The UNP is perceived by many as the only other political party, with the potential to form an alternative government. Curiously, however, the party has suffered 16 straight defeats at the Provincial, Parliamentary and Presidential elections held over the past six years.
Rebels from within the party are demanding a change in leadership and a restructured party hierarchy. Every UNP electoral defeat is followed by demands for new leadership and party reforms. The rebels say weak leadership is the party’s chief problem.
The real cause for the UNP setbacks is a lack of a policy that satisfies both the majority community and the minorities. The public is not interested in personalities. It wants a political party with a pragmatic policy that would help improve socio-economic and environmental conditions.
It is the British tradition for a Prime Minister who is also the leader of the governing political party to step down after an electoral defeat. This has never been the practice in Sri Lanka, where leaders of parties hold fast, regardless of political reversals.
In the Sri Lanka context, party leaders are rarely elected. The founder of a party automatically becomes its leader and succession is invariably within the family, or is the leader’s choice. The late Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike left the UNP to set up the SLFP because he knew he had slim chances of succeeding as UNP leader. Likewise, the late Mr. C. P. de Silva, Maithripala Senanayake and T. B. Ilangaratne of the SLFP had to make way for the Bandaranaikes.
If the majority voted for a political personality, rather than the policies or party he represented, this country would have had some excellent leaders, such as Dr. N. M. Perera, Mr. Phillip Gunawardena and Mr. S. A. Wickremasinghe among our prime ministers.
The UNP’s greatest problem is its lopsided policy strategy. The party’s initial blunder was to ridicule the government’s war effort. This angered most voters, and also many UNP diehards. Clearly, the UNP had no policy strategy to deal with the deadly terrorist outfit. It clung to the failed peace talks, telling the people that there were indirect benefits, or what it called “peace dividends.”
The UNP’s economic strategy was chaotic. Indiscriminate privatisation of profit-making state ventures and a lop-sided public transport policy did not improve the party image. Developed capitalist countries, such as Sweden, know that public transport must be subsidised by more than 50 per cent by municipal governments and local councils. This is because public transport is one area where it is impossible to make a profit while providing a satisfactory service. You can make a profit only by exploiting the public. The public applauds the present government for its efforts to revive the nationalised public transport service, and rejects the UNP policy of privatisation.
The UNP had not realised its folly even at the time of the 2010 Parliamentary elections. Its policy statement just before the election promised to reduce prices and the cost of living, increase the salaries of public servants, and establish minimum wages. With the war over, the UNP should develop a comprehensive strategy for reconciling those affected by the war and developing the war-affected areas. It should have a balanced economic policy for growth and development.
Indiscriminate privatisation is not the answer for all economic ills. The private sector should be given all the encouragement it deserves, but health, education, insurance, infrastructure development and public transport should be in the government’s firm grip.
Professor Ashley L. S. Perera,
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