| In a sense, I could say that it all began on November 18, 2005 around seven o'clock in the morning. Those were tense moments and we were monitoring the results of Sri Lanka's closest presidential election at Temple Trees.
My brother, then Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa walked out of the self-styled 'Operations Room' where the results were coming in thick and fast. The Ampara district result had just come in. It clinched the contest, for he had just obtained an unbeatable lead over his rival, Ranil Wickremesinghe.
Beaming as he came out of the 'Ops Room', I was the first person he met. As I greeted him, he had just a few words for me: "You must take over as Secretary of Defence," he said. I smiled in reply, realising that I had very little choice in the matter.
Even so, it was a difficult decision. I had retired from the Army in 1991 after twenty years of service and, after obtaining a Post-graduate Diploma in Computer Technology from the University of Colombo, I had reconciled myself to a life domiciled in the United States, where I had lived since 1994.
I had been working as a Unix Systems Administrator at the Loyola Law School in Marymount University in Los Angeles, California for over nine years. Like most others of my age, I had to support my son's education and a mortgage to pay on my house.
However, towards the end of July 2005 when I was informed that my elder brother was given the party nomination for the presidency, I felt it was nothing but right that I should return to the country for a while to help him in his campaign.
My employers were keen to support me -- it was not every day that someone came with a request for leave saying his brother was running for President! I obtained three months leave and came to Sri Lanka leaving my wife and son and kept in touch with my employers via e-mail: I wanted to return to my job as soon as the dust settled on the elections, where I was busily campaigning in the Kurunegala district.
The outcome of the elections and my brother's request had now changed all that. When my wife Ioma and my son Manoj flew to Sri Lanka for the President's inauguration, we discussed what should be done about her job in the United States, my son's future and the mortgage on the house, knowing all along that we didn't really have a choice.
That is because I have always had my own ideas -- and plans -- about the war and I sensed that this was an ideal opportunity to implement them. If I didn't, I would always regret it. While in the United States, I always read avidly about the war effort, kept in touch with officers of my vintage and, as a result, I had come to my own conclusions.
For instance, I was convinced that a military option was the only way to eliminate the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). I believed that it could be done. I also strongly believed that talking to Velupillai Prabhakaran was a waste of time -- and ultimately, a waste of lives. Now, I had the chance to be a part of a team that believed in these same ideas.
I was indeed appointed Secretary of Defence but the President came in for some criticism because of this. He was appointing family members to key posts, his critics said. It is true that I am his brother but my appointment had other advantages.
As a former army officer, I understood the war better than a civil servant and officers in the higher ranks were mostly my contemporaries. And, as the President's brother I always had unrestricted access to him and he had utmost confidence in me. Therefore, I could serve as the crucial link between the political and military establishments ensuring better co-ordination between the two. Few appreciated this at that time.
As Secretary of Defence, I had to brief the President on the state of the war. This I did, gathering information from intelligence services as well as the ground commanders. What I heard from them convinced me even more that the war could be won -- and that it had to be won, for there was no other way. And this is what I told the President.
One of the President's first tasks after assuming office was to visit India. There, he met Prime Minister Manmohan Singh for a one-on-one discussion. Thereafter, I was called in to brief Premier Singh. I handed over a report containing my observations which detailed how the LTTE had abused the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) to recruit cadres, purchase arms and even train civilians for their 'Makkal Padai' ('Peoples' Force'). These, I said, were all signs that they were preparing for war. We even requested military assistance from India to counter this threat.
Of course, as the political head of the country, the President had to purse the democratic option first -- that of talking to the LTTE. But the President was very clear in his instructions to us: he would handle the negotiations in Geneva but the armed forces must be ready for war. They were to be two separate efforts.
I also proposed key changes to the armed forces. A crucial strategy was in appointing field commanders who could get the job done. In fact, I was instrumental in appointing General Sarath Fonseka as the Army Commander.
I recommended General Fonseka for the job as I believed he should have a chance to command the Army. My recommendation posed a problem for the President because General Fonseka's predecessor, General Shantha Kottegoda had two more years to serve and there was no reason to remove him from office. Nevertheless, the President accepted my recommendation and General Fonseka was appointed Commander of the Army in December 2005.
As he was appointed just a week before his fifty-fifth birthday, General Fonseka's tenure had to be extended every year by the President. This too led to difficulties when General Fonseka came up for his first extension in 2006. By then, the Geneva peace talks with the Tigers had broken down and slowly but steadily, the war had begun. But there was pressure on the President from various quarters not to extend General Fonseka's term of office as Commander.
I do recall former Chief Justice Sarath N. Silva calling me to his chambers and having a lengthy discussion on the matter. The then CJ suggested that I should not recommend an extension for General Fonseka as he claimed the General's actions had led to many injustices in the Army causing a lot of dissent and stated that General Fonseka had dictatorial tendencies which could be a threat to democracy.
"It is not necessary for you to have him, you can manage with another person," Silva advised. Many others, including government and opposition politicians and retired and senior serving military officers had the same sentiments.
Yet, I thought that changing the Commander of the Army in the midst of a military campaign was counter-productive. I personally carried General Fonseka's file to the President for his signature, on the very last day the extension could possibly have been given and the President signed it while having lunch.
Many also often ask me the question as to whether the suicide attack on me on December 1, 2006 strengthened my resolve to fight the war to a finish. The truth is that it was not an unforeseen event. At the Security Council, intelligence services had warned us of possible attacks on the President, me and the three service commanders.
The President responded by giving us bullet proof vehicles from his pool of vehicles. It is fortunate that I used a bullet proof vehicle that day -- or else, I would not be writing this today. It is also unfortunate that General Sarath Fonseka did not use his bullet proof vehicle on April 25, 2006 possibly because he was travelling within the Army Headquarters complex which he believed to be secure, in his soft skin vehicle.
Nevertheless, the attack on me was just another incident. It did not demoralise me; nor did it add courage or vengeance to my efforts.
As far as I was concerned, I was committed to end the war, anyway.
There were many ingredients to our success. I feel that the single most decisive factor was our decision to increase the strength of the military -- mostly the Army -- three-fold. When such a request is made, it obviously entails a significant burden on the economy; it is not simply a matter of paying the salaries of the additional troops; they need to be equipped with weapons and ammunition, their logistical needs increase and other administrative and organisational changes are needed in the long term.
There are also other political implications and many politicians would think twice about why the military was seeking to enhance its strength in this manner. But again, the President understood the need for our suggestion and he believed it was a fair request. Therefore the President's decision was made easier, and he readily allocated the necessary funds for this purpose.
I was in close contact with our ground commanders at all stages of the battle. This enabled me to process their requests quickly, sort out their logistical problems and at times, directly intervene to facilitate co-ordination between the different forces.
Meanwhile, in the military operations we engaged, our troops were pushing the LTTE back, destroying their strongholds and capturing vital terrain in the process. The Tigers resorted to delaying tactics, putting up a 'ditch cum bund' heavily fortified with mines in the areas they held. Eventually, a major clash erupted at Puthukuduirippu, which had them encircled.
By then, the Tigers had decided to adopt the strategy of taking civilians with them as they retreated and when they had been cornered to Puthumathalan, they had some 300,000 civilians who were being used as their 'human shield'. The international community, the United Nations and India were very concerned and we understood their concerns. The question uppermost on everyone's mind was how these civilians should be rescued.
For the government, it was a time to take crucial decisions. The military had to maintain its momentum to end the long lasting campaign as soon as possible. The end of thirty years of suffering was near because we knew that the top leaders including Prabhakaran were surrounded.
However, at the same time the government had to consider the safety of the trapped civilians. Elsewhere, India, especially Tamil Nadu, was sensitive to events here and their concerns had to be taken into consideration. Meanwhile, Pro-LTTE organisations were lobbying and putting pressure on the international community.
The President was firm in his decision that the offensive should continue. After conferring with him, we arrived at several decisions. We declared 'no fire zones'. We also adopted a self-imposed ban on air bombing, artillery and mortar fire whenever we were confronted with battle zones which were home to civilians. Our field commanders were very mindful of this and restrained themselves often.
Also, at every stage of the battle we made certain that food and medical supplies reached the trapped civilians through the World Food Programme, the Red Cross and the United Nations. In the last stages of the war, this could be done only through sea but we still did so, even if it involved a high risk to the military and even though we knew that some of the food and medicines we supplied invariably went to the LTTE.
We felt that the LTTE strategy was to try and prolong the conflict with the help of civilians under their control with the expectation that some in the international community would intervene on their behalf to ensure that their leadership survives, so that they could live to fight another day.
To try and foil this, we adopted a novel method. We opened up corridors in the battle zone so that civilians could flee to government controlled areas. Nearly all of them did and the whole world saw footage recorded from Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) which showed how the LTTE fired at and killed civilians trying to leave the battle zone. It was a major victory for us because thousands of civilians were evacuated in this manner-and also because the hypocrisy of the LTTE was exposed.
I do admit that it was a very difficult and complex operation. Often, wounded LTTE cadres would change into civilian clothes to cross over. There would be times when we had to hold fire to prevent civilian casualties.
I must remind all those who accuse us of shooting cadres crossing over with white flags that we at all times adopted a 'zero civilian casualty' principle, despite fighting an unconventional war with a terrorist group which adopted each and every method of warfare. By mid-May last year, I was fairly certain that the end was near for the LTTE. I was engaged in visiting every district to meet the families of servicemen in each region. On May 18, by a strange co-incidence, I was at Hambantota, my hometown.
Usually these meeting are conducted in an army camp but since this meeting was in my hometown, it was arranged at Medamulana, at our ancestral home. I then received a telephone call from the President and briefed him to say that the war would in all probability end that day. Close to noon, the President called back to say that the Army Commander, General Fonseka had said it probably could not be done within the day.
I however informed him that this was possible as the field commanders had assured me that the end was at hand. Later, the President was contacted by General Fonseka who had confirmed my prediction. It was on May 18 that the military recovered many bodies of top LTTE leaders after the final battle at Nanthikadal and they began the task of identifying the dead that day itself. It was also the day that there was some speculation that Velupillai Prabhakaran had been killed while trying to flee in an ambulance.
On the following day, May 19, I was attending a meeting of families of servicemen in the Galle district when General Fonseka called me. He carried good news: the body of Velupillai Prabhakaran had been found. It was on the same day that the President addressed Parliament, officially declaring the end of military operations and the capture of all territories previously controlled by the LTTE.
For some, questions remain such as the fate of Pottu Amman, the Tigers' intelligence chief and there are suggestions that he was not killed in the final battle. We do have credible information from extremely reliable sources that Pottu Amman was in the battle zone at Nanthikadal. We also know that he could not have escaped from the tight naval and military blockade that encompassed the area.
It is true that his body was never identified. But it is also true that this area of scrub jungle yielded dozens of bodies which could not be identified positively because they were in an advanced state of destruction. Therefore, Pottu Amman is certainly dead and it would be extremely naïve to believe otherwise.
Since the end of the war we have had some significant breakthroughs, the most notable among them being the capture of 'KP' or Kumaran Pathmanathan, the LTTE's point man in international relations and close confidant of Prabhakaran.
We know that KP was responsible for organising the arms procurement network of the LTTE and that in the two years that he was side-lined by Prabhakaran, the Tiger's supplies dwindled drastically.
However, they reconciled and in the last stages of the war, Prabhakaran re-appointed him to procure weapons. KP arranged for a final shipment but when the battle ended on May 18, the vessel carrying these arms dumped their cargo in the sea on May 20 and made a hasty exit.
We also know that Prabhakaran spoke to KP from Puthumathalan through an intermediary. Prabhakaran's son, Charles Anthony, spoke directly to KP just before his demise. After their deaths, KP anointed himself as the new leader of the LTTE and asked the Tiger diaspora to rally round him and pledged to re-structure the organisation. Therefore, I would rate capturing KP as being as important as killing Prabhakaran -- and that is not an exaggeration.
Now that the war is over, there are demands to relax the military controls in the North and East. In my opinion, that would be foolish. With an organisation as destructive as the LTTE, there are always bound to be some elements who would want to re-group and we must be wary of such possibilities.
I believe protecting our coastline should be a priority now. If our beaches were secured previously, the Tigers could not have smuggled in weapons in such large quantities and they wouldn't have grown in to the monstrous organisation that they were. Similarly the vast jungle terrain in the Wanni must be dominated -- it is this land that the LTTE exploited to the maximum during the early stages of its campaign to wage guerrilla warfare.
The Police must also complement this by adopting a different role. Police officers should speak the language of the region. They should cease to be the paramilitary force that they have been for the past 25 years and revert to their more familiar role of maintaining law and order. These changes require time, effort and most importantly, a change of attitude.
I hear a clamour for political reforms in the North and East and I understand and appreciate that. But I do also sincerely believe that priority should be given not to political reforms but to infrastructure development and attending to the other basic social needs of the people.
The people of the war-ravaged areas now need roads, electricity, drinking water, schools, hospitals and jobs much more than they need amendments to the Constitution. With the former, they can rebuild their lives which had been stalled for nearly three decades. Then, surely, the latter will follow.
In two days, we will be celebrating the first anniversary of our war victory. The victory parade will represent the formations of the final humanitarian operation. We hope to continue this as an annual event, in remembrance of the country's greatest victory in recent times. It is especially a victory for those people who lived in fear of the LTTE in the North and East and in the threatened villages bordering them. But what we must also remember is that this is not a celebration of the President, the Armed Forces, the government, a political party or of one particular community; this a celebration for every Sri Lankan.
As for my future plans, many ask me whether I would follow the footsteps of my brothers and take to politics. If I wanted to do that, I had the perfect opportunity at the April general elections but I declined.
Unfortunately, all my adult life I have been either a professional soldier or an expert in information technology and politics does not have any attraction despite growing up in a political family and being under the constant influence of my brothers. Politics, therefore, is most certainly not an option.
I do believe that I can do more as a public official -- just as I have done over the past five years. There are new challenges that beckon. Remodelling the military into a modern, thoroughly professional peacetime force is one of them.
The Urban Development Authority has now been attached to the Defence Ministry and that is an added challenging responsibility. And who knows, that could be as testing as fighting the most ruthless terrorist organisation in the world!
What is certain though is that saying 'yes' to the President's offer on that November morning five years ago has not been in vain.
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