THE PRESIDENCY
Living together in a divided house
Every country, it is said, gets the government it
deserves. So, when Sri Lanka's voters over-whelmingly endorsed a United
National Front (UNF) government a dozen days ago they would have known
what they were doing: electing a legislature that would be controlled by
a party that vigorously opposed President Chandrika Kumaratunga's Peoples'
Alliance (PA).
This was indeed one of the campaign themes of President Kumaratunga.
Hers was an all-powerful Presidency designed by the ingenious J. R. Jayewardene,
she argued on the campaign trail. She could do as she pleased and call
upon her choice- not necessarily Ranil Wickremesinghe- to become the Premier.
She could also pick her ministers and arrogate to herself as many portfolios
as she liked.
What President Kumaratunga was telling the electorate was that whoever
won at the polls, she could waive the rules and rule the waves-so it would
be better for the country if it endorsed a PA regime. But, perhaps tired
of Kumaratunga's rhetoric and disillusioned with a stagnant economy and
a protracted war, the masses thought otherwise.
The results surprised even the UNF: it could muster a simple majority
even without the support of the Tamil parties. But there was considerable
trepidation within the UNF hierarchy. Would the President concede what
was constitutionally her right, without a fight? Or, would it lead to another war
of attrition between the UNF and the PA?
Those in the UNF camp say that their fears were justified. After all,
ever since Rauff Hakeem was sacked from the Cabinet, President Kumaratunga
tried every trick in the book- and a few more- to retain a PA government:
Parliament was prorogued, a Referendum was announced and then cancelled,
and a deal was struck with the JVP. In the President's own words- and her
inimitable style- she said she would get together with the devil, to carry
on the government: "Aanduwa geniyanna, api mona yakka ekka hari ekkahu
wenawa_"
And the Constitution offered no respite for the UNF either- even if
it was devised by J. R. Jayewardene. The President, it said, shall invite
whom the President believed enjoyed the confidence of Parliament to be
Prime Minister; ministers were appointed by the President, albeit in consultation
with the Prime Minister. Clearly, those who founded the 1978 Constitution
had not been considering the possibility of the executive and the legislature
being from different parties- ah, JRJ would never have allowed that!
In the aftermath of the election, the think tanks in both camps were
busy. The President herself was bitter and feeling let down that the verdict
had not gone her way. She strongly and genuinely believed that she had
done the best for the country and that she still offered the best hope
for the nation. How could the people think otherwise, she asked her confidants.
Then of course was the question as to what she should do. She could
throw in the towel, relinquish all responsibilities and say she would continue
in office just as D. B. Wijetunge did in 1994, paying mere lip service
to the Presidency. Or, she could refuse to play ball and asserting her
constitutional rights insist that Ranil Wickremesinghe- whom the media
was already touting as Prime Minister-elect- does what she says and not
vice versa.
Knowing President Kumaratunga to be temperamental rather than timid
and daring rather than diffident those in the UNF, especially the dissidents
were anxious that the Prime Minister be declared and sworn in and a new
Cabinet formed as quickly as possible. It was at about this time that there
was speculation President Kumaratunga would not relinquish the Defence
portfolio and S. B. Dissanayake responded in characteristic style saying
he would "bring the people to the streets and surround President's House",
if the need arose.
This threat was not taken lightly and the President did confer with
her security advisors and the consensus was that if such an incident did
occur, the armed forces would find it difficult to contain the protests
using aggressive means as it could then lead to a tragedy of catastrophic
proportions, inciting riots elsewhere in the country which already was
under a precautionary curfew.
Those were tense moments indeed with tenuous arguments being tendered
to and fro. Yet, saner counsel did prevail, on both sides. President Kumaratunga,
her closest advisors say, had no regrets whatsoever about delegating the
Cabinet portfolios to the UNF-except for Defence, where she held strong
reservations, based partly on security concerns and the incidents of post-election
violence which were continuing unabated. However, once that was conceded
after some persuasion, the only hiccup was the Samurdhi portfolio, which
the President was adamant, should not be given to S. B. Dissanayake and,
on this issue, it was the turn of Premier Ranil Wickreme-singhe to give
in.
At the end of the week the political landscape was becoming clearer,
the dust having finally settled after the hustings. Sri Lanka is set to
begin an era of what is called, perhaps for the want of a better word,
cohabitation. An editorialist summed up the situation succinctly when he
said it was a shot-gun marriage: neither party was keen on the arrangement,
but they had no real choice but to live together.
The more liberal among our politicians see this as the perfect platform
for power-sharing, a system of checks and balances which could offset the
negative effects of the two-party system which has thwarted attempts to
resolve the ethnic question even after fifty years of independence. The
more skeptical however will simply not believe that the President and the
Prime Minister can work together, given the hitherto acerbic relationship
between the two.
Only time will give a definite answer to this issue but it is pertinent
at this juncture to reflect on the French system of government which probably
is the closest in the world to the predicament Sri Lanka's leaders find
themselves in.
When General Charles de Gaulle enacted the fifth Republican Constitution
in France in 1958 he was looking to strengthen the hands of the Executive
President, trying to insulate himself from electoral pressures that had
buffeted previous leaders. It is no co-incidence that Sri Lanka's 1978
Constitution is based on similar lines: JRJ readily confessed to be an
admirer of de Gaullian strategy. The cardinal principle of both Constitutions
is that almost all executive power is vested in the elected President who
however has to rely on a legislature-also elected directly by the people-
to implement those powers in order to govern.
Even de Gaulle however, failed to anticipate that two political parties
could be dispensing executive and legislative powers. That did indeed happen
in France in 1986 and then came the concept of 'co-habitation', that catchword
now doing the political rounds of Colombo: Francois Mitterand was President
and Jacques Chirac was Prime Minister.
The comparison may sound uncannily similar but students of French politics
recall that when Chirac submitted his Cabinet to Mitterand for formal approval,
Mitterand objected to three prospective ministers and most believed the
objections were personal rather than on principle. Chirac however stood
down and agreed to withdraw the names averting a stand-off.
Since then, France has experienced political co-habitation between the
leftist and rightist parties twice more, in 1993 and then in 1997. These
periods have never been easy, have been clouded by uncertainty and mistrust
at times but that country has survived and prospered. What then, are the
ingredients of this success against the odds?
It appears to the concerned observer that in the French system there
has been firstly, even if through sheer necessity, a spirit of give and
take between the President and the Prime Minister. Secondly, there is a
thin dividing line, though not demarcated as such in the Constitution,
which neither the President nor the Prime Minister is willing to breach
by poaching into the other's territory. Here though, there is a difference
between Paris and Colombo: the French Constitution specifies the functions
of the Prime Minister to some extent, saying he shall run the government;
in Sri Lanka the Premier has virtually no powers vested in him through
the Constitution.
Given this lacuna, many are the issues that can arise. In theory, and
according to the Constitution, it is the President who appoints the commanders
of the armed forces, decides on foreign policy and represents the country
on ceremonial occasions as head of state and head of government. Would
a UNF government sit back and watch while President Kumaratunga does all
this on her own? That is unlikely but the best solution is for the President
to act in consultation with her Prime Minister and those closest to her
say that she has every intention of doing so.
So, perhaps President Kumaratunga will continue to chair the National
Security Council but Defence Minister Tilak Marapana will participate actively.
The President could always advise Premier Wickremesinghe and Foreign Minister
Tyronne Fernando about her concerns regarding their upcoming visit to India.
And at the forthcoming SAARC conference, the UNF government could accord
President Kumaratunga her due role as Sri Lanka's head of government.
Is this being overly optimistic? No, say the President's advisors. The
President invited Ranil Wickremesinghe for discussions regarding the formation
of the new government well before all the election results were officially
declared; those talks were always cordial and the tone and tenor of the
President's interactions with the UNF so far have given hope that all this
could become a reality.
An important factor, judging from the French experience, is the public
perception and reaction to the process of cohabitation. There, while there
may be rumblings of dissent in both political camps, rival leaders are
careful to be seen smiling and back-slapping each other before the cameras
to avoid being identified by the media and the voter as the troublemaker
and aggressor making life uneasy in the co-habitation arrangement.
It may be too premature to pass judgment on the Sri Lankan scenario,
but there is reason to believe that this process will operate here as well.
When a decision was taken to debar a private television network from the
swearing-in of the Premier and to withhold live coverage of the event,
it was roundly condemned and President Kumaratunga had to take the flak
though it was not certain that the decision was hers. Why should the nation
be deprived of live coverage of a Prime Minister being sworn in, asked
one newspaper incredulously, when it is forced to watch the President laying
wreaths at her parents' tomb, live on state television? Too harsh a rebuke
perhaps, but the message is clear.
Similarly, when S. B. Dissanayake announced he would regain the Samurdhi
portfolio in two weeks by swearing-in before the Premier-and not the President-
there was widespread disapproval and resentment that personal issues apart,
the office of the President was being ridiculed.
This then is a new political experience for this country. The voters-
and a vast majority of them- have in all their collective wisdom thrust
cohabitation at their political masters. The President and the Prime Minister
will no doubt realise that in both camps there will be a core group which
will be baying for the blood of their rivals. Their task therefore will
be not only to interact with each other reasonably for the purpose of good
governance and political stability but also to keep these political animals
in check, lest they prey on each other. This will be no easy task because
this, by the way, is Colombo and not Paris where political violence and
corruption is now a way of life.
What then will make the system work? In the words of the much respected
former Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar- who was a tower of strength
to the President over the last few weeks- as the French say, "with sound
policies, cool heads and good judgment". After all, President Chandrika
Kumaratunga prides herself on being a student of politics at Sorbonne.
Then, perhaps now is the time for her to look up her dog-eared copy of
the French Constitution and figure out how exactly the French dealt with
a seemingly uncomfortable way of governance. And she must be thankful that
on the other side of the political divide she finds herself confronted
by Ranil Wickremesinghe- and not Ranasinghe Premadasa or even J. R. Jayewardene!
It is indeed a curious irony that JRJ declared triumphantly that the
only thing he couldn't do under the executive presidency was to make a
male into a female and President Premadasa echoed his sentiments saying
that the Premier under the same system was merely a peon. Today the 'peon'
is required to take on the task of decision making while the executive
president- transformed from male to female- has to take a backseat and
reflect upon how best to confront the situation.
But then in a democracy, if the voice of the people is the voice of
God, so be it.
Consensus politics comes with hiccups
The crucial first week of the 'cohabitation-government' of President Chandrika
Kumara-tunga and her arch-rival Prime Minister Ranil Wickreme-singhe survived,
but not without many anxious moments. President Kumaratunga had made it
quite clear before the December 5 elections that she could not work with
Mr. Wickremesinghe and his United National Front (UNF) led coalition. This
statement had not been made merely with the intention of weaning away voters
who would expect more trouble in the country if the UNF was voted into
a majority Parliament. She really meant what she said.
Previous overtures at a national government, even when the chips were
down for the PA government were dismissed, and the President preferred
to strike a deal with the JVP once accused by herself of killing her husband
Vijaya Kumaratunga, rather than do business with the UNF. So naturally,
when the people voted last week re-defining her role as undisputed head
of government, she had no option but to abide by the rules.
The verdict was clear leaving no room for ambiguity. The UNF, which
included the Muslim Congress whom she sacked unceremoniously from her Cabinet,
and defectors from her party, had won an overall majority. Her own Peoples
Alliance had dropped from 102 seats to 77, nowhere close to even making
a fight of it.
As the results came in, it became clear that the President had to call
the UNF leader and her bete noire, Ranil Wickremesinghe to become her prime
minister.
Constitutionally the President is the head of state and head of government.
She is the one who appoints the Cabinet of ministers. If she wanted, she
could argue that she has a mandate, equally, from the people in an election
conducted in December 1999, not too long ago, and therefore the sovereign
power of the people to run the executive arm of government was very much
with her.
But, the reality was implicit. The people had spoken. They wanted her
government out of office and Ranil Wickremesinghe given a chance. Her own
prime minister Ratnasiri Wickramanayake was consulted, so was her trusted
foreign minister Lakshman Kadirgamar. The third to be asked was a senior
lawyer R.K.W. Goonasekera. All three agreed, that Mr. Wickremesinghe had
to be invited to become the prime minister.
And what of the Cabinet? Who was to choose its ministers? The unanimous
opinion was for Mr. Wickremesinghe to be given that opportunity as well.
What of the Defence Ministry? Now, there came the first serious problem.
President Kumaratunga was down, but did not want to be out. Compounding
the problem was the anti-PA blood-letting by UNF supporters in the provinces,
especially in the Kandy area. Forty eight people had died before the votes
could be counted. State sponsored thuggery was unleashed on UNF sympathisers.
Revenge was upper-most in the minds of the victors.
To add salt to the wounds, President Kumaratunga's bitterest foe, her
one-time closest political ally, S.B. Dissanayake had announced that he
would lead some hundreds of thousands of people to President's House asking
her to quit the Defence Ministry.
The new prime minister has many faults. He is also patient to a fault.
The 52 year old Mr. Wickremesinghe has won and lost many times over. He
knew that the President was crest-fallen and sulking. The world had collapsed
for her. She needed to be handled gently, but firmly.
At the first meeting on December 7, it was merely for formalities. He
was asked to be her prime minister, and asked when he wanted to take his
oaths. Mr. Wickremesinghe advised himself not to stir the pot. At the second
meeting, December 8, the swearing-in ceremony, Mr. Wickremesinghe decided
again, not to bring up the subject. Except that she did, in passing, when
they were having tea after the ceremony. She referred to the proposed march
and said her guards would "open fire" on them if they came anywhere near
President's House. Mr. Wickremesinghe re-assured a clearly besieged President
that there would be no such demonstration.
The third meeting was fixed for December 10, but the President had put
it off for December 11. She went ahead summoning the new Parliament by
asking the JVP and not Mr. Wickremesinghe's UNF, which had the majority
in Parliament, By now, Mr. Wickremesinghe was getting angry. Tempers were
frayed all around. Losing MPs from the President's party were pumping her
up with tales of woe, of the violence unleashed on their party workers,
urging her not to give the all-important Defence Ministry.
At the PA parliamentary group meeting on the morning of December 11,
President Kumaratunga thundered to dispirited faithfuls, that the time
had come to stand up and fight back. Prime Minister Wickremesinghe went
in this hostile environment to see the President sharp at 4, the appointed
time that afternoon. She kept him waiting for 15 minutes, but excellent
by her standards. There they discussed the Cabinet he proposed, including
his nominee for Defence Minister. The outcome was still uncertain. Prime
Minister Wickremesinghe believed he had clinched the deal.
The 3,000 strong controversy-riddled Presidential Security Division
was to be under her. She would also remain commander-in-chief of the armed
forces. Indian High Commissioner Gopal Gandhi who had met President Kumaratunga
immediately thereafter, and used his pursuasive ways to impress upon the
President of a friendly country to avoid confrontation, however, did not
share the impression the prime minister entertained. President Kumaratunga
seemed stubborn, though there were signs that she may be persuaded.
The next morning, December 12 Messrs. Wickramanayake, Kadirgamar and
two other ex-ministers met President Kumaratunga and went through the motions
once again. The Prime Minister was coming to see her at 11.30 a.m. and
a decision had to be reached. At the 11th hour of the 12th of December,
President Kumaratunga agreed to give up the Defence Ministry. She insisted
that she will not swear-in her now sworn enemy, S.B. Dissanayake as minister
in charge of Samurdhi affairs.
She had produced the Auditor General's report to Mr. Wickremesinghe
showing corruption by Mr. Dissanayake as her own Minister of Samurdhi affairs.Everyone
knew that this was not the real. Mr. Wickremesinghe said he would appoint
a parliamentary select committee to find whether Mr. Dissanayake was guilty
or not, but she was not impressed. Neither the PA ex-ministers, nor Mr.
Wickremesinghe wanted to ride their luck too far. They gave in on that,
as she had given on the Defence Ministry.
The swearing-in took place as scheduled, with Mr. Wickremesinghe having
his way with appointing his own Defence Minister, while Ms. Kumaratunga
had her own way by refusing to appoint Mr. Dissanayake as Minister of Samurdhi
Affairs. The give-and-take of cohibitation was beginning to get entrenched.
On December 13, Prime Minister Wickremesinghe pressed the issue further.
As he had promised, he asked his own Defence Minister, former Attorney
General Tilak Marapana to call on the President, the commander-in-chief
of the armed forces.
It appeared to be a kindly gesture to assuage President Kumaratunga's
suspicions that she would be relegated to the role of a ceremonial head
of state, a figure-head with no role to play in the country's political
affairs. Governments may come and governments may go - President Kumaratunga
has not changed her ways. She was 45 minutes late for the appointment with
her Defence Minister. And when she arrived, she greeted Mr. Marapana, and
then looking startled, said, "Oh!, I'm sorry, I didn't know you had also
come", to her Prime Minister.
Our man to address security seminar in Hawaii
Consultant Editor - Defence Correspondent of The Sunday Times Iqbal Athas
who is a regular contributor to the London-based military magazine Jane's
Defence Weekly, has been invited to address the annual Security Seminar
sponsored by the New York University's Centre for War, Peace and the News
Media.
The theme of this year's seminar to be held at the University of Hawaii's
East-West Center in Honolulu is "Turmoil Across Asia: Karachi to Kamchatka."
Athas, whose weekly "Situation Report" is one of the most widely -read
columns in the overseas internet edition of The Sunday Times, will speak
on "Sri Lanka - the Forgotten War".
The five-day professional Fellowship Seminar is for senior journalists
from East Asia, South-east and South Asia, Australia, Canada, Russia and
the United States.
The underlying theme of the annual seminar has been revised this year
in the context of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States.
Speakers and discussion leaders at the seminar - scheduled to take place
from today till December 21 - will include leading military analysts from
the Asia Pacific Centre for Security Studies, the East-West Center, the
Pacific Forum/Centre for Strategic and International Studies at the University
of Hawaii, the US Pacific Command and the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI).
The critical issues to be discussed include: Terror: Causes and Counter;
Terror: Bugs and Gas; Terror: Loose Nukes; Central Asia: new Arena for
Conflict; China: Benign or Bellicose?; India: Emerging Power; Nuclear Threats:
Farewell to Arms Control? and Japan: Passive and Pacifist. |