Demanding good prosecutions
in respect of extra judicial executions
This column has emphasized time
and time again that the critique advanced of the role and the functioning
of the Norwegian led Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) may be
justified to some extent, given some of its ill judged interventions.
One good example in this regard was the attribution of responsibility
(hardly before the dust had settled on the incident) on Government
forces in respect of the execution style killings of seventeen aid
workers in Mutur.
By Kishali Pinto Jayawardena
There is no doubt that UN Special Rapporteur on
Extra Judicial Executions, Prof. Philip Alston's exceedingly pungent
report on Sri Lanka to the General Assembly of the United Nations,
(to be delivered on 23 October 2006), has important implications
for this country.
His recommendation that "the General Assembly
should call upon the United Nations Secretariat to establish a full-fledged
international human rights monitoring mission in Sri Lanka"
is key to the Report. This recommendation is sure to raise the hackles
of the extreme lunatic fringe in Sri Lanka who insist on looking
at efforts to improve the rights protection of individuals as part
of some deep seated international conspiracy.
This column has emphasized time and time again
that the critique advanced of the role and the functioning of the
Norwegian led Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) may be justified
to some extent, given some of its ill judged interventions. One
good example in this regard was the attribution of responsibility
(hardly before the dust had settled on the incident) on Government
forces in respect of the execution style killings of seventeen aid
workers in Mutur. This was used to good effect by loudly outraged
government spokesmen in pointing to the mala fides of the SLMM.
In the process, these findings of the facilitators (or mediators
as the case may be) were counterproductive to ensuring justice for
the victims of the incident.
However, the critique of the SLMM does not mean
that a rights-oriented monitoring mission, (staffed by jurists and
activists who are recognised for their integrity and commitment),
should be equally scorned. On the contrary, Sri Lanka has urgent
need of such a mission given the complete inability of our domestic
processes of investigations and inquiry to be impartial and effective
in this period of utmost chaos.
But let us look more closely at what Prof. Alston
observes in his Report (submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution
59/197). He re-iterates that civilians are not simply "caught
in the crossfire" of this conflict but rather, intentionally
targeted by both sides (viz; the LTTE as well as Government forces).
In the context of his well argued point that "the conflict
between the Government and LTTE is ultimately a struggle for legitimacy,
not territory", he castigates the LTTE sharply for their blatant
human rights violations. His reflection that "no outside observer
could wish rule by LTTE on the entire Tamil community, much less
on the Sinhalese and the Muslims" would be shared by many of
us in this country.
Almost immediately however, he warns that the
Government should not interpret the widespread proscription of LTTE
as a terrorist organization as an endorsement of its own record
and goes on to observe that "Neither its past nor its present
conduct would justify great faith in its ability to respect equally
the rights of all citizens."
The undermining of domestic independent oversight
bodies such as the National Police Commission and the National Human
Rights Commission, "both (of which) have fallen victim to politics"
also forms an important part of this Report. While he points out
that "It is not my place to try to resolve a domestic constitutional
crisis, Prof Alston stresses the incompatibility of the current
"solution" (of direct Presidential appointments disregarding
the Constitutional Council) with international standards. His caution
that "There is no worse means by which to ensure an oversight
body's independence from the executive than for the executive to
directly appoint its members" is crucial in this regard.
The Report recommends that the international monitoring
mission should command a high level of investigative and forensic
capacity. Prof Alston states thus; "This requires, inter alia,
persons with police training, persons with medical training, and
Sinhala and Tamil interpreters. It should be independent of any
peace process. Two implications of this are that regardless whether
the ceasefire agreement (CFA) remains in force, the monitoring mission
should not be called upon to investigate violations of CFA. The
distinction between violations of human rights and humanitarian
law, on the one hand, and of violations of a ceasefire agreement,
on the other, must be preserved. The monitoring mission should report
to a neutral body."
Relevantly, he cites the successful prosecution
of the soldiers who raped and killed Krishanthi Kumaraswamy (and
her mother, brother and a friend who went in search of the missing
schoolgirl) as the one exception to an otherwise extremely dismal
record of prosecution successes in the North.
In this context, it is useful to recall that very
many years back, the case of Wijesuriya and Another vs the State
(77 NLR, 25) concerned one of the very first successful prosecutions
of state agents for acts of degradation committed under the supposed
authority of military law. In more recent times, both the Krishanthi
Kumaraswamy case and the Embilipitiya Disappearances case resulted
in convictions, the former regarding incidents in the North and
the latter regarding incidents in the South. However, Wijesuriya's
Case (even though decades before) affirmed some remarkably strong
judicial pronouncements emphasizing rule of law norms in times of
conflict, the likes of which we are yet to see thereafter in our
courts.
In this case, two army soldiers were prosecuted
for the attempted murder of a suspected insurgent held in army custody
after she had been arrested by the police. The accused claimed that
the shooting occurred during combat where the first accused who
first shot at her, was only carrying out the order of his superior
officer to destroy ('bump off') the deceased. The prosecution urged
the court to hold that, whether there was a period of combat during
the incident or a state of actual war, in either case, there could
be no justification for the shooting of a prisoner who was held
in custody. The Court of Criminal Appeal agreed with this submission.
It pointed out (unanimously) that no soldier could obey an order
of his superior when such order is manifestly and obviously illegal
and then plead mistake of fact in good faith (a defence available
under Section 69 of the Penal Code). Provisions of international
humanitarian law were referred to, in particular, the treatment
of prisoners under the Geneva Conventions which had been ratified
and accepted by Sri Lanka at that time.
The Court's denunciation of terms such as "in
combat", "in the field", "prisoners of war",
and "military necessity" which were sought to be used
by counsel appearing for the accused to justify the brutal acts
committed by them was notable. The argument that when a state of
emergency is called, the ordinary civil law of the land is pro tanto
suspended, thus entitling the military to engage in whatever acts
of brutality in pursuance or supposed pursuance under emergency
powers conferred on them, was not accepted. The court unanimously
affirmed the convictions of the accused and by a majority, affirmed
their sentences of sixteen years rigorous imprisonment.
This case manifests a successful prosecutorial
strategy and a relatively sensitive response by the judiciary. However,
an increasingly weak prosecutorial will and a corresponding reticence
by judges to intervene in issues of rights and justice became evidenced
in later years, with very few exceptions. The consequent failure
to impose accountability for rights violators has now formed the
mainstay of the current call for international human rights monitoring.
Taken objectively, what reason could the Government
advance for its failure to ensure that rogue elements in its services
are brought to account? Is it denying (astoundingly) that extra
judicial killings take place at all, for which its agents are to
blame? Does it maintain that its domestic laws are insufficient
for the purpose of bringing the "perpetrators to justice"?
Or does it say that factors such as the absence of an effective
witness protection system is to blame?
If the latter is the case, (as pointed out in
this column last week), it is the Government itself that again has
to take the responsibility for not putting such a system into force
despite its patent need for so many decades. Until a pattern of
good prosecutions is evidenced to bring our rogue state agents to
justice, we cannot afford to arrogantly disclaim the need for outside
monitoring by the United Nations if needs be.
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