked like Moragoda rather than Muzammil who sought to woo them by projecting a cosmopolitan image.
It would seem more likely that the result in this campaign was the outcome of a single issue that overtook all others at the last minute. The campaign was dominated from start to finish by the subject of impending demolitions in slums and shanties of Colombo - known as 'underserved settlements' in the lingo of policy makers and NGOs.
The UPFA kept making pledges to provide alternative and better housing facilities for those living in areas earmarked for demolition, who have to be relocated. The UNP kept replying with promises not to evict them. The UPFA did not at any point say it would NOT proceed with the demolition plan. And having been pressed into that wobbly position causing fear and uncertainty amongst Colombo's shanty population numbering around 68,000 households, it seems, the government buried its chances of victory.
It could be argued that the CMC election outcome was influenced by the simple arithmetic of a negative vote by 51 percent of Colombo's population consisting of shanty dwellers. Failing to consider the impact of a negative block vote from this quarter appears to have been a monumental oversight on the part of the government, when it formulated its development plans that envisaged demolitions in a number of poor urban areas.
What is surprising is that the UPFA with all the resources at its command, and the Urban Development Authority (UDA) under the Defence Ministry to boot, failed to anticipate the fallout of this issue in electoral terms. As always the UPFA powerhouse worked like a well-oiled machine to carry out a coordinated campaign. Its mayoral candidate was regularly flanked by SLFP stalwarts at news conferences and rallies, who spoke with one voice to promote a government victory.
The UNP campaign by contrast had prominent party members speaking in isolation of each other, with little evidence of any coordinated strategy. Though Muzammil's manifesto was more down to earth and pragmatic than that of Moragoda (who stretched one's credulity on many points) his message, for whatever reason, was not communicated that effectively. With all of these factors going against them, and in spite of the ongoing leadership squabble, the UNP won. It would appear that the victory was more the result of a negative vote against the government than a vote in favour of the UNP.
For a local-level election, this was a hard fought battle with president Mahinda Rajapaksa and UNP Leader Wickremesinghe both immersing themselves in the campaign. While it is the most coveted prize in the LG elections, the Colombo MC has more than symbolic importance as the contenders well know. It is the financial, administrative and commercial hub of the country and plays a vital role in the economy.
The UPFA paid the price for miscalculating the fallout of the demolition issue. Some of the squatter families live on canal banks and alongside railway lines, areas designated as 'reservations' where construction is not allowed.
Experts say that while such families would need to be relocated for the good of the wider community, there are others who have been living in their makeshift homes for several generations and have residential rights although they do not hold legal title to the land they occupy. Many are employed in the informal sector and relocation creates problems regarding their livelihoods.
Another problem - for politicians - is that relocating a community also means relocating a vote bank. So the issues are complex. If the government had well thought out plans for better housing and livelihoods for these communities, they were not communicated convincingly. This election has highlighted the fact that Colombo's large numbers of shanty dwellers can be overlooked by politicians only at their peril.
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