The Situation Report

15th August 1999

LTTE changes its strategic focus

By Iqbal Athas

Monday, August 10, had dawned and the night skies over Trincomalee were dark. The absence of occasional mortar or gunfire in the outskirts added to the calm.

It was some two and half hours later that a Reserve Police Constable noted suspicious movements ahead of his check-point near the Railway Station. He readied his weapon and took a few steps to observe an unidentified man. The spotlight from the check-point fell on the man's face. He was visibly nervous as he froze to a "hands up posture" on the orders of the RPC.

With the help of his colleagues, the RPC brought the man into the check-point area. A body search revealed a cyanide capsule, a suspicious identity card and some money. He dodged questions posed by those manning the check-point.

Later, that Monday morning, senior detectives and officials of the Directorate of Internal Intelligence (DII) in Trincomalee, put him through a gruelling course of interrogation. He loosened up, first baring details of his identity and later the missions he had been tasked with. Some of the revelations gave Police important leads into ongoing investigations. Police were still cautious not to take all his statements at face value. As the interrogation continued, they were checking on most of the confessions to ascertain their veracity.

For the Reserve Police Constable 1629 A.J. Kaviratne and two colleagues, RPC 32507 Kamal Jayasena and Home Guard 45952 Mohamed Gaffoor, life changed since that Monday morning's encounter. Police Chief, Lucky Kodituwakku, is to absorb them into the regular Police force and promote them.

The mystery man outside the Railway Station check-point was Krishnapillai Rameshwaram alias Anbu Maama. His LTTE identification number was Aavanna 901. The letter Aavanna is the second in the Tamil alphabet.

Anbu Maama was a native of Eechalampattu in Mutur. He had joined the LTTE in 1996 and operated from a camp in Peraru in the Kumburupiddy jungles that lay north of Trincomalee. In the recent months, he has been tasked to undertake sabotage and destroy missions. He was operating under LTTE's Trincomalee leader, Sudhar.

Anbu Maama led the Police to a hide out at Thoramankadu, in the outskirts of the Trincomalee town. There, the Police unearthed explosives Tiger guerrillas were to use for attacks to destabilise Trincomalee. There were two boxes, one containing 12 kilogrammes of TNT and the other, 18 kilogrammes of C-4 explosives. In addition, a metal can containing 12 kilogrammes of TNT with a "dead cord" affixed was also unearthed. The latter was meant for use as a land mine.

Anbu Maama is said to have confessed he was aware of the explosion that destroyed "NEWCO ENDURANCE," a privately owned vessel that ferried passengers between Trincomalee and Mutur. The vessel was berthed in the Inner Harbour when an explosion ripped through in the early hours of Saturday (July 24) sinking the ship and killing a crew member.

This attack, according to him, was carried out by two Sea Tiger cadres who had infiltrated Trincomalee days earlier. They were operating from Selvanayagapuram and Anbuvelipuram areas. One evening, they had used a hired three-wheeler taxi to transport explosives and scuba diving equipment from these villages for the attack.

Police are verifying these statements. They want to know why a ferry used by civilians was blasted.

If as Anbu Maama claims, the LTTE succeeded in smuggling explosives and scuba diving equipment, why did not they attack other "attractive targets" in the Inner Harbour area ? Why did they, instead, choose to explode 'NEWCO ENDURANCE ?."

Police are trying to find answers to these questions and many more. Fins, which were part of scuba diving gear, were found among the debris after "NEWCO ENDURANCE" sank due to the explosion.

Anbu Maama had revealed that Tiger guerrillas were targeting some senior military officials in the Trincomalee area. He had claimed that the land mine was meant for that purpose.

The other explosives were to be used for attacks on targets which were economically important but interrogators are yet to ascertain details. Anbu Maama is also learnt to have spoken about 150 Tiger guerrilla cadres being moved from somewhere in the Mullaitivu district for tasks in the Trincomalee area.

Whilst details of Anbu Maama's confessions may need verification to ensure there are no attempts to mislead the security forces on a wrong trail, one thing remained quite clear. After a lull of over seven months, Tiger guerrillas have now begun a new wave of offensives not in the operational theatre, but spread out widely in areas which were well within the control of the security forces. That included the City too. And the defence establishment has taken serious note of these developments.

Last Friday, Defence Secretary, Chandananda de Silva, chaired a top level conference of military and police officials to review security measures in the City and suburbs in the wake of these new developments. The conference, held at the Ministry of Defence, led to senior security officials highlighting some of the difficulties.

Important among them, it was pointed out, was the dearth of hard intelligence on LTTE activity in the City and suburbs. Despite tough security measures in place, therefore, Tiger guerrillas were able to trigger off incidents. Some officials were of the view that complacency had set in among men deployed for security tasks in the City and suburbs. There were others who held the view that a fuller enforcement of security measures in the City and suburbs were hampered by severe constraints.

They claimed it came in the form of queries raised by an official Committee that went into complaints of alleged harassment by security forces and police of persons suspected of terrorist activity and other related matters. It was argued that "such interference" hampered investigations, search operations and enforcement of preventive measures. The conference is learnt to have decided that security in the City and suburbs should be completely re-vamped.

The recent wave of LTTE attacks, significantly, is after a seven month long lull (barring skirmishes in the battle areas). On December 4, last year, the Government announced it was calling off "Operation Jaya Sikuru." (Victory Assured"). The months thereafter, saw a marked slowing down of offensive Tiger guerrilla action though succeeding months have been studded with "LTTE anniversaries." This is despite security forces and police heightening precautionary measures on each such occasion.

That stalemate was to trigger off a debate at the highest levels of the nation's security establishment. Some senior military commanders continued to express the view that the LTTE inaction was caused by a string of problems they faced – lack of cadres, resources and dwindling morale.

That thought was expressed eloquently by a high ranking Army official during a press conference last month at Army Headquarters. He said the "guerrilla quality" of the LTTE was so low "suicide" attacks were not taking place. He said security in the City was so "impregnable" the LTTE would find it difficult to penetrate.

Yet, there were others who took a more realistic view after piecing together limited bits of information that filtered down from State intelligence arms. Such information gave some insight into ground realities.

They believed the LTTE had shifted focus from committing large numbers of its cadres on attacks on security forces positions. One move that signaled this shift was the artillery/mortar attack on the Army's 212 Brigade Headquarters in Mannar on March 17, 1999 (Situation Report March 21).

Four and half hours of firing, from two locations eleven and seven kilometres away, left 11 soldiers and three civilians killed. A further 15 soldiers and four civilians were wounded. Millions of rupees worth of artillery shells, still on trucks and waiting to be unloaded, blew up into balls of flames. That caused secondary explosions to fuel dumps and food stores. Gun Towing Vehicles and light vehicles were destroyed.

It is in this backdrop that intelligence services received reports the LTTE had launched another major recruitment drive and were conducting training. According to one western intelligence source, in the recent months its "bayonet strength" (or fighting cadres) had increased from an estimated 6,500 to 8,500. But local intelligence officials continue to claim the number is much lower and did not reach even 6,500. Be that as it may, another significant development were reports that the LTTE was raising a Civilian Militia.

Civilians in the Tiger guerrilla dominated Wanni had been categorised into various age groups and were being provided different aspects of training. The able-bodied among them had been trained to fire weapons whilst the others had been taught supporting chores like helping to move supplies and attend to the wounded. Members of international agencies visiting the uncontrolled Wanni speak of civilians still moving around carrying long sticks, a substitute for weapons during drills.

Fears of information regarding guerrilla preparations in the Wanni reaching the security forces, military officials suspect, is one of the reasons why the LTTE had delayed the return of civilians into controlled areas since the opening of a Civilian Safety Zone (CSZ) on August 9. Although some of those stranded in Vavuniya have been able to cross the CSZ northwards and return to their homes since August 9, the LTTE is yet to lift the ban on civilians returning. Both the movement of food convoys and return of civilians northwards, however, continues.

It is in this scenario that the LTTE has begun its latest wave of attacks. It began on July 29 when a suicide bomber threw himself at the vehicle of TULF Parliamentarian, Dr. Neelan Tir-uchelvam, at Rosmead Place, killing him instantly. Police and intelligence teams probing this incident have still not been able to identify the suicide bomber or any other persons linked to this incident. Until yesterday, they were following up several clues but have had no break-through. Some of the other significant incidents since then:

August 4 – Some 40 Police Special Task Force commandos were travelling in a truck (42 Sri 1437). Between a refugee camp and Pillayar Kovil (near Vepankulam), a claymore mine placed tied to the handle of a bicycle exploded. Twelve commandos and a civilian were killed. The civilian, a passerby, who was near the bicycle has been identified as Pathmanathan Nagaletchumi (57). Twenty commandos and two labourers were injured.

Two days later, on August 6, on the same road, between Kurumankadu-Vepankulam, an Army Mitsubishi Canter truck (U Ha 4059) was hit by a claymore mine. Lt. Sanjeeva Rajakaruna and five soldiers were injured. Two civilians died and two more were wounded. In a subsequent gun battle that ensued, seven TELO cadres were reported wounded.

August 9 – A male suicide bomber blew himself inside the Army camp at Vakarai killing Major B. Karunanayake and wounding Major J.H. Karunadasa. The two officers were among those at the camp who were busy issuing rations to residents in uncontrolled areas. They were required report to the camp every week to obtain their supplies. The suicide bomber had smuggled himself along with the other civilians in what turned out to be lax security measures in force at the Vakarai Army Camp.

August 11 – Ten policemen were killed and 21 more were wounded when a claymore mine ripped through the vehicle in which they were travelling. The incident, near the Batticaloa Police Station, occurred when policemen, who were going on leave, were proceeding to Welikande.

If the incidents in Batticaloa saw a re-emergence of LTTE attacks, in Trincomalee, the chance arrest of Anbu Maama has prevented at least some attacks.

The increasing small-scale operations by the LTTE over a wide spread area extending from the operational areas through to urban and city targets clearly indicate that the LTTE have changed their strategic focus – a fact emphasised in these columns in the past months.

The tactical change of operational focus has been accompanied with heightened activity in their politico-diplomatic thrust to propagandize support both locally and abroad. The LTTE campaign has always had a well-designed and co-ordinated politico-military strategy. Their present strategy is no different in approach, except that their political pitch has to be to reverse the image they have gained as terrorists whilst at the same time continue their military struggle at a level which will not create international repugnance. Yet for all, LTTE actions at times contradict what seems to be their political strategy.

The killing of Dr. Neelan Tiruchelvam is one such irrationality. But then the LTTE has been prone to inexplicable, if not near self-destructive action. The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, one time Indian Premier, is perhaps the best example. But the LTTE has demonstrated that it is willing to take what they perhaps consider to be short-term risks, however politically suicidal, should there be any challenge to their supremacy. Towards that end to be the undisputed representatives of the Tamil people is an unquestionable aim.

The military policies of the LTTE, after "Operation Jaya Sikurui" have been low-profiled. In some ways, this is no doubt due to the disparity of resources. With the limited resource available to the LTTE, it is most unlikely that they could win the overall war in a direct military contest.

The best course available to them is to make the war politically and economically impossible for the Government and so to get acquiescence of their aims. In classical guerrilla terms, to wage a protracted war. The widespread battle of the flea tactics by the LTTE is aimed to tie down the military to large areas of terrain, so thin them out and deny them mobility on land. Back to square one of the tactics adopted by them in the early 1980s.

From the looks of the military re-organisation of the LTTE, both in weaponry and tactics, it would appear that they are settling down to just such a strategy of protracted war. Their politico-diplomatic thrust is to simultaneously apply pressure on the Government. The oncoming strategic phase of the LTTE seems to be to increase economic pressure on the Government and make the war politically unsustainable. A prospect which should spur all political groups to design a National Strategy to this vexed problem.

The Fifth Column

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