The second stand-off
May,
2000-Tiger guerrillas at the entrance to Jaffna town. It is
now two years since they made an abortive bid to capture Jaffna.
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Questions over why Navy failed to act on second Tiger vessel
May
Day's incident off the seas of Batticaloa, where aval craft intercepted
two fishing trawlers bringing ashore weapons for the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), has laid bare another significant
development.
After the first
trawler carrying the name "Duwa Mekhala," exploded when
a Naval craft moved closer, the second fishing trawler loaded with
mortar shells and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) was successfully
beached. It was in a stretch of no man's land, just two kilometres
north of the Army detachment at Kadjuwatte, north of Batticaloa.
A Naval patrol
with Army escorts saw the military hardware laden fishing trawler,
at close quarters. A near confrontation developed between the guerrillas
and the Navy-Army group after the former had threatened to open
fire if they interfered with the trawler.
security
shuffle after CBK's return
United
National Front leaders are awaiting the return of President
Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga to discuss some important
appointments in the security establishment.
Lt.
Gen. Lionel Balagalle
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She is
due in Colombo next week from London where she has stopped
over on her return from New York. There she addressed a special
UN session on children.
The Sunday Times learns that Prime Minister
Ranil Wickremesinghe, has directed Defence Minister Tilak
Marapana to discuss with President Kumaratunga a string of
top level appointments.
They include the appointment of a new Chief of Defence Staff
(CDS) to the Joint Operations Headquarters (JOH). The present
incumbent, Gen. Rohan de S. Daluwatte, is to relinquish office
next month to assume office as Sri Lanka's Ambassador to Brazil.
He has received the UNF Government's blessings with the High
Posts Committee in Parliament giving approval to his appointment.
Vice
Admiral Daya Sandagiri
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In the
light of the UNF Government's declared policy of not granting
extensions of service to security forces officers who had
reached their age of retirement, or are at the end of their
tenure, Mr. Marapana is to discuss how other pending appointments
will be made. This will include the post of Commander of the
Army and Chief of Staff of the Army.
Army Commander Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle's extended term is
due to end on June 14. As reported in The Sunday Times
of March 17, the post of Chief of Defence Staff has already
been offered to him. If he accepts the position, which is
described as an expression of confidence in him, Maj. Gen.
Lohan Gunawardena, is tipped as the new Commander.
Air
Marshal Jayalath Weerakkody
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President
Kumaratunga's return is already holding up Maj. Gen. Gunawardena's
appointment as Chief of Staff, a position left vacant after
Maj. Gen. Neil Dias, retired on April 11. Similarly, the post
of Deputy Chief of Staff, for which Maj. Gen. Anton Wijendra
has been recommended is also consequently delayed. Files relating
to their promotions are now held up at the President's office
and undue delays have worried the security establishment.
They say it causes uncertainty and morale problems in the
Army, which is a disciplined service.
The term of office of the Commander of the Navy Vice Admiral
Daya Sandagiri, is due to expire on August 30. He is to be
succeeded by Rear Admiral Mohan Wijewickrema.
The four year term of the Commander of the Air Force Air Marshal
Jayalath Weerakkody, ended on March 6. There there is no legal
impediment or requirement to retire after completing the customary
four year period. He has at least four years to go for his
retirement and Air Marshal Weerakkody has been allowed to
continue in office.
Meanwhile Army Headquarters has announced a series of new
appointments that will come into effect from tomorrow (May
20). They are as follows:
Maj. Gen. K.B. Egodawala, Colonel Commandant, Gemunu Watch.
Maj. Gen. Sunil Tennekoon, Colonel Commandant, Sri Lanka Artillery.
Maj. Gen. H.B. Tibbotumunuwe, Colonel Commandant, Women's
Corps.
Brigadier Kapila Hendavithana, Colonel Commandant, Military
Intelligence Corps.
Maj. Gen. Jayantha Ranaweera, Military Secretary. He will
be succeeded as GOC 56 Division by Brigadier Lawrence Fernando.
Maj. Gen. H.B. Thibbotumunuwe will continue as Quarter Master
General.
Maj. Gen. Sharman Kulatunga, as Security Co-ordinating Officer
of the Presidential Security Unit. He will be succeeded at
GOC 52 Division by Brigadier N. Wijesinghe.
Brigadier G.A. Chandrasiri, who was the Presidential Security
Unit Co-ordinating Officer is to be named Deputy GOC at 52
Division shortly.
Maj. Gen. Parami Kulatunga has been nominated for an year
long stint at the War College in the United States.
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Did the men
withdraw because of this threat ? Were they ordered to do so or
take the decision themselves ? Is their claim that their craft developed
engine problems correct ?
These are among
questions to which answers are being sought by a top level inquiry
now under way. It is headed by Rear Admiral Sarath Rathnakeerthi,
Commander, Eastern Naval Area headquartered in Trincomalee. This
week he recorded statements from sailors who were engaged in the
patrol and is due to send a report with findings to Navy Headquarters.
As reported
in these columns (Situation
Report - May 5), those on board one of the fishing trawlers
blasted themselves. Contrary to some reports emanating from a far
end of the globe, thousands of miles away from Sri Lanka, the Navy
did not fire at the first fishing trawler in question. Nor was this
trawler engaged in fishing.
The Sunday
Times has learnt fuller details of how the Naval craft tracked
down the two fishing trawlers. Due to national security concerns,
one cannot go into the finer points purely to counter diabolical
claims that the Navy fired at fishing trawlers without any rhyme
or reason. This is clearly part of a deliberate propaganda campaign
to blame the Navy for the incidents and thus the Government for
a ceasefire violation. The issue was grist to the mill for LTTE
propagandists.
However, other
details of the incident, which have now emerged, throw further light
on what happened. First to what the Army's 23 Division had to say
on the incident:
"Naval
troops detected two suspicious fishing boats positioned three nautical
miles east of Vakarai, which were proceeding towards the land. The
fishing boats did not stop when challenged and on closing up for
inspection one boat exploded itself at 1740 hours. In the meantime
the second boat beached approximately six miles south of Vakarai.
"The
beached boat then started to move north towards Vakarai. At 1835
hours Naval troops detected another suspicious fishing boat positioned
4.5 nautical miles east of Vakarai. On closing up for inspection,
the boathad fired at Naval boats. Several attempts were made to
stop the boat, but failed.
"In
the meantime Naval troops retaliated in self defence resulting in
the suspicious boat exploding and it remained ablaze for a long
time. One Fast Attack Craft proceeded for a search operation of
the area carrying two Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission personnel on
board.During the clearing operation the under-mentioned items were
recovered: 30 nos. 120 mm mortar bombs ,6 nos. 82 mm mortar bombs
and 6 nos. Rocket Propelled Grenades"
Navy officials
say the mortar bombs and rocket propelled grenades were floating
on a large piece of wreckage from the first fishing trawler that
exploded. What of the second trawler which "beached approximately
six miles south of Vakarai" ? This is where an Army Detachment
at Mankerni, and another at Kadjuwatte, together with a Naval Sub
Unit (NSU), went into action. The detachments come under the purview
of the 232 Brigade functioning under the Army's 23 Division.
A report from
the 23 Division to Army Headquarters said that upon receiving intimation
from Eastern Naval Area Headquarters, about the sighting of the
two suspicious fishing trawlers off the shores between Mankerni
and Kadjuwatte, ground troops located in both detachments were sent
out. Those at Mankerni moved northwards whilst men at Kadjuwatte
advanced southwards.
The report said
"Ground troops deployed at close proximity to Kadjuwatte
coast reported that a suspected trawler is floating approximately
300 to 400 metres from the coast. Later, immediate arrangements
were made to deploy the Naval Sub Unit with Army troops as escorts.
By this time, it was further noticed that the suspected trawler
commenced movement towards the north. Only one Naval craft was able
to approach almost 25 metres to the suspected trawler.
However,
they had not adhered to instructions. Somebody inside had instructed
not to stop the trawler. Troops have seen approximately four persons
in the trawler in civil clothes."
By then a loud
explosion had already occurred. The mortars and RPGs on board exploded
wrecking the fishing trawler. The NSU boat with Navy-Army men on
board pursued the second trawler, which was approximately two kilometres
off the shores where the Kadjuwatte Army Detachment was located.
They are said to have arrived close to the beached second fishing
trawler carrying military hardware.
The 23 Division
report revealed "Monitoring LTTE radio transmissions revealed
that whilst this activity was going on, terrorist leader in 46 Base
activated his cadres and instructed them to attack troops if they
move towards north from Kadjuwatte
."
Only Rear Admiral
Rathnakeerthi's investigations will reveal fuller details of how
the second fishing trawler, loaded with the military hardware, escaped
from the shores near Kadjuwatte, whilst armed guerrilla cadres,
who had arrived by boats, provided cover. It is now confirmed that
this fishing trawler got away with the goods. How then did another
boat explode ?
A confrontation
occurred between guerrilla boats which had arrived to secure the
second fishing trawler and Naval boats which pursued it, but found
it difficult to get closer to the shore in view of the shallow draught.
Without a doubt, fishing boats which were in the vicinity were caught
in the crossfire, though it is difficult to establish whether they
were hit by guerrilla or Navy gunfire.
The fact that
fishermen were involved is confirmed by a report from the 23 Division
Headquarters in Trincomalee. It said:
"
information
received that three boats belonging to civilians named M.T. Iliyar
and Abubakkar Anwar that had gone fishing in general area Vakarai
around 1830 hours on 01 May 2002 have not returned. Later around
1530 hours on 03 May 2002 the civilian named S.T. Iliyar had reported
to the Army that he has been informed by the LTTE that two persons
who were on board have been killed and another was injured due to
a fire fight on 01 May 2002.
eanwhile
the other boat owner Abubakkar Anwer also had been informed by the
LTTE that his boat too is in Vakarai area. Further, both boat owners
had been asked to come with SLMM (Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission)
representatives to take over the bodies, boats and equipment"
The issue is
a closed matter as far as the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)
is concerned. It has held that the incident did not lead to a ceasefire
violation. How does one prove the military hardware was smuggled
in by the guerrillas though it is as clear as daylight that it was
meant for them ?
But Navy Headquarters wants to ascertain why its personnel did not
act against the second fishing trawler and back out amidst guerrilla
threats. More so when fresh rules of engagement have been issued
to them after the Ceasefire Agreement between the Government and
the Tiger guerrillas was signed.
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